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Abstract
Economic historians tend to focus on the contrast betweenmanufactur-
ing and agriculture to explain development gaps, underestimating the
increasing role of services that has been only marginally explored. This
study provides a long-term view on geographical localization patterns
of services in the USA during the 20th century, with a special focus
on the knowledge intensive sector. It expands the traditional debate
regarding the localization theory in the context of the service econ-
omy and provides a new dataset that delivers geographically accurate
results at the level of counties. The thesis adds new quantitative evi-
dence to the pre-existing literature on the service economy, showing an
increasing and disproportional agglomeration of skilled workers in big
urban areas that exacerbates the differentials between rural areas and
metropolises. This trend is statistically significant at the level of coun-
ties, and possibly overlooked if broader geographical units are used.
This evidence favors the New Economic Geography theory by showing
a causal, positively significant and increasing impact of market size
on the disproportional allocation of not only knowledge intensive ser-
vices, but almost any non-agricultural economic activity, pointing at
the incompatibility between increasing returns to scale and activities
requiring an intensive use of land. This impact seems to be simultane-
ously constrained by the failure of agricultural production, unveiling
that good preconditions for agricultural success prevent the develop-
ment of the service economy through the persistence of agricultural ag-
glomeration. This persistence however can be fought: evidence shows
that an external shock (i.e., a new university) will not only have a pos-
itive impact on the local economy, but also on nearby counties. More-
over, the local human capital shock positively affects the whole nation
while making foreign competitors worse-off. Results are persistent in
the long run, although the strength of these shocks dilutes over dis-
tance and time. Such evidence points to the service economy as being
the driver of regional gaps in the 20th century, effectively strengthening
its importance for local and national policy-makers.
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Figure 1: Landmarks in the history of the United States of America
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Part I
INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 1
The US and Economic Historical Geography in context
Motivation
During the last century, the United States of America achieved world leadership by
adapting its productive structure to international demand. This commercial suc-
cess has increased standards of living, but has created regional gaps as well, not
only between the nation and other parts of the world, but also within the country.
Many authors point at productivity and skill premiums as the cause of these re-
gional differentiations (see Autor et al. [2008] and Moretti [2012]). The study of
agglomeration and localization of production seems reasonable to explain growth
and development, trade or regionalism. As the origins of development gaps are
postulated to be found in the era of industrialization, the norm has been to study
the secondary sector in contrast with agriculture. More specifically, the ‘manufac-
turing belt’ has been the paradigmatic case for the analysis of employment con-
centration (Krugman [1991], Kim [1995], Crafts and Klein [2012]).1
1The same framework has been used to explain why some territories are more developed than
others within other countries, like Rosés [2003] and Maurel and Sedillot [1999], at a regional
level like Brülhart and Torstensson [1998] and even worldwide like Redding and Venables [2004]
and Ottaviano and Puga [1998].
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Manufacturing has become somewhat less important for developed economies:
Leading economies have progressively shifted their employment structure from
36-40 per cent of service production in 1890 to around 80 per cent in 2010 (Ta-
ble 8). However, the service sector has not been the subject of study until very
recently. Ciarli et al. [2012] defend the importance of Knowledge Intensive Busi-
ness Services as a source of growth in Europe and its localization close to big
markets. Furthermore, Moretti [2004, 2012] shows the relative increase of very
skilled service employees that have turned the manufacturing belt into a ‘rust belt’
by shifting the core of the US economy from the centre to the coast, close to the
biggest metropolitan areas. Figure 1.1, shows the percentile distribution of mean
income across US counties, revealing several facts about regional discrepancies in
2010:
1. The mean wage distribution is extremely unequal across counties: it ranges
from a minimum of $26,559 per year in Hancock (Georgia) to $109,405 per
year in New York.
2. The lowest income counties are concentrated in the centroid region of the
country. In fact, most counties above the 50th percentile ($44,391) are lo-
cated on the coast.
3. There are four prosperous hotspots across the US map: the west coastal re-
gion (California, Nevada andWashington that seem to have a spread effect in
Oregon, Wyoming and Colorado), the state of Florida and the former ‘man-
ufacturing belt’.2 These areas are not only characterized by high earnings
levels, but also by being the most populated regions during the 20th century.3
2According to Crafts and Klein [2012]: "the term ‘manufacturing belt’ has long been used to
describe the remarkable spatial concentration of industry in the United States that prevailed from
the third quarter of the 19th to the third quarter of the 20th century. ( ... ) states whose territory
is wholly or predominantly in the manufacturing belt are Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Maine Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin."
3Excluding Florida, whose categorization as a big city starts in 1930, the main cities of the
productivity hotspots belong to the either the US Census ranking of the 100th most populated
cities or to the Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMA) classification.
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Figure 1.1: Mean income per county, 2010
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Source: own calculations from America Community Survey (2010).
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This transition from successful manufacturing cities to highly skilled service
urban clusters in the biggest world economy motivates the analysis of industrial
localization and specialization patterns. There are more practical reasons that
make the analysis of the United States relevant. A major share of the empirical
analysis on spatial economics is based on the United States of America. Moreover,
the historical records provided by the US Census are very rich, and the big size
of the country and its compartmentalization provides not only an opportunity
to study the nation but also to undertake a more regional analysis of counties,
regions and cities that may not share institutions or legal frameworks. This layered
analysis allows for the discernment of different patterns to infer conclusions for
other countries, regions and even more local units of analysis (counties or cities).
The central premise is that service sector employees are distributed following
two trends:
1. Personal and distributional services are predictably allocated in proportion
to population, which justifies the low interest of academics in the empirical
analysis of this industry (Broadberry and Ghosal [2002]).
2. A high percentage of Knowledge Intensive Services is provided to intermedi-
ate consumers (firms) and are characterized by being storable. A relatively
higher knowledge intensity makes these services more interesting from the
empirical point of view: the easy spread of information involves externalities
on information-intensive sectors and attracts the overall economy in greater
proportions.
Economic Geography in the 20th century
Economic geographers seek an explanation to the concentration of the economy
at different geographical layers. The unequal distribution of the economy can be
approached from different perspectives, from the global North-South divide and
regional differentials in the core-periphery model to local clustering of competing
businesses and industrial districts to rural-urban growth processes and within-
country disparities. Such perspectives tend to yield general equilibrium results,
but are micro-founded in the sense that individuals and firms consider the costs
and returns of relative factor endowments, including transportation costs.
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The history of economic geography may date back to the inception of location
theory during the 19th century, but the recent efforts of well-known economists
like Krugman [1991], Combes et al. [2008], Fujita and Thisse [2013], and Epi-
fani [2005], who have formulated a theoretical base on the assumptions of in-
creasing returns to scale, have underscored the importance of the role of eco-
nomic geography in the wider discipline of economics. This trend has revealed the
complex multifaceted relationship between physical distance and economic activ-
ity (Rodríguez-Pose [2011]). The role of historical economic geography is much
more recent and limited. First, because economic historians, who tend to explain
contemporary differentials of economic growth based on past economic and social
causation, rely on cliometrics (past data to explain present outcomes) and require
the use of economic models that have been properly specified only recently. Sec-
ond, because it involves the participation of a rare breed of scholars who seek to
explain contemporary economic circumstances based on the past location of in-
dustries, effectively adding a new variable to the classical economic history view.
The traditional ‘what’ explains ‘how-much’ approach is extended by economic his-
torians by adding the ‘when’, and by geographical-economic historians by seeking
the ‘where’ to explain the ‘why’.
Economic historical geography is complex: social science merging the argu-
ments of economic geography and economic history to explain long-term geo-
graphical differentials at local, regional and global levels. Economic geography is
multidisciplinary: the discipline takes from international economics, development
economics and industrial economics to analyse different geographic trends.
The origin of location theory dates back to the school of German economists pi-
oneered by Von Thünenwho, using contemporary theories (Ricardian andMalthu-
sian rents theories), inspired the future of international trade and spatial and
urban economics theory by designing the model of the Isolated State in 1803
(Samuelson [1983]): a city surrounded by concentric circles of agricultural land
with different uses, and a linear distribution of productivities and rents that would
affect the free movement of labor and the price of manufactures and agricultural
products based on iceberg transport costs.
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As Samuelson [1983] pointed out, this early model already hinted at the con-
cept of increasing returns to scale leading to the agglomeration of population in
towns later defined by Marshall [1898], by which the agglomeration economies (a
big pool of labor, linkages and knowledge spillovers) overcome the dis-economies
or costs of living in congested areas (pollution, higher rents, commuting, etc.).
The tensions between Marshallian economies and dis-economies set the basis for
the further growth of cities and determined a landscape of several isolated states
including models that are no longer dual (agricultural and non-agricultural).
An extension from this self-sustained growth of cities came from the urban
economics field. Jane Jacobs [1970] proposed that cities attract laborers not only
because of agglomeration economies, but also thanks to the economies of diversifi-
cation that exacerbate the effect of size and diversity to the process of innovation.
In her view, the dynamism of big cities is expressed by the observation that good
ideas spread across different sectors. The more heterogeneous the city is, the fur-
ther it will grow. This process is, of course, self-enforcing.
The role of knowledge seems to be a persistent matter when determining the
disproportional allocation of population in geographical terms, leading to the re-
cent concept of the smart city by Glaeser et al. [1991], who envision the kind of
city that manages to obviate dis-economies of agglomeration, ensuring the growth
of the quality of life of its inhabitants (Shapiro [2006]). All these knowledge
spillovers are particularly relevant for the kind of goods that cities have a compar-
ative advantage in producing (high value services with low transportation costs),
which lead to even higher returns thanks to the so-called ‘death of distance’.
The founders of New Economic Geography (Fujita and Krugman [2003]; Ven-
ables [2001]) did not create a new theory, but managed to emphasize the role
of increasing returns by modelling it through a monopolistic competition produc-
tion function (Dixit-Stigitz, 1977) that escaped from the traditional constraints of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Many traditional economic ge-
ographers were offended by their intention to differentiate themselves, disputing
the novelty of their framework. As argued by Fujita and Krugman [2003], the nov-
elty was simply to revisit economic geography by providing a methodology that
was very well accepted by mainstream economics.
As is common in economics and science more generally, the complexity of ge-
ography leads scholars to make assumptions. As Marshall [1898] observed:
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"Economies of massive production are of many different kinds { . . .} each
of these different kinds has its own method of affecting both the national
and social issues in question."
Thus, different economies of scale must be analyzed with different strategies and
some criticize these as leading to biased results.
Oversimplification, however, may not be a problem if the strategy of analysis
is relevant for the nature of the clustering. As Fujita and Krugman [2003] argued
in their review of the discipline, international, urban and regional models are
based on similar assumptions, but may emphasize the relative importance of one
or another feature.
The core-periphery model is based on a simple two-factor, two-region and two-
sector model that evolves from the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin configuration used
in international economics including both product differentiation and transporta-
tion costs. One of the sectors produces at constant returns (typically, agrarian
products) and the other sector produces a range of differentiated substitutable
manufactures that consumers can choose from depending on the price they get
from the market and their location: this is the simple outline of increasing re-
turns. In this framework, the main constraint on mobility comes from the constant
returns sector that forces producers to stay close to the input (farmers to arable
land), pushing manufacturers away with a ‘centrifugal force’. The region that wel-
comes manufacturers grows even more thanks to the ‘centripetal force’ allowed by
the monopolistic power of their differentiated product. This design may lead to
two unequally distributed regions depending on the degree of transport costs, the
differentiation of the goods and the relative size of the manufacturing sector.
The evolution from the core-periphery dual simplification was achieved by im-
plementing the linear distribution of land across several manufacturing locations
surrounded by agrarian regions, exemplified by Von Thünen’s location model. In
this framework the thickness of the market, usually measured through Market Po-
tential (Harris [1954]), is what determines the relative strength of the pull and
push factors. An alternative class of models considers the possibility that exter-
nalities spread across firms within the same sector and not only within the firm.
This explains the formation of industrial clusters and requires a little bit more of
visibility in terms of industries.
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Although the models are different, they do in fact examine the same idea with
different assumptions. It may be limiting to rely on a single model that restricts
the ability to grasp all the facts relating to agglomeration. An examination of New
York can lead to many interesting questions in light of localization: why does New
York produce such a great amount of services? Are these provided to New Yorkers
or to the whole country? Why do most of the firms concentrate in Manhattan? Are
all the firms on the island producing the same kind of goods? Why does Brook-
lyn exist? Does this count as diversification? Why is the Bronx poorer than the
rest of the city? Can we find as many poor people as in Detroit? Or as in Valley
Falls (Kansas)? Can we compare this inequality with the one we find in Tijuana
(Mexico)? Recent models tend to overlap these views and show that both endow-
ment and agglomeration forces induce the patterns of specialisation and trade.
In particular, Epifani [2005] shows that the interplay between factor proportions
between trade partners and agglomeration forces explain the simultaneous rise
in production specialization and the fall in trade specialization experienced in the
last few decades. This view accords with the evidence that Yamamoto [2007] put
forth for the nested-regions nature view of American markets and posits evidence
in favor of the potential development spillover effects of local projects on regional
development (Pike et al. [2007]).
Economic historians are interested in economic inequality and development
gaps, evident from the perspective of urbanization and the city. The science that
explains the income gap between a city and a village seems to be able to explain
when the trend started with sufficiently good data and even why. Economic geo-
graphical history (or better said, new economic geographical history) may provide
yet a better answer. For example, one can envision the growth of New York as a
city of services thanks to the success of its port and the high income of its merchant
population (Glaeser [2005b]). This new science can provide insights into how to
improve our living standards, whether we live in a smart city, a declining urban
area or a village in a developing country.
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Outline
The previously mentioned productivity hotspots represent a greater percentage
of services in their labor distribution. The key question is whether the unequal
configuration of the market across geographical space has something to do with
economic fundamentals like relative factor quantities and prices and whether pol-
icy makers can do something to redistribute regional growth prospects. In order
to provide answers to these questions, I first describe the historical context of the
American economy. I present an extensive description of employment patterns
by county in Chapter 3 through which it becomes clear that the knowledge econ-
omy is behind the success of the American economy in the last century. Chapter
4 presents a model that determines the regional localization of knowledge clus-
ters, where it is shown that economic geography matters, but the pre-industrial
success of agricultural production and path dependency can have a great impact
on the contemporary configuration of unequal development. This, however is not
the ultimate result of a multiple-equilibrium model. As shown in Chapter 5, local
and regional policy-makers can find a way to counteract the equilibria reached
through economic fundamentals by changing the configuration of mobile factors
of production such as labor; I show that the share of skilled workers can expand
the local Production Possibility Frontier. Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
The turning of the US into a service superpower
"Ours are the only farmers who can
read Homer."
Thomas Jefferson, 1787
This chapter reviews the economic history of the United States during
the 20th century, emphasizing its development into a service economy. The
chapter first explores the country’s transformation from a land of equal op-
portunities into an unequal country through the role of institutions. It then
shows that unequal growth created long-run geographical inequalities. Fi-
nally, it argues that regional differentials are derived from specialization pat-
terns in urban service economies. Early US leadership might have been based
on natural resource abundance, but it was perpetuated thanks to a process of
socially constructed innovation through institutional, technological and orga-
nizational rules that expanded the American market nationally and interna-
tionally enabling economies of scale. Crucial as it is for manufacturing, the
proximity of markets has been key in preserving the leadership of the US in
the market for knowledge services over the last century.
JEL classification: N00, N72, O4.
Keywords: United States, Services, Growth.
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2.1 Introduction
Economic historians tend to explain the success of the United States as a history of
manufacturing, where vast natural resources and immigration justified the break-
through of mass production. This reasoning was persuasive when manufacturing
represented a fourth of the US economy. From the 1950s to the 21st century, how-
ever, the share of manufacturing in total GDP has declined to less than a tenth
of Value Added today, while the service economy accounts for more than half of
the Gross Value Added produced in the US today (Timmer et al. [2014b]). In this
course of events, economic historians should reconsider writing the history of the
United States as that of a pioneer of the service economy, reflecting urbanization
and human capital as the key ingredients of the success of mass production.
According to Glaeser [2005a] four factors fostered urbanization -and the rural-
urban breach- in the mid-19th century: increasing agricultural productivity, manu-
facturing technologies, transportation and the related rise of immigration. The re-
mainder of the chapter describes how the country became the engine of the world
economy by first explaining the transformation from a land of equal opportunities
to a state of unequal growth through the role of institutions; then, it explores how
unequal growth created long-run income inequalities, to finally show that these
gaps correspond to urban service economies. In sum, the transformation of the US
economy can be explained through the change of institutions, economic structure
and path dependency, but above all, this success results from the extraordinary
ability of the American labor force to exploit and transform available resources in
a successful way, termed ‘social capability’ by Abramovitz [1986].
2.2 Growth, productivity and institutions
US Census population estimates report a total count of barely 2,300 Europeans
and around twenty African slaves in the original colonies of the United States of
1620. The Virginia and Massachusetts bay areas met the requirements of English
investors: permanent locations had to be surrounded by water but far inland to
prevent possible attacks; the coastline had to be deep enough to tie ships at the
shoreline, and preferably unoccupied by a native population to avoid initial con-
flict. In Jamestown and Plymouth, population growth was faster than today’s; by
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1740 population had grown by a million even accounting for the devastating ef-
fects western diseases had on the native population. Overall, pre-revolutionary
population growth represented around 3.5 per cent per annum, while today pop-
ulation grows less than one per cent according to Atack and Passell [1994].
The intentions of colonizers involved mainly land exploitation and trade.1 The
economic performance of European colonies varied widely across the New World.
The colonies that later became the founder States achieved similar living standards
to their motherlandwhile theywere still colonies; other former colonies in the New
World are considered developing economies still today. Recent consensus points
to colonial institutions as the origin of the long-run divergence between Spanish,
Portuguese, and English colonies (Sokoloff and Engerman [2000]).
The initial prospects of the English were way too optimistic: more than half of
the early English colonizers died within a year, the expectation of the discovery
of large silver and gold deposits following the Spanish and Portuguese experience
were soon forgotten. Moreover, crops in the Newfoundland did not behave as
they had anticipated. The eventual discovery of tobacco reignited the commercial
interests of English settlers who pushed the vast frontier plantations to the limit.
However, output per capita was almost stagnant, growing at an average annual
rate lower than two per cent. In other words, the colonial economy was based on
extensive growth that was maintained in the long run through the different waves
of land acquisition reported in Figure 2.1.
American agricultural goods like tobacco, cotton and rice flooded international
markets, but the market value of these goods was sustained thanks to inelastic in-
ternational demand, low production costs due to economies of scale and cheap
slave labor ([Atack and Passell, 1994, Ch.2]), which ensured a high volume of
production. By that time, the first settlements (including New York and Boston)
became important port cities thanks to good water transportation conditions and
economies of scale. These allowed reasonable costs for distribution fostering pro-
gressive population growth that led to the paradigmatic dynamic metropolises
they became in the last century (Glaeser [2005a,b]).
1A few of the early colonizers were motivated to move to the New World to find religious free-
dom. These were later known as Pilgrims: English migrants in Holland that ended up moving away
from Europe in fear that the new Dutch life-style was spoiling their English heritage.
17
Figure 2.1: US inland territorial acquisition since British Colonies unification
Source: Divine et al. [2002].
As mentioned by Glaeser, agricultural productivity growth was one of the first
phases toward urbanization. Thus, population growth was partly driven by the
discovery of ‘cash crops‘. Initial settlers eventually became landlords and required
labor to extend their wealth. This demand for labor motivated relatively high
wages that attracted further Europeans even if they could not afford the cost of
the passage. Indenture contracts paid for the trip in exchange for their labor input
during a specified period. Additionally, the British slave trade reached its peak in
the 17th and 18th centuries, bringing a total of 2.5 million Africans to the Americas
from Sierra Leone and the Upper Guinea coast, mainly in the southern colonies,
where tobacco and cotton plantations were fruitful (Maddison [2001]).2
2Slavery was common in the southern states until 1863, when president Abraham Lincoln issued
the Emancipation Proclamation.
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By the end of the 1760s, trade had allowed second and third generations of
settlers to enjoy a gradual increase over subsistence production and generated an
initial income gap within the American population: New England consisted of a
modest elite of tenants and merchants who lived luxuriously and a middle class
of farmers and artisans who managed a modest but secure income. Decent social
prosperity fermented the germs of the Revolution through the profound disagree-
ment of the colonial population with British institutions such as the Navigation
Acts. These conflicts represented the tension between the needs of a fast grow-
ing economy and the effort of Great Britain to preserve its commercial power in
the 18th century. The ‘Patriots’ broke the link with colonial governments through
the control of Boston in 1775, starting an institutional reform that began with the
transformation of the Thirteen Colonies into independent States and the suppres-
sion of any form of European power.3 The draft of the Declaration of Independence
was unanimously adopted by the states marking the birth of a new nation that
called itself the ‘United States of America’.4
Consistent with the feudal legal framework still present in Europe, all English
colonizers were the King’s tenants on their land. European traditions of land trans-
fer rights were crucial for the natives, who had no custom of private property, but
only ‘occupancy’ rights. The colonial land was gradually crowded with settlers
with land rights that ensured perpetuity and inheritance rights to preserve out-
right ownership to latter generations of settlers. This granted relative equality
that contrasted with other European colonies where power was much more con-
centrated among privileged elites. According to Maddison [2001], institutional
and societal policies transmitted by different colonizers determined the remark-
able economic growth differential between the US and its neighbors: while Span-
ish colonies were mainly draining resources to the metropolis, the British colo-
nial regime imposed mercantilist restrictions on trade, but to a much lesser ex-
3The Thirteen Colonies included: New England (New Hampshire; Massachusetts and Maine;
Rhode Island and Providence; Connecticut), the Middle Colonies (New York; New Jersey; Pennsyl-
vania; and Delaware), the Southern Colonies (Maryland; Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky;
North Carolina; South Carolina; and Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi).
4The ‘Patriots’ were also known as ‘Rebels’ with different social backgrounds (intellectuals, mer-
chants, farmers). They were led by a well educated group of New England citizens, including
Statesmen like Thomas Jefferson who rebelled against British control. Their motto was ‘No taxa-
tion without representation!’ referring to the non-existent representation of their rights in Parlia-
ment. One of the first rebellions consisted of the organization of the Boston Tea Party, where they
dumped 45 tons of tea cargo from three British ships, unleashing the American Revolutionary war.
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tent. After unification, agriculture still engaged 90 per cent of the labor force and
trade constituted the main source of (‘Smithian’) growth until the early 19th cen-
tury, when the US withdrew from international trade with the contenders of the
Napoleonic wars (the French and British Empires). The effects of the ‘Jeffersonian’
embargo in 1807 reduced GNP by five per cent according to Irwin [2005]. This
collapse, together with the soil depletion that farmers were suffering, was critical
for the US economy, whose balance of payments did not recover until the 1830s
according to North [1961].
Figure 2.2: Per capita income of US with respect to the average of Great Britain,
France and the Netherlands, 1820-1929.
Source: Prados de la Escosura [2000].
Economic historians consider the 1830s the turning point, when the coun-
try pivoted away from agrarian production to industry, or the ‘take-off into self-
sustained growth’ (Rostow [1956]). Note that GDP per capita started to increase
with respect to British standards from 1860 onwards according to Figure 2.2. In-
tensive growth started with an increase in agricultural productivity which led to
a sharp decline of the agricultural labor force from 83 to 63 per cent from 1840
to 1880. According to David [1967], the surplus of agricultural workers was at-
tracted to higher productivity sectors: a light manufacturing sector (mill indus-
try) and a heavier manufacturing industry (mostly shipbuilding). Many others
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transferred to personal services or joined the sizeable merchant marine. Bairoch
[1982]’s data shows that total industrial production in US surpassed that of Great
Britain between 1880 and 1900. The United States took over British leadership
in manufacturing thanks to labor productivity growth in manufacturing activities
associated to natural resources (namely, mining and energy) that were relatively
more productive in the United States by the 1870s according to Broadberry [1998].
Table 2.1: Labor productivity in the secondary sector of the US and Great Britain
Sector 1870 1910 1929
Mining 103.1 162.0 248.9
Manufacturing 182.5 202.7 250.0
Construction 95.5 198.5 133.7
Energy 55.8 149.5 335.9
Great Britain = 100, Source: Broadberry [1998].
The role of comparative advantage seems crucial to the path of specialization
taken by the US. Wright [1990] estimated that natural resources were the biggest
source of comparative advantage from 1877 to 1940. On the eve of the Great War,
the USA was responsible for 95 per cent of worldwide production of natural gas
and 65 per cent of petrol extraction according to the records of the US Geological
Survey (Wright [1990]). The US held an advantage due to the amount and variety
of minerals they owned in a period where minerals were costly to transport and
crucial for manufacturing. However, David and Wright [1997] point out that US
supremacy was not the result of natural resource advantage because US produc-
tion was much higher than its share of world resources. Instead, it was a socially
constructed situation driven by the adoption of new technologies of extraction.
Wright [1990] also proved that the key was the incentive structure provided
by the exceptionally liberal mining law. The General Mining Act of 1872 formally
granted open access for exploration and exploitation rights subject to proof of
having discovered a mine, whereas in most countries the state held the property
of mineral resources.5 The initial expectations of first colonizers were finally met
5Prior to this Act, miners governed themselves informally. The distance and the small size of
exploitations avoided conflicts among miners. However, this situation changed with the first wave
of gold-diggers in 1849. Miner density grew and conflicts were recurring and violent. Eventually,
miners institutionalized mining towns, controlling and regulating access, exploitation, registry and
trespass deposits.
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when the Mining Act provided the incentives that prompted the ‘gold-rush’. In
1848, the number of gold-diggers increased from 5 to 40 thousand in a year to a
maximum of 100 thousand in 1852. In the process, gold diggers discovered other
useful minerals like copper and coal in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Indiana.
The success of mineral extraction led to the investment in mining education
that served to develop an engineering culture not present in the old continent.
Scientifically trained workers were crucial for the expansion of the knowledge of
mineral uses. The role of higher education and training was crucial to the metal-
lurgy revolution and, eventually, for technological advance.
The success of the mining industry also motivated the westward expansion of
the country: two weeks after James Marshall found gold in California, the USA ob-
tained the territories fromMexico. The expansion which led to the second take-off
phase of self-sustained growth resulted from the railroad diffusion to the Middle
West in the 1850s (Rostow [1956]). The investment needed to develop the rail-
road network was not only economic, but also institutional; coordinating the huge
flow of trains between the different geographical divisions was vital.
These institutional and organizational changes led to the reform of the US
entrepreneurial system into the more complex structure associated with manage-
rial capitalism. According to Chandler [1990], this structure diffused from the
pioneering railway companies to other sectors through the modification of tradi-
tional systems of business management. Railroad diffusion enabled cheaper trade
and increased specialization, driving the growth of other sectors and also increas-
ing productivity. Atack and Margo [2011] estimate that the effect of the railroad
accounts for an eight per cent increase in average farm productivity nationwide,
and the rest to actual transport cost reductions and specialization.
As Crafts [2010] points out, productivity increases were a consequence of cap-
ital deepening only until 1890. From the late 18th century onwards, Total Factor
Productivity represents 73 per cent of the increase in labor productivity, reaching
95 per cent in the period 1929-48. In the early 20th century, natural endowments,
labor and capital investments did no longer contribute to economic growth. In-
stead, skills, institutions, organizational improvements and the development of
general-purpose technology were at the heart of US economic growth. These can
be illustrated with the example of Taylorism and the development of electrifica-
tion put into practice in the biggest successful companies that provided industrial
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products at the beginning of the century.6 Skilled labor force was able and eager
to adopt and develop new technologies to increase production enabling a world
technological leadership backed by human capital so extraordinary that it became
‘the secret of the American success’ during the ‘Human Capital Century’ (Goldin
and Katz [2009]).
2.3 Regional inequality: mobility and urban growth
Sustained increases in GDP per capita travelled alongside most indicators of well-
being during the century. However, disparities have become larger over time.
Those with a previous advantage are better off today: Connecticut, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Maryland and New York rank at the top of income per capita; while
Mississippi, NewMexico, Arkansas, Utah and South Carolina remain at the bottom
of the distribution. There seems to be a geographical pattern among the richest
counties which correlates with early colonization. The US Census reports signif-
icant differences in the median levels of household income between those at the
North-East and West and those at the Midwest and South.
A large section of the literature deals with regional inequalities as a result of
regional specialization patterns. In the context of the United States, Crafts and
Mulatu [2005] show how factor endowments played a role in industrial location
decisions prior to the 20th century, these being usually determined by relative fac-
tor prices and a constrain force of fixed (immobile) factors. Where there was a rel-
atively large endowment of land, agricultural production was successfully adopted
generating a trend of path-dependence. However, the role of transportation is cru-
cial to trade, and the reduction in communications and transportation costs altered
the mobility and prices of labor and capital, changing the specialization patterns
of those which had no prior advantage. This change reversed the relatively higher
importance of factor endowments that lagged behind the size of the market for all
those industries enjoying economies of scale.
6David andWright [2003] point out that these advances ‘were not simply matters of technology,
but also reflected political and institutional changes that allowed utilities largely to escape regula-
tion by municipal, town and governments, facilitating the flow if investment capital into holding
companies presiding over centrally managed regional networks’.
23
Individual inequality has also increased since the 1940s. In the 1970s the top
five per cent of the population received 16.6 per cent of the income and the bottom
five per cent received a mere four per cent; today, the top receives around 22 per
cent and the bottom 3.4 per cent.7 Cross-industry comparisons show that individ-
ual inequality can also be explained through industry specialization. The return
to schooling was similar for blue and white-collar workers until the 1940s when
the supply of jobs that previously required no extraordinary skills before arose:
sales-personnel had to be able not only to sell, but also to explain the mecha-
nism and install radios, refrigerators, and later on, computers. Thus, counties
with a high share of skilled employment had attracted many more skilled jobs
by the 1980s, raising the wage differential between the skilled and the unskilled
(Moretti [2004]). The counties where knowledge intensive sectors clustered re-
ceived higher salaries.
The return to education was high at the start of the century, declined until the
1940s and increased again from the 1950-70s. The last quarter of the century
was marked by a slowdown in the rate of growth where post-graduate education
returns were markedly higher. This coincided with a period of modest economic
growth that was unequally distributed. Goldin and Katz [2009] show that the key
to this inequality comes from skilled biased technological progress that accelerated
the demand for highly skilled workers, in particular within the service economy
where capital and skills are complementary; this increase accompanied by the
slowdown of schooling trend has enlarged the gap.
The long-term tradition of mass higher education was at the heart of American
success until the 1980s, but technological progress has increased the gap between
rural and urban regions crowded with skilled labor; in particular, ‘smart cities’
or ‘knowledge hubs’ have proliferated since the 1980s, exacerbating the unequal
spread of growth. Specialization of the cities in skilled sectors matters; as Moretti
[2012] observes:
7Goldin and Katz [2009] report there was a narrowing of the wage structure during the 1940s,
termed the ‘Great Compression’. It was caused by the involvement in a world war, inflation, tight
labor markets, rising union strength and government intervention. The returns to education were
higher in 1914 that in 1939 according to their calculations, the decrease in the return coincides
with the expansion of education.
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"Today there are three Americas. At one extreme are the brain hubs - cities
with well-educated labor force and strong innovation sectors. They are
growing, adding good jobs and attracting even more skilled workers. At
the other extreme are cities once dominated by traditional manufacturing,
which are declining rapidly, losing jobs and residents. In the middle are
a number of cities that could go either way."
Again, the key behind this disparity comes from skilled biased technological
changes, which have clearly contributed to skill and skill premium gaps, and the
specialization patterns of counties reflect these in their aggregate average wages.
However, General Purpose Technology (GPT) has also had an impact on these
gaps. The effect is more subtle because GPT technology affects a large segment
of the workforce not particular to any firm or sector. GPT is relevant to overall
economic activity, being pervasive, omnipresent and quickly diffused and requir-
ing workers to adjust and reconfigure the workplace. Processes like electrifica-
tion, railway transportation and communications are considered examples of GPT
(Crafts [2004]).
Most of the efficiency gains from transportation developments were related to
a learning process and organizational changes rather than technological changes,
and these also required an effort from the labor force. Shepherd and Walton
[1976] show that in-port time was dramatically reduced thanks to organizational
improvements that allowed ships to spend less time loading and waiting thus lead-
ing to reduced shipping costs as a result of knowledge and skills acquisition by crew
members. On the contrary, navigational technology development was a long-term
process where high incentives were key to the development of new technologies.
According to North and Thomas [1989], it took more than two centuries for nav-
igators to find an instrument to calculate their precise position.
Advances in land transportation were even slower. The shift from horse trans-
portation to the railroad started in the north of England in 1826. However, the
evolution of land transportation was crucial for the integration of the American
economy. By the Great War, the USA had laid a million kilometers of railroad
tracks, representing half of the worldwide service. The network allowed the in-
crease of the geographical extension of the country and reduced the distance be-
tween urban centers. Mechanical refrigeration cars introduced in the 1870s en-
abled long-distance transport of fresh meat and dairy products by rail and sea, and
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improved the nutrition of many clusters of the population in the West. Maddison
[2001] explains that regular transatlantic shipping lines were not established until
the 1880s, when goods and persons could be moved from Liverpool to New York in
only 10 days. During the colonial period maritime transportation was the second
biggest sector (10 per cent of the labor force) in the US. The remarkable yearly
0.8 per cent average productivity growth in the shipping industry was important
to the overall economy. Transportation developments implied not only the move-
ment of high volumes of products in shorter time, but also the increased efficiency
of organization that led to wholesale storage cost reductions. Companies were
much bigger and de-localized; this required greater organization between compa-
nies, branches, divisions and local governments that took some time to implement
efficiently.
In the last three decades, the transport industry was prone to liberalization,
which fostered changes in the structure, performance, and quality of aviation,
trucking, railroads and ocean shipping industries. According to the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (2000) recent growth has provided unprecedented lev-
els of mobility and contributed to the enormous economic prosperity of the last
decade. Since 1975, passenger-miles of travel doubled, while transportation fatal-
ities and environmental impact have sharply declined.
The role of private transportation is even more important in terms of mobility.
In 1908, Henry Ford was determined to build a ‘car for the great multitude’. The
car was sold at $825 , but its price dropped to $572 by 1912 (average GDP was
around $1,800 per capita), and could be paid in different instalments. By 1927,
the FordMotor Company had sold 15millionModel-T cars. Other great companies
like Chrysler and General Electric were also flooding the market and increasing liv-
ing standards for the median consumer. The diffusion of the auto-mobile reduced
rural isolation and brought urban amenities and infrastructure to rural areas; it
changed the composition of cities and neighborhoods and promoted the prolifer-
ation of residential suburbs, allowing commuting between nearby towns. Conse-
quently, tourism-related industries, entertainment, lodging, accommodation and
public provision of highways and paved streets increased from the 1950s.
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As a consequence of the diffusion of the railroad network, the introduction
of the telegraph enabled long-distance instantaneous communication. By 1913
its role had been reinforced by the introduction of the telephone and the radio.
By 1960, 80 per cent of American households had installed a private line and
the gap was concentrated in southern states (Mississippi, Arkansas or South Car-
olina) where only half of households had access to a line. By the year 2000, only
two per cent of total households did not have an available unit installed. In the
1990s telephone communication became instant, wireless and cheaper. According
to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (2009), the number of regular tele-
phone line units grew by 88 per cent from the 1990 to the 2000s. The behavior of
wireless communications was even more astonishing: line subscribers grew at an
outstanding 1,972 per cent in the same decade (from 5 to 110 million users).
Advances in transportation and communications did not only impact the move-
ment of goods and services but also enabled the geographical transfer of mobile
factors (capital and labor). Cheaper passenger costs and time reductions of com-
munications changed migratory movements. European migrants were usually em-
ployed as unskilled labor in agriculture. The most dynamic industries (manufac-
turing, mining and managerial activities) were demanding high amounts of skilled
labor. This pattern led to a reduction in the salaries of the poorer domestic work-
ers, increasing the income gap between rural and urban areas.
O’Rourke and Williamson [2001] suggest that there was a regional trend
too. Migrants originally moved to expanding markets (big cities in North-Eastern
states). They suggest that migrant workers were cheap substitutes for domestic
labor. Thus, the massive affluence of migrants to big cities had a negative impact
on the urban salaries of the East coast. Overall, international migrations reduced
salaries by 15 per cent pushing domestic workers to move into less congested areas
in the West coast, further expanding the growth of the region.
In sum, internal factor movements were fostered by lower costs of transporta-
tion and communication and had an impact on previously lower populated towns
in the West coast. Factor movements reduced the urban gap and inequality be-
tween the East and the West. The structural change from agriculture to industrial
production arose in these states too, however, the shift was not proportionally allo-
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cated. The next section shows that the development of urban areas during the 20th
century was linked to the growth of the service economy, and in particular to the
knowledge intensive sectors, increasing the persistence of regional and individual
inequalities in the long run.
2.4 The service industry
As mentioned above, the role of the manufacturing sector was central to the evo-
lution of the country from the 1840s. However, the growth of the service economy
was not sudden, but it rather grew steadily with income per capita as well.
’Despite all the media attention given to de-industrialization and the
emergence of a service economy in recent years, history reveals that the
service sector, in fact, has also grown fairly steadily following two notable
declines, the first immediately following the Revolution, the second follow-
ing President Jefferson’s embargo of foreign trade in 1807. In particular,
retail trades, financial services, and the like grew specially rapidly with
spreading urbanization especially from 1910s.‘
In fact, Atack and Passell [1994] regard the growth of the service economy as
a necessary condition for urbanization. In the 1700s, merchants were the main
service occupations, but it was already the second biggest sector in the American
economy. Trade, utilities and communications are generally correlated to the size
of the market, as they support the functioning of the economy by reducing trans-
action costs. In general, highly populated areas have a bigger share of workers
devoted to finance and commerce.
On the other hand, the clustering of the innovation sector is randomly dis-
tributed across different cities in the North-East and the West, whereas traditional
manufacturing industries tend to be tied to the location of natural resources. Thus,
oil industry clusters are necessarily located close to large oil reserves (Texas, Alaska
and Louisiana) and wine producers locate where the climate is propitious (Cali-
fornia). On the contrary, the service economy is everywhere, supporting oil, wine,
and knowledge intensive sectors.
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According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (2009), California and
New York account for 21 per cent of total GDP, devoting most of their product to
Financial and Real Estate Services and Professional and Business Services. These
sectors together represent 28 per cent of total US GDP, implying that most of these
services are produced by these states. Krugman‘s index measurement of relative
specialization shows that, on average, counties becamemore diversified until 1980
but more specialized by the 2000s using different classifications (ranging from 3
to 10 industries).
The key to the recent regional specialization comes from the patterns of growth
across sectors. Traditional manufacturing and agriculture have shrunk, but sec-
tors based on information and technology have been increasing steadily over the
century. Moretti [2012] estimates that the number of jobs in the Internet sector
reached around three million. The sector grew more than 634 per cent from 2003
to 2013 (not including Internet-related jobs outside the high-tech sector, like the
delivery of on-line purchases). Although these technologies benefit the growth of
most sectors, these seem to be produced in innovation clusters located in big cities
across the North-east and the West. The reason for this random clustering close to
crowded cities such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco seems
to be related to the size of population. In other words, big cities are specializing
in knowledge intensive service sectors, becoming larger and attracting skilled and
unskilled workers from smaller cities. As a result, workers from small cities are
abandoning their home-towns in fear of becoming part of the rural US. County
inequality is increasing, although big metropolitan areas in the upper tail of the
distribution are becoming more equal among themselves (Desmet and Fafchamps
[2004]).
When the economy specialized in manufacturing, it did so at the expense of
agriculture rather than services. In fact, the service economy continued its stable
path of growth with the development of managerial and distribution activities. An
obvious impact of these new technologies on the service economy is the ‘distribu-
tion revolution’. By the 1850s, wholesale traders were substituted by malls, like
Macy’s, that offered greater varieties of goods. The retail distribution of clothing,
and home-ware utensils began in the biggest urban areas like Boston and New
York in the 1860s and in Chicago, Washington and San Francisco later. The role of
postal shipping was also important for the distribution of goods and grew at the
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beginning of the century before markets grew in larger towns and the auto-mobile
was spread across the population. Nevertheless, the transportation and communi-
cations revolutions proved fundamental for the rest of the industries, needed for
the development of mass production as explained by Rostow [1956]. The Inter-
net and the aircraft have expanded markets and decreased distance even further.
In the last few decades, however, the demand for individualized products has in-
creased in particular segments of the market.
Thus, manufacturing companies grew substantially and became geographically
dispersed, increasing coordination and information networks even at a multina-
tional level. The large amount of data drove the increased presence of white-
collar jobs and women’s entry into the labor market (in 1930 around a half of
white-collar jobs were occupied by women, according to the US Census records).
With the development of professional occupations, companies became more cen-
tered on the research and design of new products, while manufacturing activities
were increasingly outsourced to other countries. This was part of the shift from
manufacturing to the service economy and had unequal consequences across re-
gions: while Silicon Valley becamemore prosperous, Detroit started a rapid decline
phase.
Furthermore, a sizeable share of the tertiary sector comes from personal ser-
vices, increasing with income per capita, which was the case at the time. From
1950s however, the role of the service economy becomes much more relevant
thanks to the start of the modern office and the development of non-market busi-
ness services (Broadberry and Ghosal [2002]). The development of manufacturing
led to unprecedented growth in the US that accelerated the development of the
financial system.
According to Maddison’s data, by 1913 the United States operated closest to
the technological frontier. Between 1913 and 1950 TFP grew by 1.6 per cent a
year, more than four times as fast as the TPF achieved by Britain from 1870 to
1913. The second half of the century has accelerated the divergence between
the US and Europe. This was partly an effect of several conflicts that destroyed
European infrastructures and the relative inland peace of the USA, and partly
because USworkers remainedmore productive. During the first half of the century,
TFP growth was unpredictable, uneven and related to general purpose technology
(electrification). Bakker et al. [2015] show that TFP accounted for 28 per cent
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of growth whereas labor quality had a much higher contribution than expected.
The productivity of entertainment industries grew at similar levels than the most
dynamic manufacturing sectors and represented a big share of Value Added in the
first half of the century.
Communications increased the size of these markets as well as any industry
where information was a key input. Thus, the financial sector became very dy-
namic, increasingly skilled and worthy of a fourth of the Gross Value Added of the
US economy in 1976 (the same as manufacturing) and almost 40 per cent in 2009
(Timmer et al. [2014b]).
Financial services have increased as a result of both the increase of economic
activity and the development of general purpose technologies like computers. Ac-
cording to David andWright [2003], the extent of ‘computerization’ for the service
economy in the 1980s was roughly comparable to the degree of electrification of
manufacturing at the beginning of the century. By the 1980s, technological ad-
vance wasmuchmore common in sectors operated by very skilled employees, lead-
ing to the skill-biased development of technology, Goldin and Katz [2009]. This
way, a society with a highly skilled labor force had better chances of maintaining
its leading position.
2.5 Conclusion
This brief review of the 500 years of American economic history has shown that
the central element behind the supremacy of the US over the last century has been
human capital. Comparative advantage in natural resources may have helped at
the initial stages of development, although most of the productivity enhancements
have occurred thanks to a big homogeneous market and a skilled labor force.
This chapter has assessed the role of manufacturing as a crucial episode in the
economic history of the United States. However, key to its transition from the
agrarian stage to its world supremacy has been the huge effort to foster innova-
tion. Regardless of a contemporaneous decline in the rate of school completion,
schooling differentials have accelerated the income gaps between professionals,
between industries and consequently, between regions. Despite living in one of
the quintessential clusters of knowledge services in the world during the 1950s,
Rostow, a famous economic historian whose ideas were clearly capitalist, could not
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yet envision the impact of the service economy. When he developed his famous
non-communist manifesto describing the stages of economic growth, he postulated
that ‘the United States of the 1840s and 1850s had been preparing for industrial-
ization since the 1790s, at the latest’. In this light the history of the United States
should be re-told as a story of knowledge and skills. Perhaps, the view of the
United States as an industrial country should be re-written as that of an economy
that had been preparing itself to be the leader of knowledge services since 1880
at the latest.
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CHAPTER 3
From farmers to designers: long-run evolution and
localization of services. USA, 1930-2010
Economic historians have extensively studied the contrast between manu-
facturing and agriculture to explain development gaps. However, the increas-
ing role of the service sector has only been marginally explored. This chapter
provides evidence on the service economy using a brand-new series of concen-
tration. In accordance with the scarce available evidence, this chapter shows
that 20th century service employees have been more proportionally allocated
than non-service employees. However, during the last few decades knowl-
edge intensive sectors have been agglomerating more than proportionally in
big urban areas and have even managed to overcome some manufacturing
industries thanks to technological advance. These conclusions suggest that
knowledge services might induce contemporary development differentials.
JEL classification: L8, N72, R12, O18.
Keywords: New Economic Geography, Agglomeration, Service Location, U.S. Counties.
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3.1 Introduction
Until very recently, economic historians have tended to use the contrast between
manufacturing and agriculture to explain development gaps, thus ignoring the ser-
vice economy. The proportional distribution of traditional services justified over-
looking this part of the economy leading to potential imperfections in economic
theory. Recent technological changes have increased the share (Figure 3.1) and
value (Figure 3.2) of skilled service employment in most developed regions, trig-
gering a growing interest in the service economy. Using a new dataset this chapter
shows that overlooking the service economy leads to erroneous theoretical over-
simplifications with respect to localization. Services have been increasingly ag-
glomerating in urban areas, driven mainly by highly skilled employment. In con-
trast with the traditional understanding, the allocation of service employees is not
related to population; results show that the distribution of knowledge intensive
services is highly disproportional and has even managed to overcome some tradi-
tionally localized manufacturing industries. The disaggregated analysis of narrow
geographical scales such as counties instead of states or countries generates sub-
stantial information that changes the conclusions of traditional economic models.
Figure 3.1: Employment shares by sectors
Source: Timmer et al. [2014a].
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This chapter presents a new long-term series of concentration patterns by sec-
tor across the 20th century using county employment data of the United States.
This new series describes the localization trends of employment by placing empha-
sis on the service sector. With this purpose, I propose an examination of three di-
mensions that affect the agglomeration of employees and economic activity: path
dependency, geographical conditions and industrial linkages.
Initially, path dependency describes the mechanism by which counties with
a relatively high initial proportion of knowledge intensive workers attract more
skilled employment. Geographical conditions might affect both demand and sup-
ply of employment. Regarding supply, factor price differentials foster mobile fac-
tors like labor and capital to move where returns are higher (hence, attracting
more workers to urban areas). Second, the Economic Geography argument pos-
tulates that firms allocate close to demand, with big urban areas providing bigger
markets and attracting new firms. Lastly, industrial linkages might promote lower
production and transaction costs both to providers and potential customers. These
three dimensions help explain the patterns of localization of new high value firms
in cities that seem to be fostered by the initial endowment of a knowledge econ-
omy.
Figure 3.2: Contribution to Gross Value Added by sectors
Source: Timmer et al. [2014a].
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My results confirm that manufacturing and agriculture tend to allocate more
disproportionately than the service economy and that this disproportion tends to
occur in large regions endowed with good natural conditions. The service indus-
try, on the other hand, seems to be more dispersed and its mild disproportions
are only perceptible at smaller scales (counties). However, the service sector has
become more concentrated in the long run. According to these results, the ser-
vice economy is more path-dependent than spatially correlated to the neighbors,
at least at the county level. However, industrial linkages also seem to determine
an important part of the cross-sectional differences. On the one hand, traditional
services provided directly to the final consumer (Personal Services, Utilities and
Trade) are generally distributed in proportion to population; however, Knowledge
Intensive Services (usually supplied to businesses) concentrated in particular re-
gions through the century and drove the overall service sector (and the aggregate
economy) to localize in cities more than proportionally through a multiplier ef-
fect.1
The chapter is structured as follows, after this introduction, I explore the trends
of sectorial allocation using an inequality indicator analogous to the Gini Index
defined by Krugman [1991]. Then, I identify where the disproportion occurs and
show how certain counties affect the employment distribution of their neighbors
through spatial correlation, and how specialization in agriculture prevents or ham-
pers the entry of alternative sectors. I finally summarize the main conclusions of
this descriptive analysis.
3.2 Literature review
Although the benefits of specialization were already highlighted by classical
economists in the late 18th century, data on the location of firms were not even
gathered until 1860 when the US Census Bureau published statistics of workers
per industry and state. The next available document on this issue is a monograph
1Also known as Knowledge Intensive Business Services (KIBS), as Ciarli et al. [2012] denote them.
In this investigation, these are simply referred as Knowledge Intensive Services because their main
characteristic is the relatively high human capital and information input instead of the kind of
consumer.
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on industry shares in the US published in 1900.2 More recently, a number of pa-
pers have analyzed the trends of concentration and specialization during the last
century and conclude that, overall, the 19th century was a period of greater special-
ization and concentration while the 20th century fostered de-specialization. These
studies identify transport and information cost reductions as the main drivers of
the trends.
Among others, Kim [1995] and Krugman [2009] demonstrate that non-service
sectors have traditionally been more concentrated. However, they explain that
both service and non-service employees have become increasingly agglomerated
over time. In the same line, Desmet and Fafchamps [2004, 2006] observe that
these traditional patterns hold during the period 1972-2000, when total employ-
ment has become more unequally distributed. They suggest that, in the last few
decades, non-service employees have spread out while service employment has
become more concentrated in urban areas, creating a divergence in the distribu-
tion of employment across counties. Overall, recent research argues that services
are driving the dynamics of aggregate employment in the United States.
Those that defend the role of factor endowments rely on neoclassical trade
theory. More specifically, the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) framework deals with factor
prices based on initial endowments: space is heterogeneous and creates produc-
tion cost differentials. The introduction of relative measures based on opportunity
costs implies efficiency gains if nations produce and trade only what they can pro-
duce at a lower relative opportunity cost (David [1817]). This premise implies
that even with no absolute advantage, any region can benefit from specialization
in a good that has a lower opportunity cost. Regions with access to natural en-
dowments will tend to specialize in the primary sector. With high transport costs,
these regions will also attract manufacturers whose production is intensive in these
raw materials. Production that is intensive in the use of mobile factors (labor and
capital) will move elsewhere (intuitively, where there is a labor advantage). Kim
[1995] defends the role of comparative advantage but accepts that it is not the
only explanation. He finds that resource allocation explains the cross-sectional
variation in localization but accepts that time variations can be explained by the
size of demand.
2There were several previous census-like publications of manufactures and workers (1810).
These were mere enumerations and only the ones published from 1850 would be used for later
long-term statistics.
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Accordingly, more recent research points to increasing returns and market size
as the key behind allocation. When producing at Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS),
any increase in inputs leads to a more than proportional rise of output. IRS can be
originated from external economies of scale, through synergies from the interac-
tion with other agents.3 Particularly, the so-called Principles of Economics formu-
lated by Marshall [1898] explained that industries benefit from locating close to
peers, providers and big labor markets - that is, close to big urban areas.4
A complementary view was probably inspired by the ageing of the mass pro-
duction model during the 1960. Jacobs [1970] argued that the key to exter-
nal economies was industrial diversification rather than specialization. In this
sense, a diverse society tends to grow further by applying the success formulas
‘between rather than within industries’ (Glaeser et al. [1991]). In sum, Jacobian
externalities suggest urban clustering promotes growth through diverse knowl-
edge spillovers. This reasoning fosters industries not to cluster among peers but
to distribute close to distinct industries. In a multilevel analysis the key is how to
define what different industries are: the question is at which interaction level of
the Industrial Classification are external economies created.5
In any case, both views imply that being close to large sources of local demand,
peers (diverse or similar) and pools of labor- that is, being close to the market-
provide lower costs of production and thus higher profits for firms based on exter-
nal effects. However, being close to the market also involves higher competition
that may lead to the reduction of the effects of agglomeration economies: disper-
3IRS can also be internal to the firm. This occurs when fixed costs are big relative to variable
costs. Firms that operate at IRS have a decreasing unit cost. Therefore, the greater the market
access, the higher the profit. Utilities and knowledge intensive services are generally examples of
high fixed and low variable costs. In this context it is crucial to understand the trade-off between
transport costs and IRS: if fixed costs were zero, firms would allocate in proportion to the market
size to reduce delivery costs; if transport costs were zero a sole plant could manage to supply the
entire market. In the real world, a plant provides consumers within a certain radius that depends
on transport costs and the intensity of IRS. The debate of IRS from internal economies is also
present in this investigation, because it considers the geographical allocation of workers ignoring
whether they work in different competing firms or in a monopoly situation.
4External economies tend to be summarized as 1) a greater pool of skilled labor and, thus,
lower labor costs, 2) the possibility to favor from spillover effects as information flows easily in
crowded areas and 3) decreasing costs from providers thanks to competition in large markets.
5ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) and NAICS (North American Industry
Classification System) classify industries at several levels (Sections, Divisions, and Groups). The
level at which Jacobian externalities operate is crucial. For instance: Section: M - Professional,
scientific and technical activities > Division: 72 - Scientific research and development > Group:
721 - Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering
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sion economies or agglomeration dis-economies. Desmet and Fafchamps [2004]
support the Jacobian hypothesis by arguing that the upper-tail of employment
distribution has converged (i.e. cities are becoming more equal) but the whole
distribution across counties has become more unequal, diffusing most of the ser-
vice economy to nearby cities and creating an urban-rural dichotomy.
Krugman [1991, 2009] summarized the framework of the New Economic Ge-
ography (NEG) theory, which by allowing Increasing Returns to Scale into the mo-
nopolistic competition model, reveals that industry localizes according to the size
of the market. However, several papers -including Helpman and Krugman [1985]
- argued that this theory can co-exist with traditional economic thought. In fact,
even those who dismiss the criticisms made by NEG test their theory against both
possibilities finding some evidence for the mixed model.
One of the main contributions to the literature on the localization of industry in
the United States is Crafts and Klein [2012] who show that economic geography
was more relevant than factor endowments to the existence of the manufacturing
belt. Natural advantages played a role in industrial location decisions during the
previous century but technological advance lessened the importance of natural
advantages over time.
In general, results are influenced either by the choice of industries (which is
either too broad or entirely focused on manufacturing), or by the unit of anal-
ysis (usually too big: states, regions or cities) leading to biased results. Ellison
and Glaeser [1999] observe that the importance of resources is usually underes-
timated. Together with Dumais et al. [2002], they find that natural advantage
explains about 20 per cent of the concentration of industry. However, their results
prove that access to a big market is more important than the presence of sup-
plies when the study is performed by county, leading one to question the choice
of geographical scales of analysis (cities, counties or regions).
Ellison and Glaeser [1999] also observe that employment concentration mea-
sures do not take into account the correlation of number of plants with employ-
ment concentration. That is, by using these measures one might mistakenly con-
clude that agglomeration economies motivate firms to concentrate when it could
actually be about a monopoly situation. Acknowledging the difficulty of finding
these kinds of data for long term analysis, Maurel and Sedillot [1999] use a prob-
ability model to measure the probability that firms locate away from the random
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distribution. Furthermore, Duranton and Overman [2005] discard the discrete ge-
ographical classification in which scholars in general do not agree upon, and base
their research on a continuous actual distance between plants approach. Applying
this to a long-term analysis is hard given the thoroughness of the data requirement.
Taking into account this available evidence and its shortcomings, this investi-
gation takes into account possible biases that scholars may have suffered exploring
manufacturing through the methods explained in the next section. Using a disag-
gregated geographical scale over the complete geographical distribution across all
the sectors in the economy aggregated at an adequate industrial level provides a
proper description of the patterns of localization of the service economy.
3.3 Empirical framework
3.3.1 Methodology
Relying on the previous literature, this research is based on the analysis and con-
struction of employment distribution shares and concentration indicators based on
industry and county employment data for five benchmark years. In particular, I
use Locational Gini coefficients on employment data by sectors following Krug-
man [1991] as an indicator of geographical inequality by industry to show the
geographically disproportional allocation of employees.
Locational Gini coefficients are analogous to traditional Gini coefficients of in-
equality: its value ranges from zero (showing a perfectly spread distribution) to
one (showing perfect disproportion). These inequality measures are both derived
as the area between the perfect proportion line and the (Locational) Lorenz Curve.
The Locational Coefficient version differs from the conventional Gini by taking into
account that individuals (in this case, counties) differ in population size. Thus,
Locational Gini Coefficients analyze the mismatch between the employment allo-
cations with the national share of that industry in total employment, measuring
the difference of the allocation with national proportions.
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Figure 3.3: Mining Lorenz curve, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
Take Figures 3.3 and 3.4 that show the curves for 1980 data on Mining and
Health Services industries respectively as illustrations of a localized and a spread
sector respectively. The areas between the Locational Lorenz Curves and the 45-
degree straight lines represent the Locational Gini coefficients. As shown by these
Figures, the Locational Gini coefficient for Mining employees is bigger than the
coefficient for Health Service employees, in accordance with the traditional argu-
ment that services tend to spread in proportion to population size. These results
are persistent in all benchmark years as confirmed by the decomposition of Gen-
eral Entropy indexes of state employment shown in Figure 11 in the appendix.
Note as well that both sectors show more localized employee distributions for
counties than for state observations. This finding reveals that broad scales bias
part of the localization effect of industries, where the size of the fault for spread
sectors is relatively bigger than for concentrated industries, leading to misleading
conclusions in the case of traditionally spread sectors such as the service economy
and utilities.
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Figure3.4:HealthLorenzcurve,1980
Source:owncalculationsfromUSCensusdata.
Informationonconcentrationonlyshowsonesideofthecoin:howgeographi-
calydisproportionalisthealocationofemploymentbyindustry.Thesamedata,if
properlyarranged,alowsthemeasurementofacomplementarypieceofinforma-
tion:regionalspecialization,whichshowshowdisproportionalydevotedtoanin-
dustryisthelaborforceinacounty.6Asimplewaytopresentthistwo-dimensional
informationisbyusingHoover’sindexofconcentration,whichmeasurestheinten-
sityofdisproportionofworkersinanindustryperareaandiscomparableacross
thewholecountryandindustrialclassification.Formaly:
Lir=(Eir/Ei)(Er/E) (3.1)
Where,Eiristotalemploymentinindustryiforregionr;Eiistotalemployment
forindustryiforthetotalofthecountry;Eristhetotalofemploymentinregion
r;andEthetotalemployedinthecountry.
6Formoredetails,seeAigingerandDavies[2004].
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This index measures whether the proportion of workers of an industry in a re-
gion is proportional to the participation of that area in the overall production of the
country. This indicator is lower bounded at zero; a value of one indicates perfect
proportion whereas a lower value suggests a less than proportional allocation, and
a greater value signals a higher disproportion. It serves as an indicator of the labor
advantage participating in an industry in each county in comparison to national
shares. Thus, it provides an observation per county instead of a summary value
for the whole region. Maps are a useful tool to present the information provided
by these Location coefficients effectively and help identifying whether there is a
geographical pattern of areas attracting a greater than proportional amount of an
industry.
Subsequent sections of the chapter rely on these observations to analyze the
long-run geographical distribution of employees by sector. These will show the
evolution of the economy, labor force and regional development patterns over the
period 1890-2010.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Data collection
The longitudinal panel data set consists of more than 12 thousand observations of
employment data by industry. Observations have been taken for five benchmark
years (1890, 1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010) in order to capture the effect of the
milestones of the history of the United States of America on employment patterns
but still allowing a manageable set of data. The sample includes all the counties
in 50 states (a total of 3,189) and 15 industries.7
7In several occasions Hawaii and Alaska data are missing. The maps used to represent results
will not represent these two states in order to provide a more comfortable visual idea. However,
the data will be used when possible for calculations.
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The main sources for the data are derived from different publications of the
US Census Bureau: Housing and Population Censuses (11th, 15th, 17th and 20th),
County Business Patterns (2010) which provides sub-national data classified by in-
dustry (number of establishments, employment, payroll...) and Agricultural Cen-
suses from 1980 and Craig and Weiss [1998] estimations from the year 1890.
Given the heterogeneity of these sources, building this dataset has implied an im-
portant work of homogenization to allow for a comparison across industries.8
The US Census Bureau’s reports are very rich in the quality of geographical
data. They provide several aggregations: by census regions and divisions, political
units (states, districts, congressional districts, counties...), rural-urban classifica-
tions and several statistical methods. A key criticism of the current literature is that
most authors use unsuitable geographical units. Krugman [1991], Kim [1995]
and Crafts and Klein [2012], among others, have studied industry agglomeration
of employees by state. Later, Kim and Margo [2004] presented results by region
and others chose countries as a geographical unit (Davis and Weinstein [2003]).
Using these units, Crafts and Klein [2012] and Krugman found evidence of ex-
ternal economies determining localization, due mainly to the detailed nature of
their industrial scope. A possible explanation of Kim’s findings is that the choice
of broad geographical scales ignores the subtle effect of external economies that
occur at a local level.
Alternatively, some scholars propose using smaller geographical units like cities
or urban areas; however this choice leads to the use of scattered non-randomly se-
lected data that ignores equally important information: de-localization. The study
of urban areas performed by Ellison and Glaeser [1999] or cities by Glaeser et al.
[1991] neglects the effects of availability of natural resources in rural areas and
ignores the lower tail of the distribution of certain sectors -including agricultural
producers-, obtaining biased results. Moreover, the discrete use of areas instead of
a random selection covering the whole country permits a proper study of regional
specialization but a very poor analysis of industrial concentration; this leads to
8Check the Appendix for more information on the data collection process.
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poor results in the analysis of industrial disproportion. Similarly, the choice of
SCSA or SMSA would leave small cities and rural areas out of the model as well
and is thus unconsidered although the comparison of SMSAs and the localization
of certain industries might be interesting to find an urban pattern.910
In Marshall’s words:11
"Economies of massive production are of many different kinds: some are
cosmopolitan property, some are national, some are local, and some be-
long to individual firms: each of these different kinds has its own method
of affecting both the national and social issues in question."
Acknowledging this possible bias, some authors like Ellison and Glaeser [1999]
found that results differ when the geographic unit is changed; this finding moti-
vated the development of a model to explain differences in productivity at two ge-
ographical levels. More specifically, Ciccone and Hall [1996] explain that produc-
tivity differences across states are explained by employment patterns by county.
They argue that capital is important for the state differential but that IRS are key
for local gaps. For them, agglomeration can be decomposed into national, state
and county effects. Kim and Margo [2003] admit that the patterns that hold at a
regional level may not hold for smaller local areas. Therefore, analyzing agglomer-
ation taking into account the different geographical perspectives makes for a more
complete outline of industry concentration.
Under the premise that external economies could be overlooked if the unit of
analysis is too broad, the main geographical unit used in this investigation is the
county. However state boundaries and standard Statistical Metropolitan Areas
(SMA) are also considered for comparative purposes.12 This preference creates a
9The same problem occurs in scholarly articles where the units of analysis are cities, like Kim
[1998, 1999] Nelson [1955] and Glaeser et al. [1991], Ellison and Glaeser [1999] who even try
to perform an analysis by collecting data at firm level instead.
10SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) comprise one or more counties around a cen-
tral urban area of more than 50 thousand inhabitants and a total of at least 100 thousand inhabi-
tants. Standard Consolidated Statistical Areas (SCSA), which are composed of two or more close
SMSA with a combined population of one million.
11Alfred Marshall (1919), Industry and Trade, pp.96.
12Note that using county data permits obtaining the classification by state at almost no cost.
These data are presented as well with the purpose of comparison.
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sample size increase from 52 (states) to 3,139 (counties) observations per indus-
trial group. Although more observations offer greater accuracy, they come at the
cost of a lower manageability of the dataset. As previously explained, the employ-
ment data used in this project have both a geographical and industrial dimensions.
The ultimate sample would contain the most detailed level of both industrial
classification and geographical layers. Nevertheless, NAICS classifies industries
with a disaggregation up to six levels.13
Table 3.1: Industrial classification by sector
Primary Sector
Agriculture
Forestry and fisheries
Mining and Quarrying
Secondary Sector
Construction
Manufacturing
Tertiary Sector
Utilities
Transportation and Warehousing
Telecommunications
Utilities and sanitary services
Trade
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Personal Services
Repair services
Private households
Hotels and lodging places
Entertainment and recreation services
Health Services
Education
Other Personal Services
Organizations
Finance, insurance and Real Estate
Knowledge Intensive Business Services
Business services
Professional Services: legal, engineering & other
Public Administration
Source: edited by the author based on the North American Industrial Classification System.
13The ISIC system was developed by the United Nations and used internationally. It has expe-
rienced several revisions consistent with the changes of production in several countries (Revision
1 in 1958; Revision 2 in 1968, Revision 3 in 1989, Revision 3.1 in 2002 and Revision 4 in 2007).
In 1997, Mexico, Canada and the United States developed their own comparable system to better
capture the process of production in America.
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A database of records at three-level codes would consist of 161 industry groups
for each county, resulting in around 500,000 observations per benchmark year.
More than this, as production itself has changed through time, the NAICS system
has been modified on several occasions, hindering the homogenization of long-
term data and requiring the use of a more aggregated classification. The final
longitudinal panel database comprises an industrial classification homogenized to
fit all the observations in each benchmark year provided by the US Census (see
Table 3.1). Depending on the year, it contains a maximum of 28 categories of
which 21 belong to the tertiary sector.
The trade-off between industrial detail and geographical accuracy has been re-
solved in favor of geography based on the argument of the potential biases caused
by broad or incomplete geographical units. The choice forces less accuracy in in-
dustrial detail but the database offers a more decent visibility of the service sector
than any available records.
3.4.2 The distribution of employment
One of the key elements to address regarding the importance of services is the
transfer of employees across sectors through time. This text has already empha-
sized that the value and extent of service production has increased through the
century (Broadberry and Ghosal [2002]; Moretti [2012]). Accordingly, the share
and number of employees devoted to the tertiary sector has increased substan-
tially. Table 3.2 shows labor force participants by sector both in absolute terms
and as a percentage of total participation from 1930 to 2010. The first remark is
that the total number of employees has increased from 24 to 122 millions since
1890, excluding the period after the Great Depression. The number of employees
devoted to services is now the biggest share of the economy (it has increased from
31 to 82 per cent in a century). Meanwhile, the primary sector has shrunk by 44
per cent during the whole period, although the Great Depression had a greater im-
pact on the agricultural sector in detriment to manufacturing.14 Recovery during
the Golden Age increased the share of manufacturing until the 1970s when the
sector began to decline and employment moved gradually to the service economy.
14Similar figures are shown in Lebergott [1966].
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This change in total labor force composition has been paired with a change
in the distribution of sectors across the US geography, which has become more
unequal. Table 3.4 shows variances and inequality measures for all the sectors in
1980. These indicators are not adjusted to proportion and, thus, can be biased
with the population size of the county. However, these still provide a good ini-
tial understanding of sectoral differences by showing where extreme allocations
and inequalities occur: if inequality is high, there is a high variance among the
distribution of employees in each industry per county (a greater range of values).
On the contrary, low inequality shows that population size is not very relevant to
the allocation of that sector, and it may indicate that resources may be more es-
sential to that industry. In other words, high inequality measures show industries
that tend to allocate in big urban areas, as explained by Desmet and Fafchamps
[2004].
1980 data show that the greatest dispersion occurs in manufacturing industries
(Textiles, Machinery, Chemical and Metal Industries) where IRS (from internal
economies of scale) have traditionally been identified. However, these are closely
followed by certain services (Insurance, Business Services, Other Education, En-
tertainment and Professional Services). In the case of services, inequality seems
particularly significant in the upper tale of the distribution, in other words, highly
populated counties are the key to these industries.
Table 3.2: Labor force participation by sector
Total Employees Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector
(millions) % % %
1890 24 11 44.11 6 24.88 7 31.00
1910 36 12 34.49 10 27.17 14 38.34
1920 40 11 28.50 12 29.80 17 41.70
1930 48 12 25.00 14 29.17 22 45.83
1940 48 10 20.12 14 30.21 24 48.15
1950 57 8 13.94 19 32.49 30 53.11
1960 64 5 7.64 21 33.16 38 55.28
1970 76 4 4.52 24 31.84 49 63.63
1980 97 4 4.03 28 28.30 66 67.67
1990 115 4 3.31 28 23.89 84 72.81
2000 122 5 4.10 17 13.93 100 81.97
Data shown inmillion employees and as a share of labor force. Source: Carter et al. [2006],
American Community Survey for 2000 data and US Census Bureau 15th Decennial Census
for 1930 data.
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The last two columns of Table 3.4 show a differentiation concerning between-
state and within-state inequality. In the case of 1980, the decomposition reveals
that county differences are more relevant to the disparity than between-state in-
equalities. The exception is the primary sector, where natural advantage is partic-
ularly necessary (state-effect seems to contribute to about 30 per cent). In general,
the lowest dispersion in allocation is shown in sectors like Forestry and Fishing and
Agriculture, which means that the local size of the population is not very relevant
and instead, available resources are crucial. For the rest of the sectors, between-
state inequalities are negligible in comparison with within-state variance, which
leads to further proof of the need to analyze the distribution using narrower units
than states. These results are in accordance with the state-county decomposition
effect of the General Entropy index shown in the appendix (Figure 11). Although
the data not shown here, this outcome became more pronounced for more recent
data (2010).
In sum, the importance of agriculture was crucial during the crisis but manu-
facturing jobs took over the growth of the US economy until the 1980s. The service
economy has gradually become themotor of economic growth across the whole pe-
riod. The crucial question is whether the growth of the economy, measured in this
case by the total number of employees, has anything to do with the size of the ser-
vice sector. Table 3.2 shows that these raw indicators move together: an increase
in the share of services is related to an increase of the total number of employees.
But, is this effect generalized across the whole country? Note that not all the coun-
ties behaved the same way over the period. The American population increased,
but the effect of migratory movements led counties to grow unevenly. Moreover,
their production and industrial structure varied over time (Moretti [2012]). By
1980, the service economy was already twice as big as the non-service sector and
population had already migrated away from rural areas, but the overall picture
may differ according to the state or county dynamics. The key is whether there
is a correlation between population and size of the service economy. Did coun-
ties that performed negatively depend on agriculture more than proportionally?
Did those that increased their population and production depend on services more
than proportionally?
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3.5 The new long-term series of concentration in-
dexes
3.5.1 Concentration and localization indicators
An alternative way to present information and avoid the bias of indicators on popu-
lation size is the use of Locational Gini indexes as exemplified by Krugman (1999).
As explained in Section 3, this indicator is analogous to the traditional Gini Coef-
ficient, where individuals are counties and income are workers. Instead, the Loca-
tional Gini measures how disproportionately employment is allocated per county,
taking the national values as reference. Overall sector Locational Gini Indexes for
this period are shown in Table 3.3 below. Recall that this long-term series does not
only provide unexplored insights into the service economy, but also avoids biases
on data using counties instead of aggregated geographical scales.
Table 3.3: Long-term Locational Gini coefficients by sector
Sector 1890 1930 1950 1980 2010
Primary - 0.563 0.632 0.587 0.744
Secondary 0.280 0.394 0.258 0.206 0.244
Tertiary - 0.144 0.161 0.083 0.088
Source: own calculations from US Census records.
The initial assessment of the aggregate Locational Gini coefficients is in ac-
cordance with academic consensus: the disproportion for the primary and the
secondary sector is higher than for services, on aggregate. Figure 3.5, however,
shows the trend of aggregate services to diverge from the initial hypothesis. The
service sector was expected to become more concentrated through the 20th cen-
tury but locational inequality has decreased through the century, showing that
service employees have become more spread.
The long-term growth of the service economy has absorbed a large share of
the labor force growth. The simultaneous movement of population from rural to
urban areas indicates that the service economy is absorbingmost of the labor force.
The analysis of industrial dynamics undertaken by Ellison and Glaeser [1999]
shows that declining industries tend to concentrate more by reducing the number
of plants to those where production is most efficient, which is what has happened
in the manufacturing sector from the 1980s and the primary sector during the
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whole period. In other words, crowded (urbanized) counties have grown more
and this growth is based on the service economy. As urban areas are geographically
spread across the US geography, so too is the service economy. But are all services
growing at the same rate? A more detailed look at the service economy might lead
to results in favor of the original hypothesis.
Figure 3.5: Aggregate long-term Locational Gini coefficients
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
These detailed data show a contrasting evolution across different services:
while distributional and personal services tend to remain spread, business ser-
vices show higher inequality indicators. Within sector inequality seems a relevant
issue since the production function of services seems to be so heterogeneous. In
fact, Locational Gini coefficients in Figure 3.6 identify that certain service sub-
sectors have managed to overcome the level of concentration of Manufacturing
since 1980.
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3.5.2 The tertiary sector in detail
A more detailed analysis of employees by industries requires more attention.
Traditionally, manufacturing has been analyzed emphasizing the production of
durable and non-durable goods.This is not a fanciful choice: first, the production
of durable-goods tends to yield greater value added and margins; second, the pro-
duction of both kinds of goods are usually tied to the provision of certain inputs
(like metals or chemical products) which could lead firms to locate close to natural
resource endowments; and third, their ties to customers and transport costs differ.
Considering the service sector as a whole seems to align the characteristics
of service producers, leading to an unclear and biased vision of the sector and
the general economy. This effect can be reduced by distinguishing services that
share certain characteristics, such as the low cost of distribution or the nature of
demand. Thus, we find that distributional (Utilities and Trade), personal (General
Merchandise, Repair Services...), and knowledge intensive services (like Business
and Professional services) can be followed through the analysis of Table 3.4 and
in accordance with the classification shown in Table 3.1.
(a) Concentration within services
Figure 3.6 displays the service sector in detail and puts it in the context of the
aggregate indicators. Note that Professional Services (KIBS) and Education
(also knowledge intensive) are increasing and since 1980 have managed to
surpass the concentration level of manufacturing. These sectors are not the
only ones overtaking manufacturing. In fact, services whose employees are
highly skilled and require an intensive knowledge in the industry are becom-
ing more unequally distributed according to 3.5. These include Education,
some financial services (the so-called FIRE) and, of course, KIBS. Higher ed-
ucation is paired with the pattern of research employees (within Professional
Services) whose locational coefficients progressively escalate through the pe-
riod. Other services like Entertainment behave likewise while distributional
and personal services exhibit low coefficients through the whole period.
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Concentration trends are heterogeneous within the sub-sectors of the service
economy and contrasting with the aggregate trends of services. However, if
aggregate trends are consistent with industry growth dynamics (increasing
sectors tend to spread and declining sectors tend to concentrate), how can
we reconcile these diverging trends?
Figure 3.6: Long-term Locational Gini coefficients
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
The answer lies in the fact that specialization and concentration do not nec-
essarily move together (Aiginger and Davies [2004]). First, knowledge in-
tensive sectors tend to concentrate where they can benefit from knowledge
spillovers, and this happens when information moves fast: when firms and
workers are geographically close, i.e. in highly urbanized areas. This means
that cities have become more equal and the gap between rural and urban ar-
eas has become much more severe, as pointed out by Desmet and Fafchamps
[2006]. Second, the impact of external economies is local; because cities are
scattered across the US territory and states, the effect of concentration on the
upper tail of the distribution is diluted. This explains why analyzing these
sectors by state leads to conclude that services are proportionally spread.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of employment data by industry
Industry Mean
Dev
CV Log
SD
Gini GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Between
State
Within
State
Agriculture 0.363 1.694 1.075 0.512 1.655 0.559 1.434 0.26 0.74
Forestry & fishing 0.627 2.652 1.413 0.792 2.952 1.067 3.517 0.31 0.69
Mining 0.643 4.231 1.750 0.803 8.058 1.526 8.947 0.06 0.94
Construction 0.571 3.241 1.339 0.726 3.255 1.279 5.252 0.08 0.92
Food & kindred products 0.605 3.310 1.698 0.768 7.511 1.320 5.475 0.08 0.92
Textile mills 0.649 3.996 1.963 0.817 15.637 1.529 7.981 0.12 0.88
Printing& publishing 0.699 4.653 1.781 0.849 11.020 1.890 10.820 0.09 0.91
Chemical & allied 0.718 4.180 1.927 0.867 14.942 1.815 8.731 0.15 0.85
Primary metal 0.710 5.015 1.961 0.870 16.222 1.884 12.571 0.08 0.92
Furniture & wooden prods. 0.540 3.115 1.684 0.717 7.507 1.105 4.850 0.10 0.90
Fabricated metal 0.676 4.692 1.861 0.839 12.410 1.718 11.003 0.08 0.92
Electrical machinery 0.728 5.899 2.046 0.880 22.342 2.079 17.395 0.06 0.94
Other machinery 0.685 4.107 1.910 0.840 15.465 1.758 8.432 0.11 0.89
Transportation equipment 0.748 6.317 2.007 0.890 23.083 2.221 19.944 0.07 0.93
Railroads 0.638 3.625 1.623 0.799 5.806 1.444 6.569 0.04 0.96
Trucking & warehousing 0.599 3.528 1.473 0.755 4.554 1.380 6.223 0.08 0.91
Other transportation 0.713 5.013 1.556 0.850 7.091 2.056 12.558 0.08 0.92
Communications 0.690 6.324 1.716 0.840 9.713 1.976 19.988 0.04 0.96
Utilities 0.578 3.112 1.436 0.738 3.858 1.278 4.842 0.10 0.90
Wholesale trade 0.647 3.982 1.552 0.796 6.991 1.632 7.927 0.08 0.92
General merchandise 0.668 3.863 1.773 0.820 10.311 1.661 7.459 0.08 0.92
Food & bakery stores 0.587 3.235 1.406 0.742 3.735 1.319 5.231 0.12 0.88
Automotive & gas. Dealers 0.558 3.099 1.344 0.714 3.159 1.206 4.800 0.09 0.91
Eating & drinking places 0.631 3.499 1.537 0.782 5.295 1.481 6.119 0.11 0.89
Repair services 0.598 3.693 1.398 0.752 3.644 1.399 6.816 0.09 0.91
Private households 0.586 4.006 1.427 0.752 4.061 1.456 8.023 0.08 0.92
Other personal services 0.615 3.580 1.457 0.770 4.528 1.469 6.406 0.11 0.89
Health services 0.606 3.348 1.498 0.761 5.518 1.396 5.601 0.12 0.88
Hospitals 0.650 3.835 1.649 0.803 9.378 1.609 7.352 0.10 0.90
Elementary schooling 0.606 3.174 1.400 0.754 3.478 1.344 5.035 0.12 0.88
Other education 0.655 4.424 1.462 0.806 4.369 1.674 9.783 0.09 0.91
Entertainment 0.709 6.321 1.726 0.858 10.206 2.108 19.968 0.06 0.94
Banking & credit agencies 0.663 4.356 1.493 0.809 5.515 1.746 9.483 0.09 0.91
Insurance and real estate 0.719 4.490 1.756 0.857 11.940 1.977 10.076 0.10 0.90
Business services 0.747 5.053 1.883 0.881 17.664 2.153 12.763 0.09 0.91
Professional services 0.721 4.752 1.712 0.858 10.564 2.019 11.285 0.10 0.90
Social services 0.636 3.576 1.518 0.787 5.348 1.528 6.391 0.12 0.88
Public administration 0.646 3.406 1.451 0.791 4.323 1.548 5.798 0.18 0.82
Total activity 0.601 3.473 1.338 0.751 3.003 1.389 6.028 0.10 0.90
Source: Own calculations based on employment data per county from US Census records.
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Table 3.5: Long-term Locational Gini coefficients by industry and county
Sector 1890 1930 1950 1980 2010
Primary - 0.563 0.632 0.587 0.744
Agriculture 0.380 0.615 0.660 0.608 0.763
Forestry and fisheries - 0.587 0.823 0.760 0.947
Mining - 0.619 0.867 0.797 0.854
Secondary 0.565 - 0.258 0.206 0.244
Construction - - 0.220 0.221 0.232
Manufacturing 0.565 0.394 0.330 0.261 0.361
Tertiary - 0.144 0.161 0.083 0.088
Utilities & communications - - 0.454 0.181 0.296
Transportation - 0.095 0.292 0.212 -
Railroads - - 0.228 0.512 -
Trucking service & warehousing - - 0.429 0.232 0.338
Other transportation - - 0.318 0.323 -
Communications & Public Utilities - - 0.243 0.212 0.296
Telecommunications - - 0.225 0.283 0.345
Utilities and sanitary services - - 0.299 0.245 0.623
Trade - 0.170 0.157 0.115 0.122
Wholesale trade - 0.540 0.124 0.233 0.257
Retail trade - 0.272 0.134 0.117 0.148
General Merchandise - - - 0.172 -
Food, bakery & dairy stores - - 0.208 0.183 -
Eating and drinking places - - 0.146 0.154 -
Automotive and gasoline dealers - - - 0.237 -
Other retail trade - - 0.347 - -
Personal services - - 0.182 0.111 0.113
Repair services - - 0.186 0.166 0.200
Private households - 0.147 0.330 0.313 n.a.
Hotels and lodging places - - 0.192 - 0.169
Entertainment and recreation - - 0.294 0.343 0.324
Health Services - - 0.257 0.159 0.167
Hospitals - - - 0.207 0.340
Medical and other health - - - 0.168 0.177
Education - - 0.212 0.089 0.426
Elementary Education 0.294 - 0.212 0.185 0.361
Higher education - - - - 0.675
Other education - - - - 0.363
Other personal services - - 0.399 0.217 0.187
Social Services - - - 0.170 0.244
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate - - 0.433 0.224 0.258
Insurance and Real Estate - - - - 0.266
Insurance - - - - 0.322
Real Estate - - - - 0.256
Banking and Credit agencies - - - 0.188 0.399
KIBS - - 0.293 0.278 0.255
Business services - - 0.186 0.313 0.248
Professional services: Legal, engineering & other - 0.162 0.245 0.279 0.347
Clerical occupations 0.542 0.249 - - -
Public Administration - 0.182 0.337 0.295 0.223
Industry not reported - - 0.234 - 0.760
Source: own calculations from US Census decennial records on county employment by industry.
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In this sense, looking at the distribution of sectors through a smaller unit
might help understand the localization of the service economy better. Again,
Table 11 in the appendix shows General Entropy indexes that produce simi-
lar conclusions as the Locational Gini coefficients. The interest of this table
lies in the perfect decomposability by group property of the GE index. This
way, the table shows the group decomposition of the General Entropy in-
dex GE(2), considering predominantly the distribution in the upper tail, and
proves that for any sector within services, the county effect is more impor-
tant. The between-state effect seems to affect only non-service industries,
showing a decreasing and low impact on the distribution of services, which
explains why most researchers tend to find uninteresting results when an-
alyzing the service economy. To prove that knowledge intensive sectors are
concentrated in the upper tail of the distribution, a more detailed analysis
of inequality needs to be performed.
(b) Localization of service sub-sectors
Fortunately, Hoover’s index of localization allows an accurate analysis of the
geographical shape of the inequality distribution of each industry. This mea-
sure explains where the intensity of disproportion occurs, providing an in-
dicator per industry j and county i ranging between zero and infinite. To
show this information effectively, I take advantage of maps that provide a
visual idea of the distribution of sectors across the US and allow for the clear
identification long-term patterns.
In general, sectors with extreme disproportions like Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing, Mining, and Railroads contrast with sectors like Wholesale Trade,
Insurance, and aggregate services, which display low maximums. On the
contrary, spread sectors like Elementary Schooling and Public Administra-
tion offer a positive minimum Hoover’s index. This indicates that sectors
in which production is related to a geographically fixed input (natural re-
sources) must be localized where the resource is available, while for others
there has to be some supply, no matter how small the county is. Data for
the latest benchmark year (not-reported) reveal that maximum Localization
coefficients are even higher for almost all sectors, showing an exacerbation
of trends in the long-run.
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In this sense, when a county holds a very high disproportional allocation of
employees relative to national values, it will be represented as a red hot-
spot. If the county is shown blue, the disproportion will be negative. Note
that HI=1 is associated with close to perfect proportion scenarios: no lo-
calization, no specialization, and no comparative advantage. An industry
in which the share of employment is similar to national values in all coun-
ties (i.e., share of employment in industry i is constant across all counties)
would generate a white map. The proceeding text describes the evolution of
the geographical distribution of disproportions across sectors.
The evolution of the primary sector is shown in Figure 3.7. Both maps reveal
that disproportions are high and scattered. Further, these seem to be affected
by strong state effects, in accordance with previous findings. Additionally, it
seems that counties with high shares of agriculture have increased their dis-
proportion further from 1930 to 1980. In other words, even with a decrease
in the aggregate share of primary sector employment, the localization of
agriculture has persisted through time where there was an initial advantage
(such as the central region of the US with vast land and mineral resources),
which is a typical argument in the economic geography literature.
The secondary sector shows a completely different picture. Initially, Hoover
indexes for the secondary sector indicate that most of the industrial produc-
tion of the nation takes place in very few counties in 1930. Figure 3.8 shows
a large blue area with a few scattered red groups of counties with no strong
state effects. By 1980, the geographical distribution of secondary sector em-
ployment spread more proportionally. The manufacturing belt dissolved and
the remaining industry clusters were localized in New Mexico. Part of the
explanation of this behavior lies in the decline of manufacturing in the US,
much to the benefit of other countries and sectors. It is highly probable that
the analysis of a very specific industry, say microchips, would draw a less
proportional map as the ones described by Krugman [1991].
The distribution of services exhibits a more striking evolution. Figure 3.9
shows low and scattered disproportions across the whole US geography; ser-
vice employees look proportionally distributed on average and there is no
evidence of state-effects. By 1980, the disproportion changes in favor of the
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eastern region of the country as light-red areas have remained on the right
side of the map, while the service workers in the west seem to allocate more
proportionally. Although the coefficients are greater than one, localization is
low because services are everywhere: distributional services provide access
to every single agent (in a developed country); thus, these are conveniently
dispersed. Accordingly, locational Lorenz curves are very close to the pro-
portion line, with a locational Gini equal to 0.08 for General Merchandise
and 0.09 for Wholesale Trade in 1980.15
Similarly, personal services are delivered on demand (hospitals, schools,
hairdressers, car-washers...). These services also exhibit relatively high fixed
costs and low marginal cost, however in this case consumers consider not
only heterogeneity of supply, but also transportation costs. Therefore, al-
though these tend to spread across population they are more disproportion-
ally allocated than distributional services; there is a higher supply of personal
services in congested areas: the maximum bound of the localization index
for Personal Services sub-sector for the whole period is 4.7, and for Banking
3.9 (which contrasts with the Mining sector’s upper bound of 43). Thus, the
initial hypothesis is tentatively confirmed by the Personal Service sector.
Nevertheless, there are heterogeneities within this sector that are worth
mentioning. One of the most surprising findings is the high concentration of
Private Household employees for the year 1980: the locational Gini index for
Private Household employees equals 0.313 in 1980. According to the only
accurate and available cross-section on this sector for the whole period, Pri-
vate Household employees are highly localized in the south of the country
(specifically in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia where
the highest, above 10, locational indexes are shown). This sharp clustering
is difficult to explain in the framework of external or internal economies of
scale. Alternatively, exogenous forces like institutions and traditions might
explain this behavior. These conjectures could also be applied in the case
of Entertainment (highly localized in California, Nevada, Florida and New
15Figure 3.4 shows the locational Lorenz curve for Health services.
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York, with a higher state component than other sectors) that may have been
geographically determined by the prohibition of gambling (Nevada was the
first state to legalize gambling in 1931 after the signing of the Assembly Bill
98).
When considering Knowledge Intensive Services, the results become much
more interesting, showing a higher localization index than the tertiary sector
on average by 1930. This is a natural effect of using a narrower sector;
however, Knowledge Intensive services do show the highest locational Gini’s
among any services in all benchmark years. The results for 1930 (in Figure
3.10) describe an initial situation with an almost proportional allocation of
Knowledge intensive employees, where small groups of counties with greater
than proportional allocations are scattered along the map. By 1980, the
disproportion had become more acute. Counties in which the allocation of
Knowledge Intensive employees was initially proportional showed a lower
than proportional amount of high skill workers (blue) in 1980. Conversely,
counties in which the initial proportion of skilled jobs was relatively high
absorbed an ever greater share, probably draining the skilled labor force
from the initial blue area.
The results from 2010 are even more striking in Figure 3.11, where SMSAs
are also shown. Knowledge service firms locate around cities such as New
York, Massachusetts, Chicago and other metropolitan areas, their presence
fading in less congested areas. This implies that the strength of external
economies in this sector is highly relevant while the effect of transaction
costs is negligible. The growth of the Knowledge Intensive Business Sector
only happens in areas where it will survive through externalities as Ciarli et
al. [2008] and Kim [1999] suggest.
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Figure 3.7: Location coefficient of primary sector - 1930 and 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 3.8: Location coefficient of secondary sector - 1930 and 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 3.9: Location coefficient of tertiary sector - 1930 and 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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The clustering of KIBS is not only related with externalities, but also with
the nearly costless transmission of such knowledge. As discussed by Venables
[2001], "the death of distance" allows companies in New York State to pro-
vide services to industries in Kentucky. These findings suggest 1) a migration
movement of skilled employees from rural to urban counties and 2) that the
supply of knowledge intensive services for the country can be provided by
five or six very productive clusters.
Additionally, the impact of external economies can be explored through the
differences between Elementary Schooling and Higher Education, which dif-
fer substantially in the intensity of their knowledge component. The upper
bound of the locational index for Higher Education employees through the
whole period doubles the highest one for Elementary Education. Further-
more, while Elementary Education shows no geographic pattern (recall it is
one of the counties with a minimum location coefficient greater than zero,
i.e. there is supply in all counties regardless of population size), Higher Edu-
cation is clearly localized in the North-Eastern and Western (Pacific) regions
of the country parallel to the manufacturing belt and Silicon Valley. It follows
that knowledge intensive education tends to concentrate more than elemen-
tary education; this proves that knowledge intensity fosters agglomeration
among peers (Marshallian externalities). Jacobian externalities could also
explain localization in these regions. Counties where Higher Education is
present are also great knowledge intensive industrial producers; in fact, be-
tween sectors correlation indicators show that the highest significant cor-
relation for Higher Education is Professional Services, followed by Business
Services, which are low but positive and significant. These findings support
the IRS in knowledge intensive services and are in accordance with the ar-
gument proposed by Moretti [2012].
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Figure 3.10: Location coefficient of KIBS - 1930 and 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 3.11: Location coefficient of KIBS for 1950 and 2010 with SMSAs
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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3.5.3 The polarization of the economy
The previous section provides empirical evidence of the increasing inequality
between "the two Americas" described by Desmet and Fafchamps [2006] and
Moretti’s [2012] analysis: the rural stagnating regions and the increasingly
crowded skilled economy. Recently, Yamamoto [2007] identified polarization as
a worthwhile indicator for fully comprehending income distributions. In this con-
text, increasing polarization implies the clustering of the distribution of employ-
ment by industry across similar counties and away from counties with antagonistic
characteristics. Although Yamamoto [2007] did not find evidence of income po-
larization in terms of counties, and the hypothesis is to find the same conclusion,
it is worth analyzing whether the distribution of employment is behaving likewise
and examining different behaviors across sectors.
In Esteban and Ray [1994]’s words, a polarized distribution means: 1) a high
degree of homogeneity within groups, i.e., rural counties must share similar char-
acteristics and urban counties, too; 2) high heterogeneity across groups: rural and
urban counties must be markedly and increasingly different; and 3) the number
of groups must be small and big enough to affect the distribution: in this sense,
counties should be easily classified as rural, small towns and/or big cities. Follow-
ing their methodology, Table 3.6 shows the ER polarization index by industry and
its rank across time.
The table shows that the distribution of the primary sector has remained the
most uniform sector over time. The service economy has become the most clus-
tered sector, at least since the 1980s (depending on the alpha-sensitivity to polar-
ization chosen), while the distribution of the secondary economy, which showed
the most polarized distribution in 1930, has become less extreme. The index of po-
larization can be explained through the identification-alienation strategy proposed
by Duclos et al. [2004]. This strategy simply aims to measure the degree of ho-
mogeneity between groups (identification) and the differentiation across groups
(alienation) that can easily be seen by using a frequency histogram of the distri-
bution as shown in the different examples explained in Esteban and Ray [1994].
Figure 3.12 shows the kernel probability distribution estimates of the locational
coefficients by sector over time. According to this data, probability distributions
are widely uni-modal with a high identification component in the main group,
showing a low polarization that agrees with the data from Table 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Polarization indexes and ranks by sector and year
alpha=1.0 alpha=1.3 alpha=1.6
1950 r 1980 r 2010 r 1950 r 1980 r 2010 r 1950 r 1980 r 2010 r
Primary Sector 0.017 3 0.018 3 0.014 3 0.005 3 0.006 3 0.004 3 0.002 3 0.002 3 0.001 3
Agriculture 0.017 0.023 0.015 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001
Mining 0.174 0.122 0.109 0.109 0.067 0.057 0.070 0.038 0.031
Foresty & fishing 0.113 0.046 0.039 0.061 0.018 0.015 0.034 0.008 0.006
Secondary Sector 0.058 1 0.031 2 0.034 2 0.028 1 0.019 1 0.014 2 0.014 1 0.012 1 0.006 2
Manufacturing 0.089 0.044 0.042 0.046 0.018 0.017 0.024 0.008 0.007
Construction 0.032 0.013 0.040 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.008
Tertiary Sector 0.036 2 0.034 1 0.041 1 0.020 2 0.015 2 0.022 1 0.011 2 0.006 2 0.012 1
Personal Services 0.036 0.034 0.038 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.011 0.011 0.010
KIBS 0.060 0.068 0.107 0.032 0.036 0.060 0.017 0.020 0.035
Esteban and Ray’s polarization index and ranks. Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 3.12: Kernel Density Estimation by sector
Source: from author’s own calculations.
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The primary sector seems to have suffered in terms of identification among
the counties with relatively lower advantage as the highest point of the density
function has decreased and the distribution has flattened: the counties that had
the greatest advantage have remained at the right-hand tail of the distribution,
and this has spread further (in 1930, around 40 per cent of the counties had a
slight comparative advantage in agriculture with a localization index between 1.9
and 2.9; in 2010 the disproportion has increased to a maximum localization index
of 26.2 and the counties above 1.9 are less than one per cent). Although the
right-hand tail of the distribution has become more extreme, it is very difficult to
establish common characteristics between those away from the mode, as they are
very uniformly spread showing no alienation.
In contrast, the secondary sector change is characterized by lower alienation.
The mode of the secondary employment distribution is close to perfect proportion-
ality at LC=1. Those at the right-hand side tail of the distribution are now even
closer, therefore the distribution of manufacturing employees has become even
less polarized in accordance with the rank evolution of ER indexes.
The tertiary sector is perhaps the most interesting one. The modality around a
proportional distribution of service employment across counties is also confirmed.
However, in this case, those with a relative advantage have increased it over time.
This is particularly evident by looking at the Knowledge Intensive Business Ser-
vice employment distributions: the mode remains below 1, but counties at the tail
(a minority) have multiplied their locational coefficient more than three-fold. In
other words, the vast majority of counties belong to a group with low knowledge
comparative advantage, while a small minority is becoming more and more dif-
ferent over time, increasing the alienation between them but having a low impact
on the ER polarization index because they belong to a very small group.
Although there are palpable differences across sectors in terms of polarization
and its distinct components, the low polarization in the income distribution across
counties found by Yamamoto [2007] corresponds to these findings with respect to
employment distribution by sectors across counties. These findings confirm that
a small number of counties are becoming extraordinarily different over the pe-
riod, extending upper tail on the curve but with low power to change the shape of
the distribution of locational coefficients. The privileged low number of counties
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with a slight advantage to urbanize, urbanize more and faster, leaving the rest be-
hind, increasing inequality indicators but keeping polarization indexes low. These
findings clearly confirm the relevance of the concepts discussed by Duclos et al.
[2004]; Esteban and Ray [1994].
3.5.4 Spatial autocorrelation
Economic Geography links space to the distribution of markets and industries. A
very useful tool to measure these distributions is spatial correlation, which can
be properly defined using Moran’s index of spatial autocorrelation in its various
forms. Very simply, Moran’s index shows a value of an individual relative to the
values of neighboring individuals. In practice, Moran’s index requires the develop-
ment of a neighboring matrix to determine spatial proximity across all individuals
and predict a correlation of the variable in question based on proximity rather
than time. This matrix can take several forms and orders. Here I use an order one
Queen-contiguity matrix, which provides a value equal to one if two counties are
touching through a border or a vertex and zero otherwise.
Through this proximity matrix, Moran’s index considers each region’s position
relative to all of the others, providing information on agglomeration that Krug-
man’s index ignores. This index, however, provides a higher spatial correlation
index when adjacent regions are correlated than when non-adjacent but proxi-
mate regions are correlated ([Missiaia, 2014, page 56] for further illustration).
Table 3.7 shows Global Moran indexes for each year and sector. Each observa-
tion is an average indicator for the whole sample, assuming all the regions (coun-
ties) in the US are internally homogeneous. This assumption, however, might be
realistic for many counties and completely unrealistic for others (for example, big
urban areas might be so big that they are composed by several counties that are
internally homogeneous, while more uncongested counties can be locally hetero-
geneous).
These data provide higher Moran indexes for the primary sector than for the
rest of the economy. Spatial correlation is increasing and persistent through time
for the localization of agricultural producers. Spatial autocorrelation is smaller
for the secondary sector and variable for the service economy. Using a narrower
industry classification, the trends for agricultural producers persist and the auto-
correlation of Knowledge Intensive sectors increase.
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In other words, the primary sector seemed geographically spread through the
US economy, and looking at Moran indexes reveals that counties specialized in
agricultural production were driven to further localization of agriculture. The op-
timal conditions for agricultural production are difficult to find in specific locations,
but when these happen, the area tends to be wider: regions that benefit from val-
leys, mining settlements or good climate conditions are not local; therefore, the
chance of an agricultural county located next to a big city specialized in the service
economy seems low, while the chance of a county devoted to agriculture close to
two or more agricultural counties seems much higher.
Table 3.7: Spatial autocorrelation measured by county units
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Agricultural KIBS
1930 0.170 0.090 0.167 0.307 0.181
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
1950 0.166 0.208 0.115 0.066 0.164
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
1980 0.195 0.096 0.192 0.123 0.212
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
2010 0.214 0.109 0.139 0.077 0.217
(0.010) 0.011 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
GlobalMoran’s index from simple regression coefficients of Location Coefficients
by sector and county employment data on lagged Location Coefficients (neigh-
boring regions). Standard errors reported under the coefficient, all the coef-
ficients are significant at 99% confidence. Source: own calculations from US
Census data.
On the other hand, counties might be too big to account for the proper con-
ditions that service entrepreneurs need to find the synergies from knowledge
spillovers, urban dynamics and labor markets. This local effect explains the lower
global autocorrelation indicator of both manufacturing and knowledge services.
The fact that the aggregate service economy seems to have a higher Moran index
is related to the higher urbanization levels by state in the East than the West dur-
ing most of the century, explaining a higher degree of personal and distributional
services.
These aggregate results can be used to track the location of clusters in a similar
way than in the previous section if we use local measures of spatial autocorrelation
as explained by Anselin [1995]. These measurements provide an indicator per
region and can be mapped just as in the previous sectors. However, these maps
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do not differ to a great extent. Using local spatial autocorrelation indexes we
can identify that county clusters are persistent for the primary sector over all the
benchmark years in the states of Nevada, California, Michigan and Mississippi at
95 per cent significance.
3.5.5 Industrial linkages
Spatial autocorrelation can also be linked to the regional specialization of a sector.
This way, analyzing the specialization patterns of neighbors and its significance
with the reference counties, we can assess whether industrial linkages might play
some role in the local distribution of employment by industry. This is called the
bivariate Moran’s index and is the simple regression of locational coefficients of
any industry with respect to the locational coefficient of neighbors on another
industry. In other words, this regression measures the strength of the geographical
distribution of employment in a sector on the locational distribution of another
sector’s employment.
Table 3.8: Correlation coefficient between log total employees and percentage
employment by sector
Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector
2010 -0.734 0.160 0.696
1980 -0.643 0.209 0.470
1950 -0.520 0.476 0.416
1930 -0.527 0.430 0.363
1890 -0.400 0.365 -0.084
Total -0.525 0.246 0.483
Data source: Results from own calculations at 99% significance.
The first interesting point is that the significance of the bivariate Moran’s in-
dex is much lower than the univariate calculation. The second point is that the
bivariate Moran’s between KIBS and the primary sector demonstrate a negative
relationship consistent over all the benchmark years. The rest of the coefficients
appear to show unimportant relationships. Interestingly enough, one can also look
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at the simple correlation coefficients shown in Table 9 in Appendix B and find a
positive correlation between Business services and Professional services and Insur-
ance sectors. However these simple correlations do not take into account nearby
locations but rather simple coincidences in the same county.
From this appreciation a negative relationship seems to stand between agricul-
ture and the success of the knowledge intensive economy. One explanation could
be that the local external economies that sustain the knowledge economy cannot
exist in a context of vast land resources, and therefore the knowledge economy and
agriculture seem incompatible. That the primary and the tertiary sectors are neg-
atively correlated is something that can be inferred with a mere visual inspection
of Figures 3.7 and 3.9. However, this step can be further analyzed if we consider
the growth dynamics and structural change of sectors. More simply, Table 3.8 as-
sesses the correlations between the shares of each sector with total employment
size in each benchmark year. The main implication is a negative correlation be-
tween the primary sector and the size of the labor market that increases over time.
Meanwhile, the tertiary sector follows a completely opposite trend. The primary
sector is becoming less labor intensive while labor is becoming a primary input of
the service economy. These ideas and the allocation patterns previously depicted
show that Rybczynski’s theorem holds: counties produce outputs that are intensive
in the factor that they are abundant in. Thus, counties with vast natural resources
will specialize in primary products, while counties with big labor markets tend to
use these intensively. Whether this is an effect of factor endowments or market
size is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is definitely worth an explanation
in the next chapters.
3.6 Conclusions
This analysis has confirmed that a consideration of the service economy is essential
to understanding the trends of concentration, specialization and localization of the
global economy. This is true not only because of the magnitude of the sector in
the overall economy, but also because recent trends affect the localization of the
aggregatemarket. The specialization in services to the detriment of manufacturing
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implies that the relatively lower overall concentration has had more remarkable
effects on general inequality. Although service employees are more diffused than
both primary and secondary sector workers, the evolution of the service sector has
changed in the last century, driving the trends of the market to change as well.
The picture among sub-sectors within services is rather heterogeneous. Since
1980, knowledge intensive services like Business Services, Professional Services,
Entertainment and Higher Education have become more concentrated and local-
ized, while distributional services and some personal services (Elementary Educa-
tion and Health) have remained spread. This divergence indicates that there are
differences in the shape of service production functions. For knowledge intensive
sectors, knowledge spillovers, the size of the market and closeness to a special-
ized pool of labor (agglomeration economies) seem to be more important while
transport costs and competition (agglomeration dis-economies) may discourage
allocation of utilities and personal services where they are already present. Other
factors could also determine the location of services where external economies
are not so relevant but concentration levels are strikingly high. In the case of
Private Household Employees or Entertainment in 1980, institutions are a likely
determinant. The results derived from this analysis show that the Rybczynski the-
orem holds: counties produce outputs intensive in the factor they are abundant
in. Thus, counties with vast natural resources will specialize in primary products,
while counties with a relative big labor market tend to use this factor intensively.
On the other hand, some evidence suggests that the primary sector allocates ac-
cording to natural endowments and manufacturing industries are driven by exter-
nalities.
Moreover, it appears that specialization in certain industries may attract and
repel other industries. On the one hand, knowledge intensive services seem to al-
locate in counties where Higher Education and Entertainment industries are also
present, implying some arguments in favor of Jacobian externalities. However, the
correlation between Agriculture and Mining and Manufacturing heavy industries
seems to work in the opposite direction. Where a high share of the population
is involved with primary sector activities, there is no place for knowledge inten-
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sive services, probably because in those conditions it is difficult to benefit from
market size. The results shown in this chapter emphasize the multiplier effect
of knowledge intensive service employment towards further growth in developed
economies.
The narrower analysis of counties rather than wide geographical units has pro-
vided much better visibility and allowed for the identification of the local effect
of external economies otherwise unseen. Analysis on a larger scale permits an
understanding of agglomeration through wide aspects such comparative and nat-
ural advantages but overlooks the subtle local effect of externalities that enhance
the local multiplier of services and explain local market differentials. The need
to examine different scales in terms of inequality of distributions is also proven
by Yamamoto [2007]. This explains why most research underestimates both the
localization of the service economy and its effect on regional markets by infer-
ring conclusions from an analysis that ignores 80 per cent of the value added and
overlooks part of the distribution. Furthermore, these results call for a model that
explains the determinants of these agglomeration patterns and that includes not
only the service economy, but the new configuration of markets and nesting eco-
nomic regions.
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CHAPTER 4
The determinants of service employment localization in the
long run
Economic historians tend to explain development gaps by focusing on the
contrast between manufacturing and agriculture, overlooking the increasing
role of services. This chapter analyses the causes of sectoral localization over
the 20th century in US counties by placing emphasis on the service economy.
Using census employment data by sector, I examine the debate on resource
endowments andmarket size through county location coefficients. Themodel
of localization is approached in three steps: first by showing that relative fac-
tors of production impact the geographical allocation of production. Then I
show how technology modified the relationship between factors of produc-
tion, making skills more important over time. However, when considering
market potential the coefficients of factor endowments become insignificant.
These results show that a two-way fixed-effects model appropriately explains
the allocation of services, emphasizing geographical conditions that foster the
growth of services and its persistence over time. Conclusions suggest that in-
creasing returns determine sectoral localization of employment except when
physical geography endowments are a constraint.
JEL classification: L8, N72, R12, O18.
Keywords: New Economic Geography, Market Potential, Service Location
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4.1 Introduction
The study of the localization of economic activity has received much attention in
the last few decades. The reason behind this interest is that many economists re-
gard geographical concentration of industries as the driver of development differ-
entials. Despite the great interest that specialization and concentration has raised,
the study of the service sector has been barely analyzed, not even for the United
States. This chapter examines the debate on the patterns of employment local-
ization during the period 1930-2010 across counties in the United States, with
careful consideration of the service economy.
The 20th century led to the geographical reallocation of economic activity from
a national, regional and local perspective. In the case of the United States of
America the diffusion of railways, telephones and the most recent ICT revolution
pushed many economic activities away from the Manufacturing Belt to alternative
regions.1 One of the key ingredients of this shift in location is the gradual change
in the specialization of the country from manufacturing to the service economy.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a straightforward explanation of the long-term
disproportional distribution of services in urban areas.
My contribution can be summarized by three findings: firstly, I find that Knowl-
edge Intensive Business Services (KIBS as denoted by Ciarli et al. [2012]) tend to
be disproportionally localized in densely populated metropolitan areas;2 US Cen-
sus Decennial data show that, since 1980, KIBS are more localized than some
traditionally clustered manufacturing industries. Secondly, I find that the rea-
son for this disproportion is related to the development of new technologies that
have provided Increasing Returns of Scale (IRS) to the production function of
1Crafts and Klein [2012, p. 3] explain that the ‘Manufacturing Belt’ should be defined in terms
of counties but roughly demarcate it as the area covered by the following states: Connecticut,
Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
For more information on the change in specialization patterns of these states check ‘American Rust’
in Moretti [2012].
2These are all the economic activities that use skilled labor intensively as a factor input.
More specifically, services provided by skilled labor like research, professional services, market-
ing, etcetera. Note that international specialization has led to outsourcing of manufacturing to
other countries and companies that were previously considered part of manufacturing in censuses
are now computed as services. Because it is difficult to track these changes from census to census,
the strategy is to consider aggregate sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary) and compare the
results between these and personal and Knowledge Intensive Business Sectors which are perfectly
defined from census to census and are easier to track.
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services. Lastly, I find that Increasing Returns explain better the localization of
non-agricultural economic activity and its effect doubles for knowledge intensive
industries while factor endowments determine the localization of primary sector
employment.
The debate on industrial localization is generally based on the study of the
manufacturing industry. While some authors use the Heckscher-Ohlin framework
based on factor endowments, others base their arguments on New Economic Ge-
ography (NEG).3 This new trend moves away from perfect competition and ar-
gues that production functions are likely to develop increasing returns to scale
and, thus, increasing demand is more important than resource availability. In
the last decades, several authors have argued that these two approaches are not
exclusive and, hence, should be considered together in the analysis of industrial
activities.4 However, the relative importance of HO factors and IRS determinants
may vary across industries, being the latter more important for services than for
agricultural production. This investigation combines the methodologies used by
Krugman [1991], Kim [1995, 1999] and Ellison and Glaeser [1999] to study the
patterns of manufacturing localization in the United States. More recently, the
cases of Spain analyzed by Rosés [2003], Britain by Crafts and Mulatu [2005]
and Italy by Missiaia [2014] have provided evidence in favor of the mixed model.
Approaching the service economy through these methodologies leads to the
conclusion that transaction cost reductions from technology increased the share
and value of aggregate services, fostering the agglomeration of knowledge inten-
sive activities close to big markets. Making use of a new long-term series of in-
dustrial localization using counties as a geographic unit of analysis, I test a model
of localization that considers both factor endowments and scale effects based on
counties Market Potential. I provide support in favor of the size of the market to
explain the localization of any activity with different weights across industries.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main trends
of the literature explaining localization. Section 3 explains the singularities of the
methodology and the data. Section 4 explains the results of the empirical analysis
and presents some robustness checks, and Section 5 concludes.
3These opposing views are summarized in Kim [1995] and Krugman [1991].
4See, for example, Amiti [2005] and Epifani [2005], who embed relative factor prices based
on endowments in a NEG framework to explain specialization at different geographical levels.
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4.2 Empirical framework: theories and models
The literature on the geographical allocation of production dates back to classical
economists who previously proposed comparative advantage of production based
on resource endowments of countries. Empirically, regional data on production
only started to be exploited at the end of the nineteenth century, when the US
Census published the first records on the topic.5
Traditionally, localization is measured with inequality indicators such as Theil,
Entropy or Gini Localization indexes, showing how industrial employment is un-
equally spread across regions (individuals). The general consensus is that expand-
ing industries tend to spread while declining industries tend to concentrate in par-
ticular areas (Dumais et al. [2002]). Thus, during the 20th century manufactur-
ing was spreading and agriculture remained concentrated over the whole period
Kim [1995], Krugman [1991, 2009]. Regarding aggregate services, the pattern
over the last century seems unchanged and spread in proportion to population.
However, in the last decades the growth of the service economy has led to the ag-
glomeration of certain service sectors above the level of aggregate manufacturing
industries. Ciarli et al. [2012] argue that the key to the agglomeration of ser-
vices is how knowledge intensive they are. They define Knowledge Intensive Busi-
ness Services (KIBS) as those services commonly provided to intermediate demand
(consultancy, research, marketing). During the 20th century, knowledge intensive
employees were relatively spread across states, but at the end of the period the
sector concentrated in highly urbanized counties. Desmet and Fafchamps [2004,
2006] explained that the agglomeration of services took place in the biggest urban
areas. Particularly, big cities such as New York, Chicago or San Francisco show a
very high ratio for KIBS during the whole period.
In the last few decades, economic historians have pointed out that the relative
importance of the service industry has increased through the last century in most
developed economies. Carter et al. [2006] show that the allocation of employ-
ees across sectors changed radically in this period: initially service employment
became the most important share of the economy to the detriment of agriculture
initially and manufacturing from 1970. Hence, during the last century, the aggre-
5According to the US Census decennial records, the first geographical reference on production
is presented in 1880 and describes cotton and cereal production by county.
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gate economy of the United States specialized in the production of services, al-
though not all counties behaved homogeneously: production and industrial struc-
ture of counties varied over time and, even more essentially, migrations varied
cross-county population growth moving workers towards metropolitan areas.
The local agglomeration of knowledge intensive firms suggests that externali-
ties explain these dynamics better than factor endowments: growth of KIBS may
only happen in areas where demand (businesses) is guaranteed even if low trans-
action and transportation costs reduce distance by allowing companies in New
York State to provide services to customers in Nevada at a similar cost than to
local customers, (Meliciani and Savona [2014]).
However, externalities are far more complex than a pure demand effect. Mar-
shall [1898] and Jacobs [1970] explained that closeness to the market implied in-
ter and intra-industry linkages, a greater pool of labor, and knowledge spillovers,
all of them leading to a lower cost of production. Other models explain agglomera-
tion economies in terms of information costs: a high concentration of professional
services (lawyers, judges, insurance firms...) reduces asymmetries of information
and facilitates transactions [Fujita and Thisse, 2013, ch.6].
Furthermore, traditional services were characterized by being produced and
consumed simultaneously, which made them uninteresting from the academic
point of view because the chances of being geographically dispersed in propor-
tion to population were high. More recently, technology has allowed knowledge
intensive services to become storable, thus marginal costs of KIBS are smaller and
allow producing a service in distant locations. These characteristics allow agglom-
eration economies to compensate for the greater costs of being in a crowded mar-
ket (higher rents, greater competition).
The debate on the causes of localization is split into two main theories: the
traditional argument is focused on natural endowments, while a more modern ap-
proach that defends market size as a cause of localization. The traditional endow-
ments view (HO) holds that producers allocate close to their input resources. The
main rationale is that resource availability determines the relative cost of produc-
tion and comparative advantage and therefore, producers in a region will choose
the bundle of products they can produce at a lower cost. This traditional argument
is referred to as Rybczynsky’s theorem and has been defended by Kim [1999] and
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Ellison and Glaeser [1999] using manufacturing data for the USA for 19th and 20th
centuries. Nevertheless, these authors acknowledge the several limitations of their
approach including the broad scope of their analysis and the over-specification of
their regression model.
Krugman [1991]’s seminal work criticized the traditional view by pointing out
that the assumptions upon which classical trade theory relied were too restrictive.
His work proposes a view based on Increasing Returns to Scale (IRS) that can be
justified whenever marginal costs are relatively low, which evidences that classical
assumptions are unrealistic in modern manufacturing industries (let alone in the
knowledge intensive service economy). This view shows that industrial localiza-
tion is more related to demand than supply: i.e., distance to factors of production
becomes less of a restriction with lower transportation costs. However, being close
to potential clients is crucial in a context of increasing returns to scale because low
marginal costs lead to higher than proportional profits from increases in demand.
This argument defends that being close to big markets is relatively more impor-
tant than being close to fixed factors of production for modern manufacturing
industries and decreasing transport costs. Scholars such as Amiti [2005] propose
different production functions across sectors, leading to diverging configurations
of the importance between IRS and factor endowments.
In the last decades, researchers have agreed upon the use of a mixed model,
where relative importance of supply and demand arguments could vary across in-
dustries. In fact, even Kim [1999], who strongly supports the traditional HO view,
admits that endowments explain the cross-section variation but that its explana-
tory power declines over time; he finally accepts that scale determines a lot of the
time variation.
In this context, the general approach in determining the causes of localization
involves testing the significance of coefficients in a model including both resource
endowments and scale variables. Using this framework, authors have reached
mixed conclusions based on different specifications. Commonly, the choice of the
model tends to bias results. One of the key issues towards this bias is the unit of
analysis, which tends to be too big and overlooks the local nature of IRS. In this
sense, the database presented here captures both effects by using counties instead
of nations, regions or states. I consider a model based on the framework used by
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Davis and Weinstein [2003] or Rosés [2003], who explain industrial production
based on endowments and market potential. To avoid these complications, the
many dimensions of the data used in this analysis should be carefully studied
prior to the statistical treatment of data.
4.3 Methodology and data
In this research I test how relevant endowments and scale effects are in deter-
mining the distribution of service employment across counties. Because services
have not been studied in depth, this analysis is performed in steps to provide a
complete view comparable to the trends in manufacturing. The main idea is to
test how the presence of factor endowments affects the localization of services by
county and then whether (and how) technology has changed the way these factors
interact by looking at factor intensity in the production function as done by Kim
[1999]. The analysis ends by testing how each county’s market size affects the
allocation of employees. Ultimately, this investigation analyses the mixed model
on the disproportion of employment by county over the 20th century.
Employment data come from several sources from the US Census records: sev-
eral editions of the Census of Population and Housing (15th, 17th and 20th) and
County Business Patterns (2010); these provide data by industry and county for
four benchmark years (1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010), yielding a total of nine in-
dustries and 3,189 counties.6 Given the heterogeneity of the different censuses
and the CBP, building the database implied the homogenization of the data to be
comparable across industries and years. This homogenization process was per-
formed from the most detailed general classification (1980) record to the least
one (1930), so that industrial categories where the most accurate but correctly
classified possible.
6Agriculture, Forestry and fisheries, Mining and Quarrying, Construction, Manufacturing, Utili-
ties (Transportation and Warehousing, Telecommunications, Utilities and sanitary services), Trade
(Wholesale, Retail), Personal services (Repair Services, Private household employees, Hotels and
lodging places, Entertainment and recreation, Health, Education, Social services and organiza-
tions, Finance, insurance and real estate) and Knowledge Intensive Business Services (Business
Services, Legal, engineering and others).
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This methodology is built upon the models developed in successful papers ex-
ploring manufacturing. First, geographical inequality is measured by an approach
similar to the one used by Krugman [1991] and Kim [1995]. However, the geo-
graphical unit at which data are gathered constitutes a key difference with respect
to the available literature. In general, advocates of the HO framework have stud-
ied industry agglomeration of employees by state or broader geographical units
(Kim [1995]; Kim and Margo [2003]). They also presented results by state or re-
gion, while Davis and Weinstein [2003] chose countries as the geographical unit
of analysis. The choice of broad geographical scales may be a possible explanation
of their results, as they ignore the subtle effect of external economies that occur
at a local level.7 Scholars have also used smaller geographical units like cities or
urban areas (Glaeser et al. [1995]). However, according to Desmet and Fafchamps
[2006] (p.2), this choice may lead to biased results based on a non-random selec-
tion of data that neglects the lower tail of the distribution (rural areas).
Acknowledging this possible bias, authors like Ellison and Glaeser [1999] and
Kim and Margo [2003] have found results to differ when scale is changed. Fore-
seeing that determinants of local localization may not coincide with determinants
of national patterns Ciccone and Hall [1996] developed a model using information
aggregated at two geographical levels to explain differences in productivity.8 Not
surprisingly, the small number of studies based on county data managed to find
evidence of IRS (Desmet and Fafchamps [2004, 2006]). Under the premise that
IRS tend to be overlooked if the unit of study is too broad, the main geographical
unit in this analysis is the county, however state boundaries and urban areas are
also considered in the empirical analysis to check the robustness of the results.
In this context, it is essential to emphasize the choice of counties over states or
regions and the consequent reduction in the number of sectors in this research.9
7Krugman [1991] also presented results using data by state, however, the level of sectors within
manufacturing was so detailed that he managed to find IRS evidence by state. This represents the
trade-off between being detailed at a geographical level or at an industrial level.
8AsMarshall [1898] put it: "Economies of massive production are of many different kinds: some
are cosmopolitan property, some are national, some are local, and some belong to individual firms:
each of these different kinds has its own method of affecting both the national and social issues in
question".
9Note that inputting data by county in the spreadsheet grants the classification by state at almost
no cost. In fact, regions, divisions and SMSAs are also used to control for institutional, geographical
or other effects that might affect counties’ production.
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Asmentioned,thispreferencerespondstotheprinciplethatIRShavebeenover-
lookedwhentheunitofstudywastoobig.However,acostcomesattachedtosuch
adecision:thesamplesizeincreasesfrom52to3,139observationsperindustrial
groupandthedatasetbecomessomewhatlessmanageable.
Thetrade-offbetweentheindustrialclassificationdetailandgeographicalunit
ofanalysishasbeenresolvedinfavorofthegeographicalscalefortworeasons.
First,thepreviousmethodologieshavefailedtofindIRSatgreatscales,consistent
withthehypothesisthatIRSareoriginatedlocaly. Moreover,theaggregateuse
ofsectorsalowsgreaterdetailinthegeographicalunitdimensionthatshouldnot
bewastedwhenthereissuchagapintheeconomichistoryliterature.
Thefinallongitudinaldatabasecomprisesanindustrialclassificationgrouped
bysector(primary,secondary,tertiary).Furthertothisaggregateclassification,
dataonPersonalServicesandKnowledgeIntensiveBusinessServices,whichare
theultimateinterestofthisinvestigation,arealsopresented.Thisclassification
providesbothdecentvisibilityoftheservicesectorthatcanbecontrastedwith
therestoftheeconomyandgreatergeographicaldetailthatwilsurelygraspthe
potentialeffectofIRS.
4.3.1 Locationcoefficients
Employmentdatahavenotbeenusedinrawterms.Instead,thesehavebeenused
tocomputeacoefficienttomeasurehowdisproportionalisthedistributiongeo-
graphicaly.Hoover’sIndexofLocalizationortheLocationCoefficientmeasures
thedisproportioninthealocationofemployeesofaspecificsectoriinacounty
jatperiodtwithrespecttothenationalshare.Thismagnitudeisrepresentedby
eachofthepointsthatcreatetheLorenzcurve.10Ageographicalyproportional
industrywilleadtoobservationsofHLI’sverycloseto1showingthateachcounty
hasasimilarproportionofemploymentinthesectortothenationalaverage.A
10Locationcoefficientsarederivedas
HLIij=LCij=
Eji
Ei
Ej
E
(4.1)
whereEistotalemployment,iaccountsforindustryandjforregion.
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very localized industry will lead to a broader range of observations, where most
counties will show a negative disproportion (between 0 and 0.9) and some will be
greater than 1 (up to infinity) showing a greater than proportional allocation of
sector i’s employment in the county.
Location coefficients by sector and county are the dependent variable of this
analysis as opposed to the use of raw employment data. The main reason to use
these coefficients as a dependent variable is that they are already adjusted for the
population size of each county, measuring a disproportion on the allocation of em-
ployment with respect to national averages. This avoids biased results by tackling
the effect of bigger population clusters that have more service employment.
4.3.2 Factor endowments
A way to account for the effect of factor endowments is usually to look at the
availability of resources in each region. The literature treats this in different ways:
from relative shares of factors, to instrumental variables that control for agricul-
tural productivity (Kim [1999]). In this study, the choice is limited to the use of
relative factor endowment shares by state to represent the HO variables. In this
framework, factors are arable land, capital and several kinds of labor (unskilled,
agrarian, clerical and professional). These variables have been calculated as the
state’s share of each factor with respect to the national economy.
The data on arable land come from the US Department of Agriculture that
provides data onmillions of acres of arable land per state. Data on capital stock are
difficult to find, but these are proxied by the estimations on net private capital stock
provided by Garofalo and Yamarik [2002] who provide them from 1940s onwards
and were calculated based on national trends for 1930. The records of relative
shares of labor per state were obtained from the US Census and transformed into
shares relative to the national total accordingly.
4.3.3 County Market Potential
The original definition of market potential was proposed by Harris [1954] as an
indicator of a location’s accessibility to other markets formulated as the sum of
the rest of the regions’ size (measured by GDP) and weighed by bilateral transport
costs or distances. This investigation aims to find increasing returns at county level
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and,therefore,anindicatorofstateMPmightnotbedetailedenoughtograsp
thelocaleffectofspilovers.Underthispremise,thedataofmarketpotentialis
muchmoreexhaustivethanthedataonfactorendowmentsascurrentresearchhas
provedthataggregatedataonresourcesarepowerfulenoughtoexplainindustrial
agglomeration.
Theobservationsof MPhavebeencalculatedfolowingCraftsand Mulatu
[2005]andMartínez-Galarraga[2012],whousethetraditionaldefinitionofMP
asthesumofthesizeofpotentialmarketsmeasuredbyGDPweighedbythebi-
lateraleconomicdistances:
MPi=
(j−n)
(j−1)
Mj
dij (4.2)
Economicdistanceisthedistancebetweenpairsweightedbytransportation
costs.ThesehavebeenestimatedbasedonJacksetal.[2008],Mohammedand
Wiliamson[2004]andHarris[1954]dataandareshowninTable12intheAp-
pendix.TotalMPisfurtherdecomposablebythedomesticandforeigneffect:
MPi=DMPi+FMPi (4.3)
MPi=
(1,n)
(j−i)
Ms
di,s+
(1,n)
(US−i)
MUS
di,US+SPi+FMPi (4.4)
Inthisdataset,counties’MPhasbeendecomposedintoitsDomesticMarketPoten-
tialandForeignMarketPotential.Furthermore,thedomesticelementcanbefur-
therdisentangledintothenation’s,thestateneighboringcountiesandi’sownself-
potential.FolowingCraftsandMulatu[2005]andMartínez-Galarraga[2012],
theself-potentialcomponenthasbeencalculatedasthecounty’ssizemeasuredby
GDP,dividedbytheradiusofthecirclewithanequivalentareaofthecountyto
controlfordistance:
MPi=
(1,n)
(j−i)
Ms
di,s+
(1,n)
(US−i)
MUS
di,US+
EiEs(Ms)
(1/3) areacπ
+
(1,n)
(j−i)
MF
di,F·dc,F
−0.8·coastc
(4.5)
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The formulation used to calculate MP has been simplified to adjust to data avail-
ability by assuming free trade and approximating the size of each county through
the share of state employment, leading to Real Self-Market Potential as in Combes
et al. [2008], (ch. 12). However, it has been taken into account that trade is
easier from bigger cities than from remote counties, adjusting for the distance be-
tween the domestic nodes needed to transport exports out of the county. Similarly,
coastal regions have been favored over inland regions as the traditional formula-
tion shows in equation (5).11
One of the main issues raised from this calculation is that most of the MP ef-
fect is coming from the foreign market even when focusing on small areas such
as counties. Table 4.1 shows the average level of Market Potential and its differ-
ent components in each benchmark year and its growth rates by decade. The
table shows that Market Potential has been increasing consistently through time:
decreasing transport costs, openness to trade and economic growth (greater size
of economies measured by its GDP) of countries have driven this. County Self-
potential represents a small share of the TMP composition for counties, thus, most
of the domestic effect is related to the national market. However foreign demand
coming from other counties represents the greatest component of MP and its share
is increasing over time.
Table 4.1: Average Market Potential for US counties
Level % Growth rate
Component 1930 1950 1980 2010 30-50 50-80 80-10
Foreign MP 80.66 50.80 73.59 87.58 33.44 89.98 82.2
Domestic MP 19.34 49.20 26.41 12.42 83.52 72.97 55.14
Nation 14.59 34.36 19.32 9.12 82.21 74.18 55.33
State 3.11 11.64 5.41 2.49 88.82 68.81 54.16
Self-Potential 1.65 3.20 1.68 0.81 78.39 72.37 55.99
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 58.08 85.49 78.90
Calculations based on 32 trade partners with complete data availability for all bench-
mark years expressed in 103. Source: own author’s calculations go to Appendix F for
more information.
Market Potential estimations show that overall TMP has increased through the
century, although growth has slowed down in recent decades for all components.
The trends of County Foreign MP reveal the US as one of the main world exporters
in the world since the inter-war period and the decrease in recent decades shows
11More information regarding this point is developed in the appendix.
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theupswingofotherregionsasworldproducers(Asia).IndividualMPcounty
analysisshowsthatinlandcountieshaveonaveragelowermarketpotentialthan
coastalcounties,althoughlowertransportationcostshavealowedarelativecatch
upofinlandcounties’MarketPotentialoverthecentury.
ThissectionhasexplainedthesourcesandshapeofHoover’slocationalcoef-
ficientsbysectorasthedependentvariableofthispaperandthefactorendow-
mentssharesandMarketPotentialcalculationsasexplanatoryvariablesinthe
mixedmodeloflocalization.AlthoughtherearemoredetailsintheAppendix,
thisprovidesagoodcontextinwhichtoapproachtheregressionanalysisofthe
localizationmodel.
4.4 Empiricalanalysis
4.4.1 Step1:Howimportantarefactorendowmentsforeach
sector?
ThisfirststageoftheanalysisreplicatesthemodelofthosewhodefendtheHO
view,butitisalsoasteptakenbydefendersofthemixedmodelasaprelimi-
naryanalysisoftheimpactoffactorendowmentsonagglomeration(Elisonand
Glaeser[1999];Missiaia[2014];Rosés[2003]).Themainideaistoassessthesig-
nificantimpactofendowmentsonthedisproportioninthealocationofsectorial
employmentwithoutconsideringotherregressorsinthefolowingequation:
HLIijt=αit+β1fit(N,HL,K)+eit (4.6)
Theinterestofthisexerciseliesinensuringthatfactorendowmentsaresignificant
fordetermininglocation. Table4.2showsthatindeedfactorendowmentsare
statisticalysignificanttothedisproportionalalocationofemploymentindifferent
sectors,howevermyinitialhypothesisleadsmetosuspectthepresenceofpossible
omittedvariablebiasintheestimators.12UnderthissimpleOLSframework,the
sizeanddirectionoftheestimatorsofresourceavailabilityismisleading. While
theeffectofLandabundanceissignificantlylargeandpositiveonthelocalization
12MarketPotentialiscontainedintheerrortermand,ifsignificant,theseestimatorsmustbe
biased.
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of primary sector employees and negative for any other sector, the effect of mobile
factors of production (Capital Stock and Skilled and Unskilled labor) seems mixed
across sectors. Including interaction terms on the availability of different resources
seems to yield more intuitive results in Table 4.3.
The table presents the coefficients of both single factors and interactions be-
tween factors that are used more intensively in each sector (i.e. those that allow
comparative advantage) building on the work of Kim [1999]. In this case, inter-
action terms between Land and Agrarian workers show a much higher effect than
the single factors on counties location coefficients for the primary sector.
Table 4.2: OLS Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of employment localization,
pooled sample
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
Land 35.309*** -4.019*** -2.300*** -1.463*** -1.857***
(1.102) (0.196) (0.116) (0.125) (0.143)
Artisans -111.7277*** 8.375*** 9.613*** 5.624*** 3.334***
(7.672) (1.397) (0.778) (0.881) (1.030)
Professionals 23.830*** -5.152*** -1.982** 4.779*** 4.929***
(6.711) (1.463) (0.838) (0.807) (0.837)
Clerical 41.399*** -5.063*** -3.772*** -0.977*** 0.566
(2.611) (0.599) (0.329) (0.337) (0.536)
Agrarian -1.115*** -0.075 0.011 -0.073 -0.289***
(0.524) (0.145) (0.073) (0.073) (0.091)
Capital Stock 3.205 -0.878 -1.404*** -1.188*** 2.202***
(2.676) (0.599) (0.251) (0.359) (0.339)
Unskilled 18.489 6.509*** -0.294 -6.783*** -8.569***
(5.935) (1.555) (0.861) (0.842) (0.998)
1950dummy 0.525 0.059*** 0.003 -0.264***
(0.040) (0.159) (0.007) (0.009)
1980dummy 0.928 0.294*** 0.191*** 0.039*** -0.307***
(0.052) (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
2010dummy 3.125 0.521*** -0.059*** -0.034*** -0.401***
(0.083) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 1.869*** 0.593*** 0.786*** 0.835*** 0.842***
(0.038) (0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
r-squared 0.28 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.16
N 11937 11441 11953 8976 11896
Dependent variable: Location coefficient by county. Independent variables: proportion of
factor endowments by state. Coefficients from OLS Regression for pooled observations in
1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010 (data for personal services for 1930 unavailable). Standard Er-
rors robust to heteroskedasticity in brackets under the coefficients, where (*), (**) and (***)
correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence
level. Source: own calculations.
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The sum of the single coefficients of the variables Land and Agrarian is smaller
than the significance of their interaction term. Available arable land is not enough
to produce agricultural products; there is a need for skilled labor to work this
land. The effect of Land is always significant, but the effect of Agrarian is mixed
(probably too small). Conversely, the interaction of Unskilled with Agrarian is not
significant, probably because the effect of having a great amount of Unskilled work-
ers does not allow a proper environment for agricultural production, and having a
great mass of unskilled labor might be more relevant for manufacturing and ser-
vices. Note that Table 4.3 only reports the model specifications where coefficients
are significant.
The previous results show evidence in favor of the Rybzcynski theorem: coun-
ties abundant in a factor tend to specialize in production of industries intensive
in that factor (Kim [1999]). In other words, industries concentrate where their
intensive factor is abundant. Note, however, that both the size of coefficients and
the explanatory power of the regression are much higher for the primary sector
suggesting that relative factor abundance might help explain agricultural alloca-
tion better than other sectors. Another reason behind the poor fit of this regression
is that the pooling of data neglects the evolution of production functions through
time and because different levels of disproportion might also be correlated across
time and space. For that matter, a regression that considers time and space fixed
effects would be more useful.
Considering the possible effect that regions and time could have on the dis-
proportional allocation of employees by sector, Table 4.4 shows estimates of OLS
with region fixed effects, time fixed effects and GLS random effects in case there
is dependence in the error term of the explanatory variables.13
13In order to avoid imposing a particular shape on the distribution of the error term, it was de-
cided to perform a simple regression with clustered errors at several levels (County, State, Division
and Region). These regressions yield the same coefficients than the GLS random effects estima-
tion but much higher standard errors. It was found that significance of coefficients changed when
the clustering was performed by any other level that was not the county dropping significance
at higher levels of aggregation. The exception was the regression for KIBS where results seemed
robust to any clustering level.
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Table 4.3: OLS Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of employment localization with
interaction terms, pooled sample
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
Land -4.020*** -2.191*** -1.299*** -1.768***
(0.195) (0.109) (0.116) (0.129)
Agrarian -0.148** -0.064
(0.148) (0.084)
Land*agrarian 273.217***
(12.881)
Artisans -19.206*** 5.268*** 5.260*** 5.039*** 6.649***
(6.812) (1.472) (0.655) (0.626) (0.748)
Unskilled -11.806*** 6.596 1.315* -4.335*** -6.123***
(6.495) (1.674) (0.815) (0.665) (0.789)
Professionals -30.957*** -5.235*** -1.691
(5.938) (1.47) (0.839)
Clerical 24.662*** -1.169
(2.681) (1.081)
Capital Stock 3.741
(2.775)
Capstock*Unskilled 42.026**
(24.823)
Capstock*Professional -11.209 24.513*** 33.455***
(7.475) (4.900) (7.557)
Capstock*Clerical -50.362 -16.235*** -36.458*** -36.467***
(18.204) (5.375) (6.455) (7.026)
Clerical*Professional 19.381*** 15.903***
(3.544) (4.601)
1950dummy 0.514*** 0.058*** 0.005 -0.240***
(0.039) (0.015) (0.006) (0.009)
1980dummy 0.913*** 0.292*** 0.191*** 0.037*** -0.290***
(0.055) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
2010dummy 3.115*** 0.519**** -0.059*** -0.042*** -0.382***
(0.085) (0.019) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 2.602*** 0.572*** 0.748*** 0.841*** 0.832***
(0.031) (0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
r-squared 0.220 0.182 0.147 0.05 0.160
N 11937 11441 11953 9288 12314
Dependent variable: Location coefficient by county. Independent variables: proportion of factor en-
dowments by state. Coefficients from OLS Regression for pooled observations in 1930, 1950, 1980
and 2010 (data for personal services in 1930 unavailable). Standard Errors robust to heteroskedas-
ticity in brackets under the coefficients, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly dif-
ferent from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own calculations.
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Factor coefficients still seem more relevant for the primary sector, where the
sign and significance of coefficients is robust to any of the specifications presented.
The sign of significant coefficients is behaving close to expectations in all the sec-
tors, except Capital Stock and its interaction terms for the tertiary sector. A pos-
sible reason for this result is the heterogeneity of the tertiary sector that contains
very different production functions where Capital Stock and different kinds of la-
bor may interact very differently (Section 4.2 and Table 4.7 illustrate this point
better).
The OLS estimation was tested against the region fixed effects specification by
conducting the Hausman test, where the null hypothesis was always rejected. Ad-
ditionally, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange-Multiplier tests permitted the sound rejection
of the Random Effects estimation in all sectors. This was not surprising because
the Random Effects model’s assumptions require the error term to be uncorre-
lated with the independent variables. Because Market Potential is contained in
the error term in this specification, the coefficients must necessarily be biased and
correlated with the error.
With all the evidence pointing at a fixed effects model where region effects ap-
pear significant for the three sectors, the Hausman test also shows some evidence
in favor of the two-way fixed effect specification. Yearly dummies were jointly
statistically different than zero and also individually significant. As a result, the
two-way fixed effects model seems the most appropriate specification to determine
the HO effect in the disproportional allocation of employees across counties for all
the sectors. Note that this is also the model that better fits the data according to
the R-squared.
These results hold not only for aggregate sectors, but also for service sub-
sectors shown in Table 4.5, where the two-way fixed effects model shows that Land
abundance prevents a greater than proportional allocation of services (it does not
allow the benefits of spillovers), while the joint abundance of Capital Stock and
Professional workers allow this disproportion in services with significant coeffi-
cients.
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Table 4.4: Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of regional production with interactions, fixed and random effects using a pooled sample
Variable Primary Sector Secondary Sector Tertiary Sector
Land -3.840*** -3.949*** -4.300*** -1.925*** -1.886** -2.191***
(0.203) (0.594) (0.193) (0.119) (0.355) (0.115)
Agrarian -0.050 0.050 -0.351*** -0.010 0.091 -0.094
(0.136) (0.199) (0.124) (0.089) (0.288) (0.086)
Land*agrarian 203.635*** 250.836*** 231.292***
(16.742) (15.909) (16.461)
Artisans -16.137** -5.820 -26.924** 9.940*** 9.765*** 11.216*** 4.510*** 4.279** 4.927***
(7.335) (41.841) (7.138) (1.334) (1.281) (1.281) (0.684) (0.928) (0.644)
Unskilled -47.572*** -37.097 -23.060*** 0.667 1.197 -0.061
(8.631) (64.306) (8.189) (0.767) (1.886) (0.700)
Professionals -23.984*** -23.869 -32.437*** -1.222 -0.363 -1.833
(6.744) (73.763) (6.444) (1.248) (1.145) (1.205)
Clerical 26.740*** 27.815 22.437*** -6.486*** -4.653** -6.636***
(3.464) (18.631) (3.455) (0.722) (1.429) (0.721)
Capital Stock 37.727*** 7.103 34.227***
(2.454) (20.206) (2.4612)
Capstock*Unskilled 7.559 -25.196 13.444**
(5.725) (29.013) (5.392)
Capstock*Professional -9.594 -22.860 -3.880
(8.616) (33.079) (8.546)
Capstock*Clerical -22.721*** -15.124 -20.829***
(6.037) (19.743) (6.030)
Constant 3.709*** 2.615*** 3.732*** 0.860*** 0.598*** 0.859*** 0.779*** 0.736*** 0.789***
(0.045) (0.220) (0.042) (0.010) (0.087) (0.010) (0.007) (0.084) (0.006)
r-squared 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.06
N 11937 11937 11937 11441 11441 11441 11953 11953 11953
Region fixed effects yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no
Year fixed effects no yes no no yes no no yes no
Random effects no no yes no no yes no no yes
Dependent variable: Location coefficient by county. Independent variables: proportion of factor endowments by state. Coefficients from
OLS Regression for pooled observations in 1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010 with one and two-way fixed effects and GLS Random effects.
Standard Errors in brackets under the coefficients, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients at
10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own calculations.
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Interestingly,onecouldquestionwhatthecausaldirectionofthiseffectis:i.e.
isthedisproportioninthealocationofservicescreatedbyahighshareofthis
kindofmobilefactororistheavailabilityofthisfactorcausingthegeographical
disproportioninthesector?Thisquestionwilbeaddressedagaininsection4.4.4,
asthecurrentequationisaimedtosimplytestthesignificanceofavailabilityof
resourcesonthedisproportionalalocationofworkers.
Lastly,notethattheinteractionbetweenClericalworkersandCapitalStock
hasanegativecoefficientinbothpersonalandknowledgeintensiveservices.This
couldbebecausethelowerdynamismthatalocalmarketwhereclericalwork-
ersarepresentinamorethanproportionateshare(wherebureaucracymightbe
high)leadstolessbenefitofknowledgespilovers,wherethetruepositiveeffect
goesfromprofessionalworkersbenefitingfromtheassistanceofclericallaborand
capitalstock(knowledgehubs).
4.4.2 Step2:Howhastechnologyshapedtheproductionfunc-
tionofservices?
Afterconfirmingthatindeedfactorsofproductionmatterwhendeterminingthe
geographicaldistributionofsectors,economichistoriansmightbeinterestedin
thechangesinproductionfunctionsacrosstime.
HLIi=αi+β1fi(N,HL,K)+ei (4.7)
InKim[1999]theauthoraccountsforchangesintheproductionfunctionofman-
ufacturingbylookingatthefactorintensitiesoftheproductionofmanufactur-
ingsectorsovertime.Becausetheserviceeconomyhaschangedfromproducing
mostlypersonalservicestoamoredynamicsystemwhere,obviously,technology
hasdefinedthewayworkersinteractwithotherfactors-seeBroadberryandGhosal
[2002]-itisnecessarytoassessthechangesthatproductionfunctionsmighthave
experienced.
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Table 4.5: Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of production for service sub-sectors with interaction terms, fixed and random
effects
Variable Personal Services KIBS
Land -1.001*** -1.021** -1.280*** -1.422*** -1.690*** -1.528***
(0.119) (0.220) (0.116) (0.146) (0.078) (0.142)
Artisans 5.601*** 5.557 5.096*** 9.217*** 9.509** 6.457***
(0.666) (2.419) (0.630) (0.837) (1.701) (0.790)
Unskilled -4.201*** -4.165 -4.393*** -7.293*** -8.200** -5.439***
(0.753) (2.140) (0.679) (0.947) (1.746) (0.853)
Capitalstock*professional 21.152*** 20.081* 24.741*** 10.649 27.206** 18.609**
(6.328) (7.705) (5.499) (8.519) (6.350) (7.394)
Clerical*professional 14.547*** 12.890 21.074*** 37.120*** 6.238 47.899***
(3.937) (7.787) (3.819) (4.439) (8.165) (4.176)
Clerical*capitalstock -38.008*** -36.895* -38.686*** -62.931*** -33.662** -67.194***
(7.057) (15.496) (6.565) (8.679) (8.780) (7.758)
Constant 0.825*** 0.828*** 0.838*** 0.582*** 0.823*** 0.593***
(0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.008) (0.099) (0.007)
r-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.04
N 9288 9288 9288 12314 12314 12314
Region fixed effects yes yes no yes yes no
Year fixed effects no yes no no yes no
Random effects no no yes no no yes
Dependent variable: Location Coefficient by county. Independent variables: proportion of factor endowments by state.
Coefficients from OLS Regression with one and two-way fixed effects and GLS Random effects for years 1950, 1980
and 2010. Standard Errors in brackets under the coefficients, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly
different from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own calculations.
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The following tables show changes in factor intensities in the production of
service sub-sectors by year. The outcome suggests that production functions of
services have changed over the century. For example, the effect of Capital Stock
on the localization of knowledge intensive sectors is greater in 1930 than in 1980.
In 2010, the effect of capital is only relevant through its interaction with high-
skilled workers. These variations on the relative importance of each factor on the
localization index hold for any sub-sector in the regression. Additionally, note that
the fit of the regressions improve substantially by performing yearly regressions
instead of pooled OLS regressions.
Table 4.6: Heckscher-Ohlin determinants for service employment localization by
year
Variable 1930 1950 1980 2010
Land -1.025*** -0.105 -5.105*** -4.041***
(0.217) (0.188) (0.358) (0.257)
Capital stock 0.499 0.366 -2.050 6.988***
(0.893) (0.999) (1.922) (0.853)
Artisans 13.653*** 6.297*** 13.261*** 1.399
(1.238) (1.328) (2.595) (1.451)
Professionals 9.104*** 7.869*** -25.057*** -0.955
(1.453) (1.319) (2.518) (1.276)
Clerical -4.376*** -1.661*** -9.002*** -2.001***
(0.547) (0.488) (1.031) (0.501)
Unskilled -16.096*** -11.710*** 25.719*** -1.587
(1.627) (1.656) (2.455) (1.238)
Agrarian -0.654*** -0.377*** 1.187*** -0.723***
(0.127) (0.108) (0.262) (0.137)
Constant 0.924*** 0.879*** 0.906*** 0.872***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.034) (0.014)
r2-squared 0.24 0.15 0.35 0.16
N 2969 3006 2954 3024
Region-fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Dependent variable: Location Coefficient by county. Independent variables: pro-
portion of factor endowments by state. Coefficients from OLS Regression with re-
gion fixed effects. Standard Errors in brackets under the coefficients, where (*),
(**) and (***) correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients at 10%,
5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own calculations.
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Morespecificaly,Table4.7presentstheregressionresultsofyearlycoefficients
ofaggregateservicesusingtheregionfixedeffectsmodelconsistentwiththepre-
viousstep.ItappearsthatCapitalStockhasbecomemoreintensivelyusedover
theyears.ItisalsointerestinghowLandabundanceseemstopreventthelocal-
izationofservicestoagreaterdegreeastimepasses. However,therestofthe
coefficientsleadtomixedresults;again,itisnecessarytolookattheservicesec-
torinmoredepthtoavoidmisleadingconclusionsderivedfromtheheterogeneity
ofthesector.
ThecoefficientsavailableinTable4.7suggestthatPersonalServicesbehave
differentlytoKIBS,particularlyfrom1980whentheknowledgeintensivesector
sufferedagreatchangeintheproductionfunction.Specificaly,notehowtheeffect
ofCapitalStockismuchhigherforKIBSthanforPersonalservices(particularly
fromthe1980sfromtheinteractionofCapitalStockandProfessionallabor).The
evolutionoftheLandandAgrarianlaborcoefficientsisalsonoteworthy,when
thenegativeeffectitcausesontheagglomerationofserviceemploymentseems
increasingovertime.Thisleadstotheideaofasnowbaleffect,wherethemigra-
tionofskiledlabortomoreurbanizedareasapplies,asMoretti[2012]observes.
Again,theeffectofClericalworkersabundanceisunclearacrosstime. Whilethe
coefficientUnskiledworkersisconsistentwiththedefinitionofKIBS,negativeand
significantacrossalbenchmarkyears.TheeffectofUnskiledlaborischanging
throughtimeinthecaseofPersonalservices,probablybecausetheemployment
ofUnskiledworkersisspreadacrosssectorsastheyjointhesectorthatisgrowing
ateachperiodoftime(manufacturingbefore1980,personalserviceslateron).
4.4.3 Step3:Doesmarketpotentialaffectthedisproportionof
employment?
Uptonow,resultsareinfavoroftherelevanceoffactorendowmentsinthegeo-
graphicaldistributionofemploymentandthedifferenceofintensitiesacrosstime.
ThelaststepofthisanalysisinvolvesaddingthevariableofMarketPotentialto
themodel:
HLIij=αi+β1fi(N,HL,K)+β2MarketPotentiali+ei (4.8)
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This formulation of the industrial disproportion of employment (HLI) explains the
localization in two components. The first element of the equation represents the
function of the relative endowments of the county, the Heckscher-Ohlin effect, and
the second part accounts for Market Potential (MP).
Including Market Potential in the model has three straightforward effects on
results. First, Market Potential is relevant and significant for all sectors. MP cor-
relates positively for all sectors except for the primary sector where it has a large
negative effect. Second, when MP is added to the regression equation, most of the
HO factors become insignificant and inconsistent with previous results. Lastly, it
increases the fit of the regression.
Table 13 in the appendix presents the regressions of locational indexes of ser-
vices using the complete model specification as explained in equation (7). These
results are calculated using the two-way fixed effects regression that was proved
the best possible specification in previous sections. However, random effects and
pooled data have also been ruled out in this new model.14 Profiting from the de-
composability of TMP, this step can be used to capture where IRS originates by
regressing the different elements of TMP in the same model. Results of the regres-
sion of Self-Potential and HO on the locational coefficient (in Table 14 also in the
appendix) do not differ greatly with Total Market Potential. In fact, most of the
resources remain insignificant while the coefficient of Self-Potential is still more
extreme.
Table 4.8 shows the yearly coefficients with fixed effects for the service econ-
omy. The coefficients report the increasing importance of local market potential
from decade to decade. The coefficient is twice as big for the knowledge intensive
sector from 1980 onwards. This leads to the powerful conclusion that the scale
effect is experienced at a local level more than at an international or national level.
In other words, according to these results, Increasing Returns do affect the local-
ization of employees, particularly those of the service economywho have gradually
agglomerated where local demand was high.
14The Hausman test led to a rejection of the null hypothesis that OLS could be more efficient than
the fixed effects estimation. Fixed time effects proved jointly significant through yearly dummies
and Breusch-Pagan test soundly rejected the possibility of random effects.
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Table 4.7: Services localization determinants by year
Variable Personal Services KIBS
1950 1980 2010 1950 1980 2010 1980 2010
Land -0.577** -1.898*** -3.924*** -0.141 -2.923*** -5.953*** -2.598*** -4.715***
(0.226) (0.201) (0.308) (0.335) (0.341) (0.415) (0.358) (0.407)
Agrarian -0.306** -0.803*** -0.566*** 0.168 -1.181*** -1.217*** -1.159*** -0.698*
(0.144) (0.148) (0.173) (0.212) (0.250) (0.233) (0.419) (0.405)
Artisans 6.943*** 2.188 -1.986 3.352 -9.115*** 4.858** 10.091*** 9.593***
(1.682) (1.464) (1.779) (2.493) (2.470) (2.392) (1.663) (1.598)
Unskilled -10.397*** -8.616*** 3.764** -4.660 -13.904*** -6.141*** -12.946*** -2.459
(1.985) (1.238) (1.646) (2.937) (2.087) (2.216) (1.887) (1.798)
Clerical -0.011 -1.422** -0.846 0.957 7.820*** -3.643***
(0.693) (0.562) (0.653) (1.025) (0.945) (0.878)
Professionals 7.314*** 3.537*** -4.629*** -3.114 5.778*** -1.172
(1.571) (1.068) (1.433) (2.318) (1.807) (1.928)
Capital Stock -3.541*** 7.910*** 7.764*** 2.726 13.207*** 11.708***
(1.156) (1.068) (1.032) (1.715) (1.803) (1.389)
Capital*professional 51.718*** 51.870***
(13.028) (11.991)
Clerical*capital -14.572 -70.040***
(10.999) (10.335)
Constant 0.980*** 0.997*** 0.956*** 0.586*** 0.746*** 0.573*** 0.796*** 0.533***
(0.028) (0.020) (0.026) (0.042) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
r-squared 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.08
N 3006 2946 3024 2991 2926 3010 3029 3114
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Dependent variables: proportion of factor endowments by state. Coefficients
from OLS Regression with one and two-way fixed effects and GLS Random effects. Standard Errors in brackets under the coefficients,
where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own
calculations.
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Table 4.8: Determinants of HLI service sub-sectors by year
Variable Personal Services KIBS
1950 1980 2010 1930 1950 1980 2010
Land 0.697 -1.295*** -2.432*** -1.180 -0.496 -0.364*** -2.432***
(0.507) (0.293) (0.710) (0.925) (0.765) (1.332) (0.710)
Artisans 2.347 2.819 4.727 12.249*** 8.570 4.618 4.727
(1.508) (1.610) (2.708) (2.618) (3.857) (4.252) (2.708)
Unskilled -4.192** 1.281 -2.775 -8.455 -9.597 -14.585** -2.775
(2.296) (2.274) (3.772) (4.825) (5.999) (4.796) (3.772)
Capital*Professional -19.222 -40.465* -17.792 -69.946 98.200 91.182 -17.792
(24.616) (20.222) (26.548) (102.252) (69.898) (85.885) (26.548)
Clerical*professional 43.494 -24.934 -67.871*** -36.922 -115.812** 26.484 -67.871
(29.856) (18.894) (20.111) (19.837) (47.646) (25.145) (20.111)
Clerical*Capital -18.765 -47.727 83.654 -9.387 54.447 -38.861 83.655
(25.026) (37.110) (43.740) (49.891) (29.991) (53.699) (43.739)
log MP 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.040*** 0.011*** -0.003 0.019*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.0034)
Constant 0.278*** 0.162*** 0.259*** -0.198*** 0.577*** -0.291*** -0.475
(0.149) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.054) (0.109) (0.187)
r-squared 0.028 0.065 0.048 0.145 0.008 0.044 0.048
N 3107 3043 3052 3132 3092 3023 3108
Dependent variable: Location coefficient by county. Dependent variables: proportion of factor endowments by state and
County Local Market Potential. Coefficients from OLS Regression with one and two-way fixed effects and GLS Random
effects. Standard Errors in brackets under the coefficients, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly different
from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own calculations.
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The good news for NEG advocates leads to unsatisfactory results of the mixed
model and indicate the necessity of a test of Market Potential as a single explana-
tory variable. The information presented in Table 4.9 shows the results of the single
regression of locational coefficients on the logarithm of different components of
Market Potential.
Table 4.9: OLS Market Potential effect in localization, pooled data
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
Log Total MP -0.396*** 0.037** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.026***
r-squared 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.15
Log Foreign MP -0.289*** 0.031** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.023***
r-squared 0.25 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.15
Log Self-Potential -1.169*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.120***
r-squared 0.46 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.28
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Independent variables:
Logarithm of Market Potential by county (Foreign, Domestic, SP). Coefficients from
two-way fixed effects regression from pooled data for 1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010
where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients
at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. R-squared of the simple regression reported
under the coefficient. Source: own calculations.
One might regard the effect of market potential on localization as relatively
small, however its marginal effect is quite high in comparison to other variables:
the marginal effect of Log Total MP at means for the two way fixed effects model
is equal to 0.117 in the localization index of KIBS, while the marginal effect at
means of land represents a value of -0.603 (from Table 13). These coefficients
provide evidence in favor of Increasing Returns as the explanation of not only ser-
vices and manufacturing but also agriculture, where Market Potential has always
been left off the table. In this case, it seems that regions where Self-Potential is
high prevent the localization of agricultural industries. In other words, Agriculture
cannot be produced close to urban areas. In this context one may question the pos-
sible simultaneous causality problem in this model specification, as it is clear that
agricultural production must have been established in certain areas prior to ur-
banization. The trials with random effects specifications have reported very high
Lagrange-Multiplier coefficient, which rules out the Random Effects specification
in favor of Fixed Effects. This time, the error term could be assumed independent
to the variables included in the model, however further checks are required to
solve these doubts.
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4.4.4 Testing for endogeneity
Up to this point, the text has focused on the use of variables dependent on mobile
factors of production. However, there remains the problem that Market Potential
could be simultaneously determined in the model.
For starters, the simple calculation of Total Market Potential implies that at
least the local component of market potential is completely dependent on the size
of the region measured by GDP. Furthermore, Self-Potential is determined by the
relative factor prices of resource endowments of each allocation. These factor
prices are in turn dependent on the number of people in the county. A high Loca-
tional Coefficient of KIBS will lead to higher wages for Skilled workers, resulting
in the migration of skilled workers to the county. All in all, finding an instrument
that accords with Combes et al. [2008] could be a solution to the potential bias
caused by the simultaneous causation problem.
As we have seen, panel data allow for the isolation of year specific and also re-
gion specific factors that could affect both locational coefficients and factor prices,
but the interaction between the agglomeration of workers and both Market Po-
tential and Factors can only be isolated through the use of instrumental variables.
The instruments chosen in this context include the lag of mobile resource endow-
ments (the allocation of resources of 1930 to determine the localization patterns of
1950 and so on). I considered using the lag of Market Potential in a similar fash-
ion, however, since Redding and Venables [2004] find that the Foreign element
of Total Market Potential is completely exogenous, it was used as an instrument
for Total Market Potential. 15 The complete IV regression was performed in the
Generalized Method of Moments because it allows clustering the standard errors
by region. The first experiment involved the test of all the variables in the model.
The results from this regression show that both resource endowments and market
potential are significant across counties, leading to some hope for the use of the
mixed model. Complete regression results can be found in the appendix, Table
15. However, further tests of endogeneity on the instrumented variables lead to
the invalidation of these results because the Hausman test was not significant for
any of the instrumented mobile factor endowments. Based on this result and the
15Combes et al. suggest the use of a natural disaster as an instrument for Market Potential. The
famous 1974 Tornado Outbreak was used but it did not yield significant results.
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previous step showing Market Potential as the only significant variable, the same
experiment was performed using only Total Market potential instrumented by its
foreign element as the explanatory variable of location coefficients. Results are
shown in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: GMM: Instrumented Market Potential effect on localization, pooled data
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
log TMP -0.818*** 0.099*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.054***
(0.017) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 16.597*** -1.127*** -0.144*** -0.346*** -0.086
(0.354) (0.087) (0.045) (0.061) (0.054)
r-squared 0.28 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.16
N 12343 11818 12358 9278 12301
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Independent variables:
Logarithm of Market Potential by county instrumented by Logarithm of Foreign Mar-
ket Potential. Coefficients from IV regression with year and region fixed effects for the
years 1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to signifi-
cantly different from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Standard
errors clustered by region reported under the coefficients. Source: own calculations.
GMM regression results provide evidence for Market Potential even when there
is evidence for it being endogenous. Foreign Market Potential is a strong instru-
ment for Total Market Potential. The resulting coefficients of the instrumented
variable are significant for all the sectors and show the expected sign: positive for
all sectors and negative for agriculture. However, this regression shows that prior
coefficients were probably biased. According to these results, Market Potential
has the strongest effect on agricultural production, although it is a negative one.
In other words, newest industries will allocate where there is greater Market Po-
tential which is where agriculture is not present. These positive results lead one
to question whether the purely endogenous component of Total Market Potential
(Self-Potential) could be analyzed in the same manner. The analogue analysis
of self-potential yielded surprising results. The self-potential coefficient instru-
mented by foreign market potential was always significant. It replicated the sign
that was obtained in the previous experiment, but this time the coefficient was
more extreme. The R-squared of the regression doubled in all cases except in the
secondary sector, showing that in fact, local market potential was more impor-
tant for explaining the allocation of employment for services than for total market
potential.
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Surprisingly, the impact of log Self-Potential is significantly larger for the agri-
cultural sector than the tertiary sector. Market size seems to have a greater effect
on the localization of agricultural employees than any other sector. More than this,
the R-squared of the primary sector is significantly bigger than for KIBS in this re-
gression. These coefficients seem to point at why KIBS do not allocate in certain
areas based on the persistence of specialization in the primary sector. If the size of
the local market is small, very skilled service employees are less likely to live there,
urbanization is less likely to be high and the transmission of local spillovers is more
difficult. The successful land exploitation of a county persists through time in the
most appropriate areas and prevents the settlement of industries that require IRS.
Table 4.11: GMM: Instrumented Market Self-Potential effect on localization, pooled data
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
log Self-Potential -1.715*** 0.211*** 0.114*** 0.099*** 0.114***
(0.037) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 27.638*** -2.536*** -0.857*** -1.008*** -0.837
(0.597) (0.151) (0.070) (0.088) (0.081)
r-squared 0.47 0.15 0.25 0.19 0.30
N 12343 11798 12338 9258 12276
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Independent variables:
Logarithm of County Self-Potential instrumented by Logarithm of Foreign Market Po-
tential. Coefficients from IV regression with year (1930, 1950, 1980 and 2010) and
region fixed effects, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly different
from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Standard errors clustered
by region reported under the coefficients. Source: own calculations.
These tests seem to favor the result that Market Potential determines the alloca-
tion of all industries. However, the link between Market Potential and agricultural
production is so strong that there seems to be an underlying relationship between
Market Size and natural endowments. These results may point in the same direc-
tion as Davis and Weinstein [2003], who claim that physical geography may be
the most important determinant of economic geography.
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4.5 Conclusions
Prior work has stressed both the contribution of resource endowments and market
potential to the geographical allocation of production. However, most studies have
relied on manufacturing data, neglecting the worth of an important part of the
economy. This investigation is motivated by the gap in the localization literature
regarding the service economy, the motor of US employment dynamics in the late
20th century according to Desmet and Fafchamps [2004]. The observation that
Knowledge Intensive activities tend to localize in densely populated metropolitan
areas more than proportionally motivates this study, which constitutes the first
attempt to understand the causes of localization of the service economy based
on the methodology of Kim [1995]; Krugman [1991] and Rosés [2003], among
others.
The conclusions that arise from this investigation are manifold: firstly, relative
factor endowments were found to be significant in determining industrial localiza-
tion, especially through interaction terms between complementary factors of pro-
duction for each industry. Moreover, technological improvements have changed
the use in which factors of production interact, increasing the relative intensity of
capital in all sectors (individually or through its interaction with labor). However,
introducing Market Potential in the equation dispels the significance of endow-
ments. In fact, Market Potential seems to explain a large part of the location of
economic activities. More specifically, this analysis has identified that its local el-
ement (county Self-Potential) is the main contributor to localization patterns of
the service economy. In other words, Increasing Returns to scale (spillover effects,
closeness to specialized labor force and competitors and providers) are originated
locally and attract more services into the city, confirming that many studies have
overlooked the local nature of IRS by choosing geographical units of analysis that
are too broad (Kim [1995, 1998]).
This investigation points at NEG as the sole explanation of localization, instead
of the mixed model of localization defended by Dumais et al. [2002], not only for
services but for all sectors. The most surprising finding is that market access seems
to be incompatible with the localization of agricultural production, which requires
the intensive use of land. The evident incompatibility between the snowball effect
of increasing returns and the long term persistence of land exploitation is obvi-
108
ous from this perspective. This study therefore indicates that the good precondi-
tions for agricultural production prevent the development of the service economy
through the persistence of agricultural agglomeration and its conflict with large
market potential.
The analysis of the service economy has proven that increasing returns to scale
explain localization as long as the analysis is performed on the appropriate geo-
graphical scale, not only in the service economy, but in any sector. However, the
strong negative relationship between agriculture and market potential seems to
point to physical geography as a constraint for increasing returns. Although these
results underscore the NEG side of the debate, there is some hope for the defend-
ers of the mixed model. Nevertheless, these results present broad data on personal
and knowledge intensive sectors in contrast with aggregated manufacturing and
agriculture. Future work could explore the link between Market Potential and the
persistence of natural geography that could be determining the history of services.
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CHAPTER 5
Knowledge shocks diffusion and the resilience of regional
inequality
An investment in knowledge always
pays the best interest.
Benjamin Franklin, 1758
This chapter provides a simplified method of exploring the geographical
limits of a knowledge shock over the long run. Using a geographically de-
composable distance-weighed sum of world GDPs by county, differences in
differences regression analysis shows that a new university will not only have
a positive impact on the local economy, but also on the GDP of nearby counties.
Furthermore, challenging the conventional wisdom that knowledge spillovers
affect the local economy, this study provides evidence that the effect expands
to the whole nation although its strength dilutes with distance. Consistent
with the education literature, this investigation provides evidence that the
shock will make the relative GDP of foreign competitors worse-off. Results
are persistent in the long run, although the effect of time is also decreas-
ing. Results are robust to potential endogeneity related to the self-selection
of prosperous allocations for new academic institutions.
JEL classification: L8, N72, R11, O18.
Keywords: New Economic Geography, Spillovers, U.S. Counties.
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5.1 Introduction
The search for policies to fight the regional persistence of inequality is crucial
in industrialized economies. A number of contributions to the economic history
literature have shown that high-value added sectors tend to cluster in particular
regions and promote a process of de-industrialization in the rest of the economy,
creating long-term divergences that lead the population tomove toward these clus-
ters in search of higher income.1 These policies might include national subsidies,
tax reductions, federal minimum wage increases or locally planned projects that
promote business creation or service provision like new airports, freeways or the
improvement of local administration to hopefully increase or maintain the popu-
lation (Moretti [2002]).
In 1949, the Federal Government of the United States decided to investigate
the power of nuclear energy. The fear that nuclear power could harm the health
of the population led to the search for an isolated desert to locate the nuclear en-
ergy research facility.2 In less than two decades, Idaho, formerly known as the
Potato State, was among the top-100 biggest metropolitan areas in the country.
The population of Idaho Falls and its surrounding counties had increased, had
become much more skilled, and enjoyed higher living standards. The creation of
this national research facility led to a presumably unexpected upswing in terms of
population and income that accumulated further growth in nearby counties. This
study explores the geographical impact of a knowledge shock as urged by two
fathers of the New Economic Geography (Fujita and Krugman [2003]) and chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom that knowledge spillovers act locally. Evidence
shows that the effect of local investments tend to spread to the whole nation and
make foreign competitors comparatively worse-off, ceteris paribus. These conclu-
sions prove that development processes should be assessed in spatial, territorial
and scalar terms and provide optimistic prospects for those in favor of policy de-
centralization and devolution (Pike et al. [2007]; Rodríguez-Pose andGill [2003]).
Local policy-makers that can contest regional inequality, but also promote national
competitiveness through micro-investments.
1Enflo and Rosés [2015] explore the Swedish late industrialization period and the policy efforts
to decrease regional inequality, Autor et al. [2008] do the same for the US in the last few decades.
2National Reactor Testing Station.
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I propose an experiment that considers the appearance of a new academic in-
stitution as a knowledge shock and performs a common differences in differences
methodology to observe the significance of the knowledge shock in comparison
with an untreated control group. The main contribution of this paper is the sim-
plification of the methodology to obtain results that would usually require com-
plicated spatial econometrics: by disentangling the county geographical impact of
GDP into layers, I can test the significance of the shock at different levels, avoiding
the nuisance of complicated county neighboring matrices. An additional contri-
bution is the consideration of the whole range of counties in the USA rather than
only cities or metropolitan areas, which usually lead to biased conclusions.
The basic empirical results show that the establishment of new universities
during the 20th century had a positive impact not only on the local economy and
its nearby counties, but also on distant locations within the nation. Moreover,
ceteris paribus, a new academic institution in any county of the USA made foreign
competitors relatively worse-off in terms of GDP. The effects of knowledge shocks
seem stronger in closer locations and milder, but significant, in more distant areas.
Similarly, the effect of the shock seems to slowly wear-out over time. However,
these effects seem to persist over the whole century. Testing the significance of
the shock in per capita terms shows that the effect in productivity is only local and
the shock affects nearby regions through a multiplier effect as in Moretti [2010].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
historical background on the higher education system of the United States in con-
text with urban growth during the last century. Section 3 develops the theoretical
framework and main hypothesis, followed by a description of the variables and the
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents results and robustness checks and Section 6
concludes.
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5.2 Historical background
The economic history of the United States is a story of skills and human capital.
Its academic institutions have not only turned the Human Capital Century into
the American Century (Goldin and Katz [2009]), but have also driven the diver-
gence of regional economic performance over the century. While the relevance of
academic and research institutions has only recently become evident, it has been
an important driver of economic growth for a long period of time. The following
paragraphs summarize the origins of the American higher education system.
As a consequence of the fear that the imprudent European tendencies would
corrupt their souls, the Puritans who travelled to the New World launched the
precursors of college institutions in the first settlement allocations at the end of the
17th century. These would become the well-known institutions of Harvard, Yale,
andWilliam&Mary Universities. Originally theseweremeant to produce educated
gentlemen whose "business (was) to spread religion and learning amongmankind"
[Geiger, 2014, pp. 11]. The evolution and emergence of these institutions was
slow and always related to local religious elites.
The initial courses included theological and literary education and grammar
subjects; the introduction of ancient languages like Greek and Hebrew to study
sacred original texts motivated the introduction of logic and other mathematical
areas, but the low depth of scientific knowledge did not yet reflect intellectual
advances in Europe until well into the 18th century. Eventually, the American elite
accepted that scientific knowledge could make laborers more productive, and thus
Newtonian scientific doctrine started to be taught in US colleges. By 1836 the
academic system even allowed higher education for women. However, the elitist
character of these institutions forced the imbalance between theoretical science
and practical applications for gentlemen. Under the rising scarcity of mechanical
and agricultural engineers, fostered by the railroad boom of the 1840s, some non-
college alternatives started to arise in the cities like mechanics and polytechnic
institutes.
The role of private sector investment went hand in hand with the growth of
"useful knowledge". By the second half of the 19th century, America had turned
into a world reference of technological advance. The land grant promoted by
President Lincoln (Morrill Act, 1862) helped revolutionize higher education by
114
providing states with public lands to create universities specializing in agriculture,
mechanics, and military tactics. This was the beginning of mass higher education,
as congressman Morrill envisioned the existence of a college in each state as an
opportunity "accessible to all, but especially to the sons of the toil . . . thousand
willing and expecting to work their way through the world by the sweat of their
brow" [Geiger, 2014, pp. 281].
In the 20th century, the higher education system offered students the widest
range of opportunities in the world (around 1,400 institutions offering bachelor’s
degrees in several areas). As Goldin and Katz [2009] put it, the system was ge-
ographically spread and accessible to all kinds of economic and intellectual back-
grounds. While the role of mass education has been crucial for the productive
structure of the country, the location of Universities seems to create regional di-
vergences in the US territory. First, colleges were established even when secondary
education was not yet standardized, so that the mass movement toward college
had to be led by the diffusion of secondary schooling. Although both kinds of in-
stitutions were originally decentralized, public and open to all genders and races,
a minimum scale was needed to create such institutions. Just as the first colleges
appeared in the first populated settlements, secondary schools were allocated in
towns with at least 3,000 people in 1903 (Goldin and Katz [2009]). This threshold
set a precedent for the divergence between rural and urban growth.
The effects of academic education on growth are directly visible on labor pro-
ductivity through an increase in the quality of the workforce (see Caselli and Cole-
man [2002]), but there are also indirect effects: higher income generated by labor
productivity raises physical capital investment and the capital to labor ratio; also,
the quality of the workforce facilitates the diffusion of innovations and ideas. Thus,
regions with higher levels of education are expected to grow faster. At the begin-
ning of the century, all the regions below the population boundary would be at a
practical disadvantage of growth opportunities, although evidence suggests that
town size is negatively correlated with school attendance rates [Goldin and Katz,
2009, pp. 224]. This negative correlation is explained by the relative opportunity
costs of schooling as well as the quality derived by a higher share of students per
school in biggest cities. Nevertheless, the demand for skills gradually changed in
the cities. US occupational data from Edwards [1943] show that in the late 19th
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century, only 10 per cent of the workforce was engaged in jobs requiring educa-
tion beyond secondary school, by 1920 more than a quarter of the jobs required
high school or college education. The proliferation of white-collar occupations
was accompanied by the structural change of the economy.
Regional specialization determines the average level of human capital: while
mining regions are associated with relatively lower effects of knowledge spillovers
and have remained small, cities that grew around the textile industry were
crowded with unskilled labor and only grew at the beginning of the 20th century.
In contrast, commercial towns that specialized in skill-intensive activities like ac-
counting, advertising and law tended to become large cities over the same period
(Chicago, Boston, New York). This way, in the 1930s the population in Idaho Falls
was specialized in the production of agricultural products and their low wages
responded to their skills level. After the knowledge shock, represented by the es-
tablishment of the Nuclear Research Center, their production bundle diversified by
including valuable knowledge intensive services (nuclear energy research), and
the population grew by attracting scientific employees that earned much higher
salaries, fostering the creation of new businesses and, eventually, raising living
standards.
The analogy between the Human Capital Century and the American Century
is not only motivated by the higher human capital increase of the American la-
bor force over the century, but also because the change was not comparable to
the standards of any other nation, which led to the great divergence between the
US and the rest of the world and also the increasing domestic inequality within
the country. The next section explores the different views proposed in the litera-
ture for exploring the role of educational differentials on regional disparities, and
explains how this chapter differs from spatial models to account for knowledge
shocks across space and time.
5.3 Theoretical framework
The link between urban growth and human capital has been widely studied.
Glaeser et al. [2014, 1995] and Simon and Nardinelli [2002], among others, iden-
tified human capital and skills as an important factor behind the growth of cities
after WW2. The theoretical base comes from the evidence that the existence of
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urban clusters is derived from the positive external effects of human capital (in-
creasing returns to scale); without these, rational citizens would not bear the costs
of moving to crowded clusters just as observed by Lucas [1988]. Endogenous
growth models argue that innovation comes from the mix of labor, human capital
and knowledge. In this sense, the proliferation of institutions providing human
capital is expected to promote higher growth and urbanization. A crucial question
is whether urbanization is exogenous to the localization of new academic institu-
tions or whether there is a self-selection process instead.
This chapter offers a view in which the localization of a new academic insti-
tution acts as a positive knowledge shock to the county. The objective is not to
show that a shock improves the local economy, as that has already been repeat-
edly proven on several occasions (Anselin et al. [1997],Goldin and Katz [2009],
Krueger and Lindahl [2001]). Instead, this research addresses the extent to which
local spillovers spread geographically and whether these effects persist over time.
The analysis of such shocks on economic activity is not new in economic history,
however the spatial diffusion of local shocks over the long run has never been
investigated with this much detail. Recently, the New Economic Geography litera-
ture advocated for the need for this kind of analysis (Fujita and Krugman [2003])
to prove that development policies can act through scalar, spatial and territorial
redistribution (Pike et al. [2007]).
The literature on urban economics has explored the effects of external shocks
on the spatial distribution of economic activity in several areas, finding mixed re-
sults. The pessimistic view can be well exemplified by Redding et al. [2011], who
use the German division after WW2 and its later reunification as a natural ex-
periment of an external shock to the location of the air transport industry. They
show that neither endowments nor market access differentials are big enough to
explain the reallocation of the air hub from Berlin to Frankfurt. They suggest that
the differential between local economic activity is not a good predictor either, in-
stead, the selection of Frankfurt as the localization of the main air hub in Germany
responds to a relatively small external intervention (US setting Frankfurt as the
main air transport base) that influenced the location of the new hub given the
large investments required for its functioning. Their conclusion that German re-
unification was not a sufficiently big shock to return the hub to its pre-war location
casts evidence against the ability of policy to shift economic activity from an exist-
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ing steady state. On the same track, Davis and Weinstein [2002] showed that the
allocation of cities in Japan was persistent over 8 thousand years and the massive
destruction of the atomic bombs did not alter the original allocation of the main
cities. This localization persistence is explained by fundamentals and the degree
of inequality is accounted for by increasing returns, but again, the effect of shocks
is only temporary and does not change the steady state. WW2 bombings in Ger-
many also offer an opportunity to analyze the reconstruction of markets in their
original cities. According to Brakman et al. [2004], the effects are significant for
both areas; however the bombings affected the reallocation and growth of cities
permanently in East Germany and temporarily in West Germany, where increasing
returns slowly took over city growth path in the long run.
On the other hand, a number of studies reveal opposing conclusions. Local
shocks generated by the expansion of transport facilities like the railroad (At-
ack et al. [2010]) or highways (Baum-Snow [2007]) have provided evidence on
changes in the urbanization rates of counties and cities in the mid-19th and mid-
20th century. Other authors have proved the significance of negative shocks like
wars, or factor input shortages. For example, Hanlon [2014] studies the Ameri-
can cotton supply drop during the Civil War, finding temporary growth effects and
permanent level effects on population in British cotton towns.
These contradicting views on the effects of external shocks are generally look-
ing for changes in steady state aggregates or local changes in levels or growth
magnitudes in comparison to a prior situation; however, the effects of local shocks
on neighboring areas remains largely unexplored. Hornbeck and Keniston [2014]
have surveyed this area by performing a very local study on the impact of the
Great Fire of Boston in 1872 on land prices of unburned nearby areas. They ar-
gue that in a period of intense growth, the fire motivated a reconstruction that
increased the property values of the burned areas more than proportionally. This
was a consequence of the parallel reformation of nearby buildings, showing that
the reconstruction led to the spread of local spillovers. In the same line of work,
Simon and Nardinelli [2002] find that the extent of spillovers works at the city
level.
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Scholars have tried to study the economic impact of research institutions fol-
lowing two paths. Taking a microeconomic perspective, some scholars evaluate
single-case institutions through the analysis of economic fundamentals like spend-
ing, investment and employment rates or more sophisticated variables like the
creation of spin-off firms, or the assessment of university-linkaged firms; others
use surveys on firms evaluating the local effects of an institution on their deci-
sions. Using a macroeconomic approach, economists like Grilliches [1979] and
Jaffe [1989] have generated models based on knowledge production functions de-
rived from the location of institutions, while others have designed cross-sectional
econometric experiments that evaluate the economic impact of these institutions.
These four approaches have different benefits and drawbacks and are efficiently
summarized in Drucker and Goldstein [2007]. In this perspective, the framework
I use follows an econometric cross-section experiment on different years (because
the data set is actually a panel).
In this area of work, Anselin [2000], using a knowledge production function à
la Grilliches-Jaffe, showed that universities generate local spillovers across partic-
ularly high technology sectors like Electronics and Instruments, extending up to a
75-mile range to the boundary of Metropolitan Areas, while Drugs and Chemicals
and Machinery showed no significant spillover effects. Positive evidence on univer-
sity R&D was previously suggested at the state level by Anselin et al. [1997] using
the same approach. Additional studies have proven that industries where new
economic knowledge plays an important role have a higher propensity to cluster
together (Audretsch and Feldman [1996]) in regions and also across nations (Cia-
rli et al. [2012]). These positive results offer an opportunity to policy-makers who
wish to design economic policies to promote regional growth under the influence
of increasing returns to scale at various geographic levels. However, Audretsch
et al. [2012] underline the need to be cautious about the potential crowding out
effect of private research activity under the provision of publicly funded research.
This investigation extends empirical evidence on three different aspects: first,
the geographical framework covers the whole territory of the USA using smaller
geographical areas than States or Metropolitan Areas. More specifically, the use of
counties increases the number of observations from 50 or 125 to more than 3,000;
in addition, it provides a much better view of the diffusion of local spillovers by
including not only cities or metropolitan areas, but also rural counties, whereas
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the traditional literature is generally biased towards the isolated analysis of urban
areas. Secondly, the sample extends evidence to five benchmark years, presenting
a longer-term view of results. Lastly, instead of considering the use of a spatial
lags model (Anselin [2000]; Anselin et al. [1997]), the methodology explores the
spatial extent of spillovers using an alternative measure: a distance-weighed sum
of GDP that can be decomposed at different geographical scales to identify the
extent of the shock.
The use of this framework allows one to ascertain the impact of a new univer-
sity over distance and time. Say, a new university is established in Fresno in 1911;
by 1915 it will have presumably attracted some students that will eventually be-
come part of a pool of skilled workers. With some luck, the pool of skilled workers
can foster the creation of new firms that may capture the knowledge spillovers
from the university. The increase in local demand will attract other kinds of work-
ers and services with the consequent rise of local income and wages as explained
by Moretti [2004].
The central question is whether this shock will affect the well-being in adjacent
counties such as San Benito or even spread to more distant counties like Inyo.
Further, will this shock expand to Nevada? Will it maybe affect Kansas? How long
will the impact last for any of these layers? The following section outlines the way
a distance-weighed GPD index can provide a measure of the effects of a knowledge
shock and describes how it has been obtained and provides a description of the
variables and their sources.
5.4 Data and empirical strategy
5.4.1 The data set
The current data set is a panel on distance-weighed Total GDP observations by
county over five benchmark years during the 20th century (1930, 1950, 1980 and
2010). Thus, the number of observations amounts to a total of 12,512: five time-
series observations for 3,130 counties. This measure provides the means to in-
vestigate the geographical expansion of the shock econometrically using a simple
differences in differences model. The distance-weighed sum of GDPs is similar to
the concept of Market Potential, originally defined by Harris [1954] as the sum
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oftheGDPsofpotentialcommercialpartnersweighedbybilateraltransportcosts
ordistances.Thisspecificationtakesintoaccountthattwoadjacentcountieswil
haveagreaterchanceoftradethantwodistantcounties,withnoneedtousea
neighboringmatrix.Inthissense,itcanbedefinedasalocation’saccessibilityto
theothermarkets,andcanbeformulatedas:
MPi=
(j−n)
(j−1)
Mj
dij (5.1)
MarketPotentialaccountsnotonlyforlocalGDP,butalsoforalpotentialtrade
withneighboringcountieswithinastate,withthenationasawhole,andeven
withothernations;thisisusefulbecauseitprovidesadetailedviewoftheexten-
sionofthemarketbasedonbilateraltransportcostsandthesizeofothermarkets.
MorebackgroundinformationonMarketPotentialcanbefoundintheappendix.
Inasimilarway,thedistance-weightedtotalGDPcanbesplitintodifferentcom-
ponentstoaddresstheextensionoftheimpactofanewuniversity.
Distance-weighedTotalGDPobservationsforeachcountyhavebeencon-
structedfolowingthe methodologiesusedbyCraftsand Mulatu[2005]and
Martínez-Galarraga[2012],whocomputeMarketPotentialusingitsdifferentge-
ographiccomponents.ThisdatasetprovidesvisibilityonForeign,Domestic,State
andcountyGDPself-impactaswel.
Table5.1:Geographycomponentsparticipationoncountydistance-weighedGDP
AverageParticipation %Growthrates
Component 1930 1955 1980 2010 30-50 50-80 80-2010
Foreign 80.66 50.80 73.59 87.58 33.44 89.98 82.27
Domestic 19.34 49.20 26.41 12.42 83.12 73.18 55.42
State 14.59 34.36 19.32 9.12 82.21 74.18 55.33
Neighbors 3.11 11.64 5.41 2.49 87.14 69.99 55.56
Local 1.65 3.20 1.68 0.81 78.39 72.37 55.9
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 57.89 85.52 78.89
Source:OwncalculationsfromUSCensusBureau,InternalRevenueServiceforDomestic
dataandWTO(2005)andMaddison(2010)forinternationaldata.Moreinformation
inAppendix.
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One of the main issues raised in Table 5.1 is that the indicator has been in-
creasing through the whole period, and most of the effect comes from the Foreign
component, revealing that the commercial power of the United States has only
changed recently favoring other regions. Meanwhile, county self-potential repre-
sents a small share of the domestic component.
This basic database is combined with an additional collection of data on Uni-
versities and Educational Institutions in the United States, coming from The Insti-
tutional Data Archive on American Higher Education (Brint et al. [2003]). This
source contains academic data on 384 four-year colleges and universities in the
United States based on stratified random sampling to over-sample elite institu-
tions. The sample includes all highly-selective colleges and research universities
in the United States, as well as other selective colleges and research universities,
masters-granting comprehensive universities and non-selective baccalaureate-
granting institutions. The IDA sample does not include business colleges, art
schools or any other specialized institution, neither profit-institutions nor two-
year program colleges. This release incorporates longitudinal and cross-sectional
information on institutions, university systems, programs, academic departments,
earned degrees and institutional academic rankings over time. The main variables
of interest within this sample are the location of Educational Institutions, the year
of establishment of these institutions and how research-intensive their activity is.
This information has also been merged with the number of academic establish-
ments provided by the County Business Patterns to gain proper visibility on the
counties with no academic institutional presence.
The random relation between academic institutions is classified according to
the Carnegie Classification, the leading framework for describing institutional di-
versity in US higher education for the past decades, (McCormick [2006]). This
framework has been widely used in the study of higher education, as a way to
represent and control for institutional differences and to ensure adequate rep-
resentation of sampled institutions, students, or faculty. The classification has
changed over time; however, the main groups are easily traceable over the period.
To simplify, this database contains a numeric indicator variable from one to four,
depending on the average category each institution has been over the base year
in which the Classification was released. The basic categories used in our sample
according to research activity includes:
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•Doctorate-grantingUniversities:Whentheinstitutionawardedatleast20re-
searchdoctoraldegreesduringtheupdateyear(excludingdoctoraldegrees
thatqualifyprofessionalpractices,suchasMD,PharmD,DPT,etc.).
•Master’sColegesandUniversities:includesinstitutionsthatawarded50or
moremaster’sdegreesandfewerthan20doctoraldegreesduringtheupdate
year.
•BaccalaureateColeges:whenbaccalaureatedegreesrepresentatleast10
percentofalundergraduatedegreesandfewerthan50master’sdegreesor
20doctoraldegreeswereawardedduringtheupdateyear.
•Associate‘sColeges:whenaldegreesareattheassociate‘slevelorbachelor
degreesaccountforlessthan10percentofalundergraduatedegrees.
Thedatasetalsotakesintoaccountseveralcontrolvariablessuchastheyearthe
countywaspartoftheUnitedStates,whetheritwasoneofthethirteenoriginal
coloniesorthedateofitsofficialestablishmentaspartofaState.
5.4.2 Empiricalstrategy
Thischapteraimstodemonstratethatalthoughincomedifferentialsarepersistent
overtime,ahumancapitalshockinaregionwilincreasegrowthinthelongrun,
notonlyinthatregion,butalsoinneighboringregions.Thechapterapproaches
thisanalysisbyusingadifferencesindifferencesregressionanalysisoftheshock
usingarandomsampleofcountieswithacademicinstitutionsandarandomcon-
trolgroupofcountieswithnoacademicpresenceatal.Theseregressionscompare
theevolutionofthedistance-weighedGDPimpactandaddressthesignificanceof
theknowledgeshockinthetreatedgroupusingtheusualbaselinespecification:
l(GEOimpact)=β0+β1(Treatmenti,t+β2(AfterTreatmenti,t)+
+β3(Treatmenti,t∗AfterTreatmenti,t)+β4(Controls)+ei,t
(5.2)
Wherethedifferentgeographicalelementsareregressedonthevariable
Treatmenti,t(whichequalsoneifthecountyisintheTreatedGroupandzerooth-
erwise),Aftertreatmenti,t,whichequalsoneintheperiodafterthenewuniversity
wasestablishedandthedummyinteractionofbothvariables(Treatmenti,t*After
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treatmenti,t), which equals one only when the county is within the Treated Group
and after the treatment has taken place. Additionally, the regression controls for
the different benchmark years at which the shocks take place. Using this approach,
the main interest is the significance of the coefficient of the interaction term, beta3,
that assesses the difference of the market potential gap between the treated group
and the control group after the shock has happened.
5.5 Results
At first glance, a quick examination of the observations with and without academic
institutions samples leads to preliminary optimism regarding the potential find-
ings from this analysis. The sample contains the 300 observations which host an
academic institution in 2010 provided by the IDA database and an additional 300
random observations of counties with no academic establishment obtained from
the County Business Patterns report performed by the US Census Bureau for each
benchmark. As Table 5.2 reports, the long-term evolution of urbanization reveals
that the treated group has evolved from the rural economy much faster than the
control group although they started-off at very similar levels in the first year. Con-
sistent with the consensus found by urban economists, in this sample the effects
of a college education shock are positively correlated with an acceleration of city
growth as proposed by Glaeser et al. [1995].
Table 5.2: Rural and urban counties in the sample
Treated Group Control Group
Rural Urban Rural Urban
1930 297 3 299 1
1950 175 125 265 35
1980 121 179 235 65
2010 15 285 154 146
Follows the classification of Rural County pro-
vided by the US Census on each benchmark year.
The initial experiment consists of finding a causal effect between the establish-
ment of new academic institutions and this growth differential by comparing the
situation of the treated group and the control group before and after the shock.
Table 5.4 shows the pooled OLS regressions of the geographical components of the
distance-weighed sum of GDPs on the dummies related to the knowledge shock
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created by the new universities controlling for the year of the change. The result-
ing coefficients show that the shock has a positive effect on the self-potential of
counties and its neighboring counties within the state at 1 per cent significance,
but there is no evidence that the effect expands further. Notice the high R-squares
of the regressions of the Local Impact and Neighbor County Impact in comparison
with the rest of the components; other unobserved variables affect GDP of States
and Foreign competitors.
The significance of the shock on the local element is not unexpected, as it is
consistent with the central premises of education economics. Many have argued
for the simultaneous causality of this result though, and have even posed education
as the ‘weak link’ of the growth literature: higher local GDP (the central element
of the indicator of the Local element of the distance-weighed GDP) fosters a higher
provision of services and vice-versa.3 Proving the causality behind such a relation-
ship is beyond the scope of this investigation that relies on the findings of scholars
like Goldin and Katz [2009],Moretti [2002], and Rauch [1993].
The most interesting result comes from the positive and significant coefficient
of the interaction term in the Neighboring Counties regression. The neighboring
counties GDP component might be correlated with the local GDP component, how-
ever it is bound to be affected by many other independent variables. Thus, con-
trolling for yearly fixed effects and regional effects adds reliability to the results
of the neighbors impact regression. The effect of the shock reports a 7 per cent
increase of the impact on neighboring counties in the Treated Group than in the
Control Group at one per cent significance, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. These re-
sults yield evidence of the significance of the treatment on nearby areas. However,
one might question these results by addressing the self-selection of counties to the
location of new universities even by abstracting from the obviously endogenous
character of self-potential. It is possible that new universities might be allocated
in areas where high growth is already expected. The decision to establish a new
academic institution might not even be taken locally but at a more global scale as
in the case of the Morrill Land-Grant Acts (1862), where federal incentives moti-
vated the creation of state universities by state governments. State governments
could have selected these allocations in areas with positive growth prospects.
3Krueger and Lindahl [2001]; Mankiw [1997].
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Figure 5.1: Effect of the new university on neighboring counties with Random
Control Group
Source: from own calculations.
This intuition leads to the hypothesis that the Treated Group counties might be
special. In order to control for this potential self-selection, an alternative synthetic
random control group that shows similar initial characteristics to the ones in the
treated group could be used to perform the same analysis, replicating the tech-
nique developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal [2003]. This way, the difference-in-
difference coefficients will only show the variance related to the treatment, elimi-
nating the bias from the intrinsic heterogeneity of the samples.
5.5.1 Synthetic control method
Finding a control group that is synthetically equivalent to the Treatment Group
implies restricting the sample to comply with several conditions that are met by
the treatment group at the beginning of the period. In this sense, the Synthetic
Control Group must start-off at a level similar to the treated group. Indeed, from
Table 5.3 it is visible that the Treatment Group is a special sample of counties and
rather different to the the Random Control Group used in the previous section. An
examination of the initial levels of urbanization was not a sufficient way to analyze
the impact of new academic institutions.
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The Treated Group does not only differ substantially from the average level of
primary sector employment of the population, but is almost half of that of the Ran-
dom Control Group. The shares devoted to other sectors consequently also differ,
thus showing that our counties in both samples evidence very different productive
structures and pools of labor. Additionally, the pattern of growth seems to have
diverged in both samples, where population from the Control Group seems to be
stagnant between 1930 and 1980 while the counties in the Treated Group have in-
creased their population by almost 50 per cent in the same period. It seems, thus,
that the previous analysis considers two rather contrasting samples of counties,
where clearly most of the components of the weighed GDP sum amount to differ-
ent levels. Consequently, the alternative random control group has been forced
to meet certain criteria, such as a similar productive structure or a closer local
component sum of distance-weighed Total GDP, finding an alternative sample of
300 counties with no academic presence with a similar productive structure and
distance-weighed Total GDP.
Table 5.3: Descriptive data from samples and population
Group All counties Treatment Random Synthetic
Establishments =1 =0 =0
N=3128 N=300 N=300 N=300
Average Indicators in 1930 T=4 T=4 T=4 T=4
l(Distance-weighed Total GDP) 18.284 19.154 17.942 19.395
l(Local component) 14.347 14.865 14.237 14.903
l(Neighbor Cty. component) 16.073 16.544 15.955 16.691
l(States component) 15.911 15.708 15.949 16.236
l(Foreign component) 16.277 17.709 15.601 17.707
Employment Share %
Primary Sector 0.487 0.289 0.578 0.279
Secondary Sector 0.132 0.256 0.068 0.259
Tertiary Sector 0.380 0.456 0.354 0.461
Population growth (1930-1980) 0.113 0.450 -0.051 0.382
Rural counties in sample
1930 3117 (0.99) 297 (0.99) 299 (0.99) 300 (1.00)
1950 2844 (0.91) 175 (0.58) 265 (0.88) 279 (0.93)
1980 2462 (0.79) 121 (0.40) 235 (0.78) 234 (0.78)
2010 1325 (0.43) 15 (0.05) 154 (0.51) 67 (0.22)
Source: own calculations.
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In line with the previous case, note that the initial level of the Synthetic Random
Group starts-off at slightly higher levels of urbanization than the treated group
with an even smaller primary sector participation share, but the rate of urbaniza-
tion is quite slower than that of the Treated Group with slower population growth
from 1930 to 1980. There is still hope to find optimistic results regarding the
shock.
Figure 5.2: Effect of the new university on neighboring counties with Synthetic
Control Group
Source: from own calculations.
The analysis of the treatment with the Synthetic Control Group provides a bet-
ter view of the treatment with unbiased estimators of the interaction group. This
time, regression results show coherent signs and sizes and are significant in all
the geographical components of the impact. According to Table 5.5, the signifi-
cance and size of the local impact has decreased by a third, but the impact of the
shock is now relevant in terms of counties, states and foreign counties. In other
words, after a new university is established in Fresno, all the counties in California
will experience an upswing in their GDP (ceteris paribus) significant at 1 per cent.
Moreover, this shock will have a positive statistical impact on the rest of the coun-
ties within the country, although the effect will be smaller than for the neighbors
within the same state, as opposed to the previous experiment with the Random
Control Group. Additionally, the shock seems to make the domestic economymore
competitive, creating a negative and quite sizeable Foreign GDP impact.
128
Table 5.4: Before & after effect of new university against Random Control Group
Impact l(Total) l(Local) l(Neighbors) l(States) l(Foreign)
Treatment group 1.619 *** 0.311 ** 0.336 0.003 3.277 ***
(0.344) (0.161) (0.229) (0.603) (0.435)
After Treatment -1.267 *** -1.837 *** -1.773 *** -1.739 *** -0.203
(0.294) (0.094) (0.126) (0.072) (0.171)
PostTreatInteraction 0.230 0.318 *** 0.226 ** 0.108 -0.739 ***
(0.265) (0.132) (0.114) (0.069) (0.218)
N 1384 1380 1372 1384 1384
r-squared 0.396 0.490 0.629 0.304 0.408
Coefficients from the OLS difference-in-differences regression of the log of the geographical components of distance-weighed
sum of GDPs to the shock of new universities. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported under the coefficients. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. Source: own calculations.
Table 5.5: Before & after effect of new university against Synthetic Control Group
Impact l(Total) l(Local) l(Neighbors) l(States) l(Foreign)
Treatment group 0.609 *** -0.100 -0.094 0.087 1.492 ***
(0.286) (0.196) (0.178) (0.494) (0.483)
After Treatment 0.126 -1.532 *** -1.425 *** -1.313 *** 1.145 ***
(0.219) (0.087) (0.102) (0.110) (0.334)
PostTreatInt -0.854 *** 0.276 ** 0.317 *** 0.142 *** -1.756 ***
(0.186) (0.106) (0.084) (0.052) (0.353)
N 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388
R-squared 0.445 0.441 0.587 0,275 0,315
Coefficients from the OLS difference in difference regression of the log of the geographical components of distance-weighed sum
of GDPs to the shock of new universities. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported under the coefficients. ***
indicates statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. Source: own calculations.
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The knowledge shock, thus, seems quite important to future development both
in terms of regional and global inequality; however, one could question whether
quality could also be an issue. To control for quality, the same analysis has been
repeated including the interaction of a variable that accounts for the average
Carnegie classification rate of each institution to show whether more research
prone institutions have a higher impact than associate college institutions. Results
show no significant evidence on the difference associated to the level of research-
intensity; in other words, there is no evidence of a higher effect of doctorate-
granting academic institutions over Baccalaureate colleges; instead, any academic
institution that creates a human capital shock will have a significant impact.
To improve long-term visibility, the same regression can be adapted to include
several time periods to account for the date of the shock, where the indepen-
dent variable is the final-benchmark year distance-weighed GDP impact. Table
5.6 shows the differences in differences regression of the long term impact of each
shock. This table provides a much more detailed view of the shock that confirms
that the local impact expands to nearby regions, diluting its effect with distance,
while also having a significant effect in the international arena.
The effect of time seems to be similar: on average, the closer in time the shock
is, the higher the effect becomes, although there seem to be discrepancies in the
long run impacts of the different geographical layers: the domestic impact seems to
last longer than the foreign impact according to the significance of the interaction
treatment variables.
This new experiment shows that, for counties with similar levels of urbaniza-
tion, a knowledge shock implies a regional acceleration of GDP growth that ex-
pands to nearby regions, creating a ’shock-wave’ effect that also impacts faraway
counties. Although the Synthetic Control Group seems to start slightly above the
Treated control group in terms of distance-weighed Total GPD, the treatment has
led the Treated Group to surpass the Synthetic Control Group by a lower, but still
significant, impact as shown in Figure 5.2. Overall, the shock affects the relative
position of the whole country in international perspective. This impact is inde-
pendent of the type of institution that creates the knowledge shock. However, this
before-after treatment analysis does not say much about the long-term effects of
the shock and whether the change is persistent or temporary.
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A possible interpretation of the time coefficients can come from the statistical
significance of single time variables. It seems that time affects significantly the
evolution of regional GDP weighed by economic distance. Firstly, transport costs
decrease over time (see the Appendix for more details), and so does economic
distance leading to an overall increase of the distance-weighed sum of GDPs. Sec-
ond, path-dependency is rather crucial when determining income; initial GDP is
a rather important factor of future GDP. Consequently, GDP ten years ago also
matters, but to a lesser degree.
Figure 5.3: Long term effect of the new university on neighboring counties with
Synthetic Control Group
Source: from own calculations.
According to Table 5.6, the impact of the shock has shorter term consequences
for the local economy than for neighboring counties or states. If the treatment
took place in the 1940s and showed its consequences in the 1950s, it is natural
that the effect of the treatment is already taken into account in the time variable
rather than the interaction variable. However, the interaction has longer term
consequences for neighboring areas than for the local impact.
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Table 5.6: Effect of new university against Synthetic Control Group in the long term
Impact l(Total) l(Local) l(Neighbors) l(States) l(Foreign)
Treatment group 0.461 *** -0.198 -0.312 -0.187 1.348 ***
(0.317) (0.226) (0.218) (0.500) (0.514)
Before 2010 4.502 *** 3.644 *** 4.150 *** 4.015 *** 5.206 ***
(0.216) (0.141) (0.186) (0.178) (0.340)
Before 1980 2.718 *** 3.158 *** 3.354 *** 3.247 *** 2.642 ***
(0.166) (0.123) (0.165) (0.180) (0.206)
Before 1950 1.030 *** 1.758 *** 2.085 *** 1.706 *** 0.086 ***
(0.171) (0.113) (0.109) (0.172) (0.208)
PostTreat2010 -0.707 0.373 ** 0.535 *** 0.416 *** -1.612 ***
(0.243) (0.174) (0.139) (0.150) (0.390)
PostTreat1980 0.253 0.196 0.456 *** 0.404 *** 0.125
(0.163) (0.155) (0.135) (0.147) (0.217)
PostTreat1950 0.190 *** 0.095 0.198 ** 0.417 *** 0.310
(0.185) (0.129) (0.098) (0.147) (0.229)
Constant 19.395 *** 14.890 *** 16.199 *** 1.236 *** 17.687 ***
(0.289) (0.234) (0.533) (0.535) (0.449)
N 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388
R-squared 0.445 0.450 0.609 0.279 0.325
Coefficient from the difference in difference regression of the log of the geographical components of distance-weighed Total GDP
sum to the shock of new universities. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported under the coefficients. *** indicates
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. Source: own calculations.
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This result may seem unreasonable, however I propose an interpretation re-
lated to increasing returns to scale. The local shock of a new university institution
might be locally absorbed almost immediately, or in a few years, however, spillover
effects may take some time to reach neighboring counties, and even more if they
reach further. In practical terms, new researchers rapidly arrived to the Idaho Falls
city as soon as the job positions started, but the expansion of the city took more
time.
Similarly, the long-term interaction of the Foreign impact component might
require some explanation. In this case, it seems to show a similar behavior to
the Local impact, evidencing a single short term impact. Notice that the Foreign
impact is assembled by the GDP of countries weighed by the economic distance
(bilateral transport costs from each county to each county). Each country’s GDP
is affected by many more variables that are independent of the events in the USA,
including the response to the opening of new academic institutions, which might
have an analogue negative effect in US counties.
5.5.2 Local endogeneity test
Previous sections acknowledged the potential endogeneity of the local element,
exposing the simultaneous causation between higher local GDP and higher provi-
sions of services like university schooling posited by Mankiw [1997] and Krueger
and Lindahl [2001]. Although proving the causality behind such a relationship
is beyond the scope of this investigation, the variables used in this analysis al-
low for the performance of a simple extension that clarifies the link between local
productivity and these knowledge shocks.
A slight transformation of the distance-weighed Total GDP sum to per capita
terms has two consequences: first, it allows for the removal of the effect of the size
of each of the participants in the sum of GDPs, while making distance much more
important. Secondly, it allows one to understand the impact of a new knowledge
institution in terms of productivity (as per capita GDP is a proxy for wages).
As a result, the new independent variable is the sum of the distance-weighed
sum of per capita GDPs, where the foreign impact becomes relatively smaller than
the domestic components. This is because the bigger size of countries is controlled
for while the effect of its further distance becomes much more important. Like-
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wise, the impact of close neighbors increases over distant counties, states and
countries. Because the local component is computed as each county’s GDP per
capita over the great circle distance equivalent to its area, high wages and small
areas lead to bigger local effects in the sum of the distance-weighed sum of per
capita GDPs. In other words, big city counties with high productivities have rel-
atively higher local components than large rural counties; furthermore, the total
sum of distance-weighed per capita GDPs is driven by the local component as can
be seen in Figure 20 in the Appendix.
Table 5.7 shows the result of performing the parallel regression between the
Treatment group and the Synthetic Control Group in per capita terms. This time
the results are quite distinct, leading to subtle differences between the growth of
the economy and its development through improvements in labor quality. First,
the effect of the shock on the State and Foreign components is no longer signif-
icant: the local shock does not affect distant economies. However, it seems that
the local effect of the shock has now increased its size and significance and also
affects nearby regions.
Additionally, the effect of a local shock does not only increase the local GDP per
capita in the first period after the shock, but persists after one period on a lower
scale, whereas the effect on the productivity of nearby regions is constrained to
the first period of the shock.
These results show that knowledge shocks do affect the local economy as well
as nearby regions. By controlling the potential causality between increasing coun-
ties and increasing service provision, this experiment has shown that the effect of
knowledge shocks go beyond the size of the economy and affect the local produc-
tivity of regions and their neighbors, leading to multiplier effects that explain the
results in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.7: Effect of new university against Synthetic Control Group per capita in the long term
Per capital impact l(Total) l(Local) l(Neighbors) l(States) l(Foreign)
Treatment group 0.245 -0.278 0.076 0.255 0.730 *
(0.177) (0.222) (0.561) (0.169) (0.447)
Before_2010 -0.088 3.644 *** -0.860 0.032 0.078
(0.124) (0.141) (0.306) (0.113) (0.288)
Before_1980 0.007 2.934 *** -0.539 0.098 0.029
(0.177) (0.192) (0.352) (0.163) (0.354)
Before_1950 -0.109 1.600 *** -0.368 -0.113 -0.360
(0.206) (0.162) (0.361) (0.203) (0.337)
Post_treatment2010 0.088 0.448 *** 0.860 *** -0.032 -0.078
(0.124) (0.190) (0.306) (0.113) (0.288)
Post_treatment1980 -0.069 0.421 ** 0.539 -0.098 -0.029
(0.177) (0.206) (0.352) (0.163) (0.354)
Post_treatment1950 0.109 0.253 0.368 0.113 0.360
(0.206) (0.156) (0.361) (0.203) (0.337)
Constant 20.448 14.890 *** 17.536 *** 20.099 *** 6.340 ***
(0.212) (0.234) (0.581) (0.180) (0.269)
N 1388 1388 1388 1388 1388
R-squared 0.011 0.510 0.014 0.009 0.032
Coefficient from the difference in difference regression of per capita geographical components of distance-weighed Total GDP
sum to the shock of new universities. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported under the coefficients. *** indicates
statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. Source: own calculations.
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5.6 Conclusions
This chapter has offered an alternative methodology to explore the regional impact
of local shocks from different geographical perspectives. Traditionally, academics
have used spatial econometrics frameworks that require the application of tools
like neighboring matrices that limit the study to small or aggregated areas. This
methodology allows a more detailed analysis that ensures unbiased results by in-
cluding the whole population. Traditional differences in differences regression
analysis on a decomposable sum of distance-weighed GDP by county has shown
that the impact of a new university affects not only the local economy, but also
other counties within the state. This was already proven by Anselin et al. [1997]
in the context of manufacturing industries. The analysis of the distance-weighted
Total GDP reveals that the impact also affects counties in other states and improves
the relative international competitiveness of the country. Using a Synthetic Con-
trol Group that replicates the initial conditions of the Treated Group proves that
the effect of the shock is not spurious.
The effect of the shock dilutes with distance and time but remains significant
although the time impact of the different geographical components varies, being
reduced for the foreign element that obviously depends onmany other factors, like
its own domestic policy. The regional effect of the shock seems to take some time
but is persistent in the long run, ceteris paribus. These results provide evidence in
favor of the potential regional effect of customized local policies and prove that
a holistic development policy could potentially be more effective than "spatially-
blind-one-fits-all" strategies (Pike et al. [2007]; Rodríguez-Pose [2011]).
While land abundance was originally posed as a curse for Idaho Falls, the es-
tablishment of a research center transformed the production frontier of this desert
area to a more valuable bundle of products that included knowledge intensive ser-
vices. The previous results and this anecdotal evidence provide a lesson for both
local and national authorities: economic fundamentals are by no means a restric-
tion to the production possibility frontier; any economic configuration can provide
increasing returns to scale. Perhaps, further research could help develop a model
to find the factors that define the optimum industry for maximizing both the local
impact and spillovers. This might require some effort from academics and policy-
makers, but this strategy could both reduce inequality and perpetuate the USA as
the human capital paradigm.
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Discussion
This thesis has shown that the service economy, in particular the knowledge in-
tensive economy, is at the center of modern economic growth and is responsible
for important income gaps at several geographical levels. The origin of the gap
can be located in the establishment of a large market but the persistent snow-ball
effect on growth is a consequence of the path-dependency of increasing returns.
Historical economists used to depict this image as a division of the world economy
into urban manufacturing towns and rural stagnating areas. More recent results
reveal that the trend has become much more extreme, showing a contrast between
big urban colossi consisting of large cities, and neighboring smaller cities at the
service of the colossus and stagnating agricultural areas. In the case of the United
States, this is very well exemplified by Moretti [2012] and his portrait of the ’two
Americas’. This research agrees with the last depiction and confirms that knowl-
edge spillovers are a cause of regional and local income gaps. However, I have
shown that not everything is lost for stagnating rural American cities. This investi-
gation has proven that attracting skilled workers contributes to long-term growth
that can even expand to nearby regions and foster local and domestic prosperity.
In this sense, not only local governments have a good reason to provide incentives
to promote skilled employment, but national and international institutions can see
this as a project for global competitiveness thanks to multiplier effects.
One of the key issues is the identification of the appropriate knowledge for each
area. From these results it is clear that market size is a cause of economic growth,
but that comparative advantage determines the path of a market’s specialization
during the first stages of development. Part of the success of the United States
comes from its mineral wealth on the eve of industrialization, but the true fosterer
of the leadership comes from the ability to mold the social and human capital of
society at the service of this resource, as defended by Wright [1990]. Identifying
what kind of knowledge can trigger the appropriate use of resources in a particular
area is key to future growth. In this sense, the establishment of a Nuclear Reactor
Facility full of nuclear scientists in Idaho Falls motivated the use of vast land for
land intensive and knowledge intensive production. In the case of urban colossi,
comparative advantage comes from large highly skilled labor markets, where the
production of ideas is the cheapest option.
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These results show what has happened in the United States of America, but
these are not only useful for American policy-makers. The results use data on the
United States but show that a local policy can trigger changes in other states and
the whole nation. Therefore, also states and local authorities should find incen-
tives to propose projects to attract skilled workers to areas within its jurisdiction
by benefiting frommultiplier effects. Moreover, other countries should find this in-
formation relevant to determine where local investment could stimulate economic
growth; even the European Union and other cross-country associations should find
this information relevant when proposing projects for structural investment funds.
Main contributions
The contributions of this research to the field of economic history are manifold.
From the point of view of theoretical outcomes, it has confirmed that the service
economy is much more important than economic historians have presumed, and
it has revealed the necessity to study this sector in depth, particularly since the
1980s. This result is relevant for economic historians, but also for economic theo-
rists, who might find the special nature of services as a challenge to the traditional
models of development, trade and location. As a preliminary attempt, this thesis
contributes by providing a mixed model of localization for services, where the size
of the market is shown as the key driver of almost any industry and thus the only
constraint to urbanization is the relative success of the agricultural economy. This
shows that the effect of natural geography matters because it does not allow the
propagation of spillovers.
This investigation has also provided several methodological improvements.
First, it proves that the analysis on large geographical scales misses subtle but
very relevant information on increasing returns, which are particularly crucial for
the service economy. One might regard this finding as obvious: better data pro-
vide better results, but if this analysis had been done using states, the conclusions
would have been much different. As explained by Krugman [1991], the smaller
the industry, the greater chances of finding Increasing Returns. Analyzing the
Business Service Sector at SIC 4-digit level instead of at 3-digit level would have
probably lead to much more spectacular agglomeration results, but it is possible to
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find these increasing returns defining the geographical unit of analysis at a smaller
scale too. This is relevant particularly when analyzing the role of diversification
and specialization of the economic structure as it leaves room for further analysis
(Bickenbach and Bode [2008]).
These contributions are backed by the creation of a new long-term data set
of industrial employment by county using US Census Decennial Records that has
allowed the creation of a long-term series of concentration for the 20th century that
enhances the results of previous records and includes the knowledge economy.
Policy-makers can also benefit from the results obtained from these experi-
ments. Following Fujita and Krugman [2003], I explore the effects of local knowl-
edge shocks diffusion and show that an external (local, federal, national or interna-
tional) shock can lead to long-term local growth by attracting skilled employment
to a particular area. This effect spreads to nearby and distant regions, increasing
the motivations of national and international policy-makers to contribute to local
development.
These findings are logically outlined. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 have provided
a long-term view of the history of historical economic geography and the United
States as a service economy, starting from its very first origins during the colo-
nial era and its expansion of agricultural trade, passing through its industrializa-
tion and conversion into a world economic leader associated with the will of out-
standing American entrepreneurs and willing employees. Chapter 3 performed
a detailed long-term spatial analysis of industrial localization making reference
to states, counties and SMSAs and showing that the service economy has pro-
gressively become the motor of the whole economy during the period. Chapter 4
develops a mixed model of localization and proves that increasing returns are the
cause of localization for the aggregate economy and not only for Knowledge Inten-
sive services. It challenges the traditional view that factor endowments define the
industry of a place and shows that the only relevant factor is the one that is immo-
bile (i.e., land). From this point of view, agricultural success has a perverse effect
for the development of those regions, because it requires a small or spread local
market, preventing increasing returns and externalities. Chapter 5 uses these re-
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sults to produce an experiment using universities as knowledge shocks and shows
optimistic results for long-term growth prospects of both rural and urban areas.
The next section discusses some drawbacks of these results and presents alterna-
tive ways to apply these findings and their shortcomings.
Open gates to future research
These findings and conclusions come from the analysis of a very particular nation,
the United States of America. Although this case study is purposefully used as a
canonical case, and its size and multi-dimensional nature allow this, it is plausible
that other conditions may lead to different conclusions for other regions. This
represents, thus, an opportunity to apply these findings and methodologies to
other regional scales. This is particularly relevant for regional studies as several
parts of this thesis could be applied to economies in the process of integration
like the European Union. There might be interesting conclusions for development
policies on the local level as well.
Likewise, the research has looked at the general economy with a special focus
on Knowledge Intensive Business Sectors, but there might be increasing returns in
other service sectors (like Entertainment, or Finance). This analysis could also be
expanded to these sectors. Additionally, this thesis calls for empirical economists
to work on a model that does not only account for industry, but one that can also
account for the recent and increasing trends in the service economy and trans-
portation costs.
These findings can be criticized by those who dislike the approach of economic
geography, as noted by Martin [1999]. However, both economic geographers and
historical economists can find clues to modernize their approaches in these lines:
by including the service economy, by avoiding the imprecise geographical unit
classifications that lead to biased results, and also by adopting the simplifications
derived from chapter 5.
Apart from the possible expansions and applications to other areas that can
arise from these findings, it is important to address the possible shortcomings that
can probably be better handled in future work. First, this text does not address
that the concentration of workers can happen because of internal economies of
scale rather than external economies of scale, as explained by Ellison and Glaeser
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[1999]. Instead, it assumes that all the concentrations are linked by external
economies of scale avoids the concentration of firms. However, the geographical
concentration of workers, even if we are in a monopoly situation, must be some-
how profiting from knowledge spillovers, too. In the case of Business Services the
monopoly situation is far from the truth.
Additionally, the nature of external economies, and particularly knowledge
spillovers has been questioned several times, not only by the mentors of these
schools of thought, Jacobs and Marshall, but also by several scholars like Rosen-
thal and Strange [2008]. Breschi and Lissoni [2001] propose several critiques
to the traditional analysis of knowledge spillovers. First, the externalities that
empirical analyses on knowledge intensive sectors address are usually misclas-
sified as knowledge spillovers, when they should be included in the other two
classes of economies of agglomeration (labor market economies and specializa-
tion economies). Secondly, they expose the problem that arises thanks to the
flows of tacit knowledge, that can usually be considered to be easily transmissible
within local audiences, but the ’death of distance’ (Venables [2001]) has allowed
this knowledge to be easily dispersed within professional communities, raising
some questions on the true local nature of these spillover effects. Their criticism
highlights the potential jargon barrier that could prevent knowledge from flowing
between different communities of technical knowledge and thus reducing the di-
versification effect of knowledge spillovers. They conclude that, at least recently,
there is no proof that knowledge transmission occurs among people located in the
same geographic area thanks to knowledge tacitness, low transaction and commu-
nication costs and labor mobility and that dis-economies of agglomeration should
also be considered.
More detail can, of course improve this analysis. A potential way to polish these
results could thus be to examine whetherMarshallian or Jacobian externalities are
behind knowledge spillovers. Including comparative data for specialized versus
diversified geographical units combined with the growth patterns of population
could explain the R&D divergence between growing (hypothetically diverse) cities
and stagnating ones.
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Appendix
A Data collection: building the longitudinal panel
data
• 1890 Data: The 11th Census of Population and Housing provides data on
manufacturing workers (by skill level or occupation) and number of teach-
ers in schools. The data of agricultural workers was obtained from Craig and
Weiss [1998]. Ultimately, the data for this benchmark year includes only
three categories of occupations per county whereas the rest of the bench-
mark years include more than 10 categories. An alternative to this lack of
information is to use the classification of skilled manufacturing employees
(those that lead with managerial occupations) as a proxy for the knowledge
intensive sector. However, the accuracy of this estimation is dubious. Con-
sequently, the data for this year are used for comparative purpose only and
are not included in calculations to avoid biased results.
• 1930 Data are very detailed by occupation in original censuses. However,
the occupation classification used by the US Census report made industry
estimations complicated. From this report, the Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) collected the data using a classi-
fication that is more convenient for the purpose of this investigation than
the original one. However, certain collection problems are difficult to solve:
according to the procedural file provided by the US Census, enumerators
generated a bias by counting housewives as domestic workers included in
the labor force, showing that domestic service workers seem to be almost
proportionally allocated across the country. The data for 1950 and 2010 ig-
nore this sector, and a process of estimation is not considered as it involves
a big time investment that cannot be paired with good long-term results.
Instead, these observations will be taken with caution when used.
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• 1950 Data were collected directly from the 17th Housing and Population
census records. Although industry and class of worker was collected on a
100-percent basis, questions related to industry were asked for a sample of
one out of every 30 persons and first tabulations revealed a very large "not
reported" rate. Moreover, occupation classification was very detailed, but the
1950 Census industrial classification system was organized into 13 groups.
As a consequence, private household services where omitted. These data
have been converted to the classification used in this research by using the
most accurate data and the extrapolations from other years.
• 1980 Data were collected from both US Census Population and Housing data
records by industry and ICPSR. Census data are more detailed than the data
provided by the Summary File provided by ICPSR. However, some state book-
lets were not available and ICPSR compilations were used instead. The Cen-
sus report omits data on agricultural workers. Therefore, the USDA - Census
of Agriculture Historical Archive were used to obtain data from agricultural
employees (farmers and others). However, Census of Agriculture data are
only published every five years, thus, data provided do not match perfectly
with the timing of decennial employment data. Under the assumption that
the agricultural sector is stable and moves slowly, it is assumed that a three-
year gap will not cause big deviations.
• 2010 Data on employment on each industrial division have been obtained
from the County Business Patterns. This database uses the 2007 NAICS clas-
sification, up to six levels, but the data have been aggregated to match the
1980 classification. The US Census grants privacy to respondents by showing
inaccuracies whenever a single firm operates an industry in a specific region
(county, state or nation) by stating an interval instead of the real value. The
approximate number of employees has been estimated through the records
of number of firms within each size class, also available from the US Cen-
sus. Moreover, the USDA Census of Agriculture Historical Archive has been
used to obtain data omitted from the County Business Patterns (farmers and
others within categories 111 and 112). However, Census of Agriculture data
are only published every five years while data on the census are published
every ten years (in this case, the last publication of the Census of Agriculture
corresponds to 2007 and CBP corresponds to year 2010) but the assumption
that abrupt changes do not occur in the agricultural sector allows the use of
these data as an approximation in this case as well.
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B Industry and structural change
Table 8: Employment structures in the Netherlands, UK and USA - 1700 to 2010
(% of total employment)
Year Sector NL UK USA
1700 Primary 40 56 n.a.
Secondary 33 22 n.a.
Tertiary 27 22 n.a.
1820 Primary n.a. 40 n.a.
Secondary n.a. 32 n.a.
Tertiary n.a. 28 n.a.
1890 Primary 33 16 39
Secondary 31 44 27
Tertiary 36 40 34
1989 Primary 5 2 3
Secondary 26 29 26
Tertiary 69 69 71
2010 Primary 3 1 2
Secondary 15 19 17
Tertiary 82 80 81
Source: Maddison [2010] estimations and ILO (2010).
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Figure 4: Correlation between sector share and GDP growth by county
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Table 9: Forward and backward industrial linkages measured with correlations
Agriculture FoFi Mining Food Kindred Publishing Chemical Primary metal Furniture Fabricated metal Machinery Transport equip Railroads Trucking Other transp
Agriculture -0.077 -0.104 0.086 -0.186 -0.199 -0.184 -0.160 -0.210 -0.134 -0.211 -0.002 0.015 -0.223
FoFi -0.077 -0.014 0.036 -0.131 -0.062 -0.019 0.270 -0.144 -0.153 -0.070 0.049 -0.141 0.175
Mining -0.104 -0.014 -0.196 -0.179 -0.060 -0.005 -0.102 -0.143 -0.160 -0.143 0.025 0.076 0.017
Food & Kindred 0.086 0.036 -0.196 0.038 -0.021 -0.032 -0.029 0.045 0.054 -0.021 -0.045 0.095 -0.074
Printing & publishing -0.186 -0.131 -0.179 0.038 0.069 0.041 -0.154 0.202 0.187 0.095 -0.021 0.077 0.092
Chemical -0.199 -0.062 -0.060 -0.021 0.069 0.043 -0.042 0.107 0.047 0.075 -0.015 0.027 0.063
Primary metal -0.184 -0.019 -0.005 -0.032 0.041 0.043 -0.026 0.185 0.091 0.080 0.021 0.022 0.074
Furniture -0.160 0.273 -0.102 -0.029 -0.154 -0.042 -0.026 -0.023 -0.106 -0.066 -0.049 -0.022 -0.096
Fabricated metal -0.210 -0.144 -0.143 0.045 0.202 0.107 0.185 -0.023 0.282 0.227 -0.037 0.113 -0.067
Machinery -0.134 -0.153 -0.160 0.054 0.187 0.047 0.091 -0.106 0.282 0.180 0.000 0.035 -0.100
Transp equip -0.211 -0.078 -0.143 -0.021 0.095 0.075 0.080 -0.066 0.227 0.180 -0.034 0.014 0.038
Railroads -0.002 0.049 0.025 -0.045 -0.021 -0.015 0.021 -0.049 -0.037 0.000 -0.034 -0.014 -0.042
Trucking & warehousing 0.015 -0.141 0.076 0.095 0.077 0.027 0.022 -0.022 0.113 0.035 0.014 -0.014 0.007
Other transp -0.223 0.175 0.017 -0.074 0.092 0.063 0.074 -0.096 -0.067 -0.100 0.038 -0.042 0.007
Communications -0.040 -0.004 0.110 -0.060 -0.066 0.065 0.057 -0.036 -0.013 -0.093 -0.062 -0.005 -0.007 0.011
Utilities -0.360 -0.034 0.014 -0.099 0.178 0.030 0.028 -0.149 0.029 -0.020 0.004 -0.009 0.002 0.194
Wholesale 0.128 -0.143 -0.165 0.185 0.151 -0.006 -0.069 -0.220 0.031 0.026 -0.005 -0.069 0.214 0.036
Retail -0.426 -0.133 -0.072 0.005 0.205 0.097 0.103 -0.138 0.140 0.086 0.109 -0.022 0.057 0.185
Food stores 0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.072 -0.138 -0.033 -0.024 -0.018 -0.048 -0.070 -0.043 0.086 -0.086 -0.069
Banking -0.130 -0.150 -0.077 -0.007 0.246 0.013 0.005 -0.185 0.046 0.008 0.054 -0.028 0.055 0.180
Insurance -0.357 -0.062 -0.169 -0.052 0.312 0.037 -0.006 -0.210 0.069 0.058 0.078 -0.069 -0.007 0.287
Business services -0.378 -0.072 -0.080 -0.057 0.230 0.104 0.007 -0.176 0.043 0.016 0.070 -0.077 -0.058 0.255
Health 0.085 -0.141 -0.160 0.081 0.172 -0.054 -0.004 -0.114 0.104 0.138 0.020 -0.042 0.074 -0.065
Elementary education -0.077 0.049 -0.024 -0.081 0.012 -0.056 -0.041 -0.058 -0.106 -0.088 -0.080 -0.080 -0.152 0.032
Other education -0.006 0.011 -0.001 -0.019 0.044 -0.055 -0.036 -0.027 -0.037 -0.017 -0.032 0.002 -0.057 0.041
Entertainment -0.227 0.020 -0.051 -0.083 0.122 -0.016 -0.014 -0.111 -0.024 -0.008 0.001 -0.043 -0.127 0.120
Hospitals -0.234 -0.103 -0.069 -0.025 0.106 0.047 0.028 -0.116 0.032 0.053 0.033 -0.030 -0.027 0.042
Professional services -0.351 0.027 -0.056 -0.079 0.236 0.007 0.016 -0.173 -0.032 -0.033 0.033 -0.082 -0.115 0.316
Communications Utilities Wholesale Retail Food stores Banking Insurance Business Serv Health Elem educ Other educ Entertainment Hospitals Professionals
Agriculture -0.040 -0.360 0.128 -0.426 0.001 -0.130 -0.357 -0.378 0.085 -0.077 -0.006 -0.227 -0.234 -0.351
FoFi -0.004 -0.034 -0.143 -0.133 0.008 -0.150 -0.062 -0.072 -0.141 0.049 0.011 0.020 -0.103 0.027
Mining 0.110 0.014 -0.165 -0.072 0.000 -0.077 -0.169 -0.080 -0.160 -0.024 -0.001 -0.051 -0.069 -0.056
Food & Kindred -0.060 -0.099 0.185 0.005 -0.072 -0.007 -0.052 -0.057 0.081 -0.081 -0.019 -0.083 -0.025 -0.079
Printing & publishing -0.066 0.178 0.151 0.205 -0.138 0.246 0.312 0.230 0.172 0.012 0.044 0.122 0.106 0.236
Chemical 0.065 0.030 -0.006 0.097 -0.033 0.013 0.037 0.104 -0.054 -0.056 -0.055 -0.016 0.047 0.007
Primary metal 0.057 0.028 -0.069 0.103 -0.024 0.005 -0.006 0.007 -0.004 -0.041 -0.036 -0.014 0.028 0.016
Furniture -0.036 -0.149 -0.220 -0.138 -0.018 -0.185 -0.210 -0.176 -0.114 -0.058 -0.027 -0.111 -0.116 -0.173
Fabricated metal -0.013 0.029 0.031 0.140 -0.048 0.046 0.069 0.043 0.104 -0.106 -0.037 -0.024 0.032 -0.032
Machinery -0.093 -0.020 0.026 0.086 -0.070 0.008 0.058 0.016 0.138 -0.088 -0.017 -0.008 0.053 -0.033
Transp equip -0.062 0.004 -0.005 0.109 -0.043 0.054 0.078 0.070 0.020 -0.080 -0.032 0.001 0.033 0.033
Railroads -0.005 -0.009 -0.069 -0.022 0.086 -0.028 -0.069 -0.077 -0.042 -0.080 0.002 -0.043 -0.030 -0.082
Trucking & warehousing -0.007 0.002 0.214 0.057 -0.086 0.055 -0.007 -0.058 0.074 -0.152 -0.057 -0.127 -0.027 -0.115
Other transp 0.011 0.194 0.036 0.185 -0.069 0.180 0.287 0.255 -0.065 0.032 0.041 0.120 0.042 0.316
Communications -0.038 -0.086 -0.044 -0.019 -0.025 -0.082 -0.039 -0.052 -0.073 -0.018 -0.063 -0.030 -0.078
Utilities -0.038 0.130 0.342 -0.128 0.299 0.434 0.379 0.033 0.029 0.073 0.239 0.156 0.395
Wholesale -0.086 0.130 0.142 -0.121 0.303 0.227 0.111 0.207 -0.129 -0.051 -0.044 0.030 0.104
Retail -0.044 0.342 0.142 -0.156 0.253 0.353 0.333 0.066 0.066 0.017 0.146 0.235 0.279
Food stores -0.019 -0.128 -0.121 -0.156 -0.162 -0.166 -0.134 -0.126 -0.163 -0.059 -0.103 -0.135 -0.145
Banking -0.025 0.299 0.303 0.253 -0.162 0.438 0.303 0.206 -0.097 0.042 0.139 0.166 0.338
Insurance -0.082 0.434 0.227 0.353 -0.166 0.438 0.525 0.132 -0.015 0.053 0.360 0.191 0.564
Business services -0.039 0.379 0.111 0.333 -0.134 0.303 0.525 -0.023 0.033 0.082 0.271 0.126 0.559
Health -0.052 0.033 0.207 0.066 -0.126 0.206 0.132 -0.023 -0.011 0.080 -0.009 0.229 0.024
Elementary education -0.073 0.029 -0.129 0.066 -0.163 -0.097 -0.015 0.033 -0.011 0.138 0.030 0.060 0.065
Other education -0.018 0.073 -0.051 0.017 -0.059 0.042 0.053 0.082 0.080 0.138 0.096 0.046 0.121
Entertainment -0.063 0.239 -0.044 0.146 -0.103 0.139 0.360 0.271 -0.009 0.030 0.096 0.060 0.335
Hospitals -0.030 0.156 0.030 0.235 -0.135 0.166 0.191 0.126 0.229 0.060 0.046 0.060 0.147
Professional services -0.078 0.395 0.104 0.279 -0.145 0.338 0.564 0.559 0.024 0.065 0.121 0.335 0.147
Source: own calculations using industrial data by county from the year 1980 from the US Census.
C Geographicalversusindustrialinequality
Itiscrucialtounderstandhowspecializationandconcentrationdetermineeach
other.Underaperfectlyevenalocationofresources,therewouldbenoincentives
forspecializationorconcentration,eachlocationwouldproducethesamegoods
proportionaly.FromKrugman[1991],itcanbeinferredthatatzerotransporta-
tioncost,thatwouldalsobethecase.Intherealworld,howeverthereareboth
costsoftransactionandtransportationanddifferencesintheregionaldistribu-
tionoffactorsofproduction.AsexplainedbyBickenbachandBode[2008],both
(industrial)specializationand(geographical)concentrationaccountforthedis-
proportionofadistributionofworkers/firmsacrossasetofexclusivecategories.
Itiscrucialtounderstandthatusingthesamedata,theseindicatorsarefunda-
mentalydifferent:specializationmeasuresthedisproportionofworkersalocated
byindustryholdingregionsconstantwhileavariablemeasuringconcentration
considersregionsandkeepstheindustryconstant.
Formaly,aregionalconcentrationmeasureforfinitesetsofindustries
i∈I{1,..,I} (3)
andregions
r∈R{1,..,R} (4)
let
Lir=Lir:ir∈{IxR} (5)
denotetheemploymentpatternbyindustryandregion,
Lir=Lir:r∈{R} (6)
thedistributionofanindustry(i)employmentacrossregions.Foragivenemploy-
mentdistribution,
Πr=Πr:r∈{R} (7)
andregion-specificweights,
Wr=Wr:r∈{R} (8)
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thedis-proportionalitymeasureisgivenby
RegionalConcentrationWΠi =fm Wr,
Li(r)
Πr (9)
WheretheRCmeasurereflectsafunctionsuchthatregion-specificproportionality
factorsarescaledbytheirweights,forexample,theLocationalGiniCoefficient.
Theseindicatorsdonotdescribeinequalityacrossregions,butinequalityacross
proportions.
Similarly,anindustrialspecializationmeasureforfinitesetsofindustries
i∈{I}{1,..,I} (10)
andregions
r∈{R}{1,..,R} (11)
let
Lir=Lir:ir∈{IxR} (12)
denotetheemploymentpatternbyindustryandregion,
Lr(i)=Lri:i∈{1,..,R} (13)
thedistributionofemploymentinregion(r)acrossindustries.Foragivenemploy-
mentdistribution,
Πi=Πi:i∈{1,..,R} (14)
andindustry-specificweights,
Wi=Wi:∈{1,..,R} (15)
thedis-proportionalitymeasureisgivenby
IndustrialSpecializationWΠr =fm Wi,
Lr(i)
Πi (16)
Inthisfunctionindustry-specificproportionalityfactorsarescaledbytheirweights
suchthattheindexdescribesinequalityacrossindustryproportions.
167
Inthissense,wecanarguethatspecializationandconcentrationindicators
measuredifferentdimensionsofthesameobservation.Thustheymovetogether
Kim[1995],butnotnecessarilyinthesamedirection,asshownbyAigingerand
Davies[2004]. Asusual,theserelationshipsarebetterunderstoodbylooking
atextremecases:saytwoeconomiesarecompletelyspecializedindifferentin-
dustries,asinRicardo’sexample,eachindustrymustbecompletelyconcentrated
withineacheconomy.Conversely,aperfectlyproportionaldistribution(nocon-
centrationatal)wouldimplynospecialization,i.e.notradeinaneconomyful
ofmanyRobinsonsthatprovideforthemselves.Theseindexesshowahalf-blind
portraitofthedistributionofemployment.Tosolvethisdichotomy,Hoover’sIndex
ofLocalization(1935)managestoshowbothmagnitudesinasingleindicator:
Lir=
EirEi
ErE
(17)
Where,Eiristotalemploymentinindustryiforregionr,Eiistotalemploymentfor
industryiforthetotalofthecountry,Eristhetotalofemploymentinregionj,and
Ethetotalemployedonthecountry.Thisindexmeasureswhethertheproportion
ofworkersofanindustryinaregionisproportionaltotheparticipationofthat
areaintheoveralproductionofthecountry.Notethatwhileindustrialspecial-
izationindicatorslayoneindicatorperregionandconcentrationindicators(such
astheLocationalGiniIndexusedinthisinvestigation)giveoneobservationper
industry,Hoover’slocalizationindexshowsanobservationperregionandindustry
(IxR)whichmakesthisvariablemuchmorecompletebutmorecomplicatedto
understandwithoutvisualaid.
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D Accounting for smaller geographical units
Table 10: Locational Gini indexes by state and county, 1980
Sector Industry State County
Primary Agriculture 0.169 0.306
Forestry and fishing 0.267 0.387
Mining 0.313 0.395
Secondary Construction 0.092 0.112
Food and kindred products 0.106 0.197
Textiles 0.279 0.338
Printing and publishing 0.107 0.149
Chemical 0.153 0.265
Furniture and lumber 0.198 0.297
Primary metal industry 0.400 0.316
Fabricated metal industry 0.155 0.209
Machinery (except electrical) 0.199 0.237
Electrical machinery 0.133 0.261
Transportation equipment 0.208 0.295
Tertiary Railroads 0.147 0.261
Trucking and warehousing 0.068 0.117
Other transportation 0.108 0.160
Communications 0.088 0.141
Utilities and sanitary services 0.063 0.123
Wholesale trade 0.051 0.095
General merchandise 0.039 0.087
Food and bakery stores 0.038 0.090
Automotive and gas dealers 0.118 0.061
Eating and drinking 0.052 0.074
Repair services 0.062 0.079
Private households 0.102 0.152
Other personal services 0.069 0.101
Health services 0.060 0.081
Hospitals 0.052 0.103
Elementary education 0.039 0.092
Other education 0.085 0.058
Social services 0.042 0.076
Entertainment 0.121 0.165
Banking and credit agencies 0.058 0.090
Insurance and Real Estate 0.080 0.130
Business services 0.099 0.153
Professional services 0.088 0.139
Public administration 0.083 0.146
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Table 11: Between and within state inequality on employment 1980.
GE(2) County effect State effect
1890 1930 1950 1980 2010 1890 1930 1950 1980 2010 1890 1930 1950 1980 2010
Primary Sector - 0.112 0.142 0.356 0.379 - 0.702 0.659 0.400 0.324 - 0.298 0.341 0.600 0.676
Agriculture 67.447 0.129 0.181 0.522 0.420 0.950 0.692 0.648 0.554 0.680 0.050 0.308 0.352 0.446 0.320
Forestry & fisheries - 0.898 5.503 3.748 6.167 - 0.000 0.838 0.757 0.882 - 1.001 0.162 0.243 0.118
Mining - 0.960 3.183 2.010 3.186 - 0.012 0.808 0.718 0.817 - 0.988 0.192 0.282 0.183
Secondary Sector - - 0.174 0.099 0.193 - - 0.444 0.488 0.190 - - 0.556 0.512 0.810
Construction - - 0.111 0.099 0.226 - - 0.809 0.812 0.885 - - 0.191 0.188 0.114
Manufacturing 1.270 0.973 0.350 0.194 0.334 0.666 0.844 0.543 0.495 0.801 0.334 0.156 0.457 0.505 0.199
Tertiary Sector - 0.023 0.052 0.017 0.043 - 0.764 0.210 0.225 0.251 - 0.236 0.790 0.775 0.749
Utilities & comms. - - 0.535 0.139 2.114 - - 0.871 0.906 0.947 - - 0.129 0.094 0.053
Trade - 0.217 0.052 0.103 0.053 - 0.822 0.784 0.546 0.890 - 0.178 0.216 0.454 0.109
Personal services - - 0.066 0.031 0.069 - - 0.884 0.776 0.812 - - 0.115 0.224 0.188
Repair services - - 0.087 0.094 0.358 - - 0.726 0.216 0.956 - - 0.274 0.216 0.044
Private households - - 0.280 0.310 - - - 0.576 0.662 - - - 0.424 0.338 -
Entertainment - - - 0.561 1.617 - - - 0.746 0.907 - - - 0.254 0.093
Social Services - - - 0.088 0.188 - - - 0.767 0.872 - - - 0.233 0.104
Health Services - - 0.487 0.108 0.142 - - 0.895 0.711 0.089 - - 0.105 0.289 0.108
Education - - 0.155 0.010 2.790 - - 0.895 0.920 0.921 - - 0.105 0.079 0.079
Elementary 0.190 - 0.155 0.102 3.290 0.486 - 0.896 0.922 0.055 0.487 - 0.105 0.078 0.945
Other education - - - 0.277 7.230 - - - 0.935 0.971 - - - 0.065 0.029
Other services - - 0.139 - 0.097 - - 0.708 - 0.880 - - 0.292 - 0.120
FIRE - - 0.226 0.105 0.194 - - 0.805 0.816 0.954 - - 0.195 0.184 0.046
Insurance & Real Estate - - - 0.212 - - - - 0.936 - - - - 0.064 -
Insurance - - - - 0.314 - - - - 0.923 - - - - 0.077
Real Estate - - - - 0.515 - - - - 0.862 - - - - 0.138
Finance and Banking - - - 0.075 0.995 - - - 0.873 0.950 - - - 0.127 0.050
KIBS - - 0.267 0.244 0.366 - - 0.842 0.757 0.852 - - 0.160 0.243 0.148
Business services - - 0.751 0.456 0.480 - - 0.851 0.858 0.889 - - 0.149 0.142 0.112
Professional services - 0.024 0.290 0.261 0.541 - 0.001 0.864 0.617 0.856 - 0.999 0.136 0.383 0.144
Public Administration - 0.069 0.457 0.235 0.275 - 0.004 0.752 0.762 0.852 - 0.996 0.248 0.238 0.148
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 5: GE(2) geographical group decomposition by industry
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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E Location coefficients (HLI)
Location indexes are derived as the relative share of employment devoted to a
sector in a specific county, relative to the contribution of that sector in the national
economy. It represents each of the points in the Locational Lorenz Curve, as in
Krugman [1991]. The following graph shows the long term pattern of geographical
concentration on the employment records of sectors and several sub-sectors using
counties as a unit of analysis. In accordance with Desmet and Fafchamps [2006]’s
results, knowledge Intensive sectors are surpassing the agglomeration records of
manufacturing since the 1980s.
Figure 6: Long-term Locational Gini coefficients
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
These Locational Gini coefficients come from the area between the analogue
Locational Lorenz Curve and the perfect proportion line (situation in which a sec-
tor’s employees are allocated in proportion to population given the national share
of that sector). Figure 7 illustrates the case of mining and business services for
the year 1980 and show that the mining sector is much more unequal than busi-
ness services by county in the whole territory of the US: this means that most of
the counties do not have or have very a low participation rate of employment in
the business service economy. There are many counties that have a high share of
employment devoted to mining and many that have none.
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Figure 7: Lorenz Curves, 1980
(a) MINING (b) HEALTH
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
An alternative way to present this information is by taking each of the points
in the Lorenz Curve, which is the share of the sector’s employment in each county
relative to the national share, and plotting them on a choropleth map. Figure
8 describes the observations from the agricultural sector for 1980, where most
counties in the centre of the country show an extremely higher than proportional
share of agricultural employment relative to the national values. Figure 18 shows
the observations for location coefficients for KIBS in the years 1950 and 1980,
used as an independent variable in several regressions of this study. Both figures
show that a few counties account for most of the Business Service employment
while the rest buy services from them.
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Figure 8: Location coefficients by state and county - Agriculture, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census of Agriculture data.
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Figure 9: Location coefficients by state and county - Mining, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 10: Location coefficients by state and county - Railroads, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 11: Location coefficients by state and county - Utilities, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 12: Location coefficients by state and county - Elementary Education, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
178
Figure 13: Location coefficients by state and county - Other Education, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 14: Location coefficients by state and county - Insurance, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 15: Location coefficients by state and county - Entertainment, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 16: Location coefficients by state and county - Business Services, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 17: Location coefficients by state and county - Professional Services, 1980
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Figure 18: Location coefficients by county - KIBS, 1950 and 2010
Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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F Sources, methods and calculations for Market Po-
tential and Distance-Weighted Total GDP sum
The concept of Market Potential has been derived from the framework of geogra-
phers and used on several occasions as a measure of comparison of market size
of different regions based on its location. It considers the potential demand that
could arise from trading partners weighed by the economic distance to the subject
location. This research also relies on the Distance Weighed Total GDP sum which
is, in practice, computed in the same way.
The 30 countries used as trading partners of the US are based on the top im-
porters on each benchmark years reported by the World Trade Organization and
on the historical data availability on GDP obtained fromMaddison [2010].4 Mayer
and Zignago [2006] provide information on the geodesic bilateral distances from
counties to each of the countries that are used as commercial partners of the US.
The latitudes and longitudes of the centroid of each polygon on all US counties and
its area are available from and US Census Bureau. A dummy variable for county
coasts was built to account for international transportation costs and was obtained
following the criteria of the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration of
the USA Department. Bilateral distances have been obtained from latitude and
longitude coordinates available from TIGER (US Census Bureau).
GDP by state for the years 2010, 1980, 1950 and 1930 have been obtained
from the original records of the Internal Revenue Service, that hold the original
documents from Statistics of Income reports for 1930, 1950 and 1980 and from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis for 2010. These original data were presented
in nominal dollars and had to be transformed to real dollars using CPI deflator
calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
4Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, Venezuela and, since 1950, Israel, Singa-
pore and South Korea.
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Additionally, the transport costs structure has been derived from the informa-
tion presented in several sources. International transport costs have been obtained
from the long-term evolution presented inMohammed andWilliamson [2004] and
Jacks et al. [2008], the average bilateral costs presented by Golub and Tomasik
[2008] for bilateral trade costs between US and OECD countries. Internal trans-
port costs have been obtained from the data presented by Harris [1954] and the
Statistical Abstracts for each year’s economic census.
The cost structure has been calculated as an ad-valorem tariff equivalent that
follows this structure:5
Table 12: Trade costs
1930 1950 1980 2010
INTERIOR
Trucking
0-80 Kms 0.037 0.029 0.017 0.004
80-160 Kms 0.049 0.039 0.023 0.006
160-480 Kms 0.061 0.049 0.029 0.007
480-708 Kms 0.109 0.087 0.052 0.013
Railroads
708-1780 Kms 0.139 0.136 0.119 0.102
more than 1780 Kms 0.215 0.223 0.196 0.168
INTERNATIONAL 0.292 0.365 0.156 0.146
Ad-valorem tax-equivalent per potential transported dollar. Source: see
text.
Market potential between international trading partners and counties has been
obtained by designating domestic nodes as Market Potential calculations are usu-
ally done (Martínez-Galarraga [2014] and Missiaia [2014]). In this case, the pro-
cedure is closer to the one followed by Jacks et al. [2008], by choosing closest
distance from each county to any of the top 100 biggest cities from 1930 to 1980
or the Standard Statistical Metropolitan Areas in 2010 as the most probable con-
nection of trade.
5Golub and Tomasik [2008] show that the cost of transportation by kilogram of goods trans-
ported is very similar to the cost of transportation by dollar.
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Figure 19: Market Potential components, 1980
Source: from author’s own calculations.
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Figure 20: Per Capita Market Potential components, 1980
Source: from author’s own calculations.
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G HO and MP regression control tests
Table 13: Determinants of production with interactions
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
Land 8.258 -0.035 -0.500 -0.207 -0.611
(5.926) (0.590) (0.546) (0.277) (0.572)
Agrarian -1.691 0.226 0.227
(1.331) (0.240) (0.085)
Artisans -5.917 -3.667 4.555* 1.160 6.277**
(24.714) (3.630) (1.980) (0.900) (2.266)
Unskilled -45.146* 9.145*** 1.492 0.309 -7.191*
(19.717) (2.474) (2.161) (0.911) (3.180)
Professionals 32.563 -3.739 -2.304
(17.779) (3.421) (2.230)
Clerical 7.453 -0.813 -1.979***
(5.131) (0.770) (0.516)
Capital Stock 9.250 -1.751 -1.892
(24.986) (2.185) (1.643)
Capital*Professional -13.704 40.405**
(12.800) (17.037)
Capital*Clerical -10.403 -45.589**
(18.779) (13.897)
Clerical*Professional 15.000 18.430
(12.902) (10.451)
log TOTAL MP -0.371*** 0.041** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.021***
(0.072) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 8.997*** -0.180 0.398*** 0.207** 0.445***
(1.257) (0.276) (0.078) (0.083) (0.113)
r-squared 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.15
N 11918 11423 11933 9272 12294
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Independent variables: proportion
of factor endowments by state and log of Total Market Potential by county. Coefficients from
two-way fixed effects regression. Standard errors in brackets under the coefficients, where (*),
(**) and (***) correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1%
confidence level. Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Table 14: Heckscher-Ohlin and Local Market Potential
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
Land 4.528 -0.269 0.043 0.027 0.428
(4.273) (0.523) (0.424) (0.357) (0.558)
Agrarian -0.123 0.092 0.147 0.302
(2.054) (0.270) (0.125) (0.213)
Artisans 0.905 -2.217 2.885** 1.605 4.677***
(17.731) (4.178) (1.219) (1.410) (0.954)
Unskilled -29.274 7.359 0.772 -0.423 -7.08***
(31.693) (4.301) (2.712) (1.086) (2.041)
Professionals 14.370 -3.029 -0.695
(23.032) (4.258) (2.618)
Clerical -1.041 -0.737 -0.991***
(7.196) (1.252) (0.276)
Capital Stock 20.974 -2.451 -2.840**
(18.270) (2.500) (1.175)
Capital*Professional -36.517 26.636
(18.965) (22.182)
Capital*Clerical -39.603**
(19.056)
Clerical*professional 20.189** 29.796**
(8.686) (11.189)
Log Self-Potential -1.176*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.078*** 0.120***
(0.174) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 18.855*** -0.653* -0.508*** -0.473** -0.870***
(2.249) (0.294) (0.144) (0.145) (0.177)
r-squared 0.46 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.29
N 11898 11403 11913 8940 12269
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Independent variables: proportion
of factor endowments by state and County Local Market Potential. Coefficients from two-way
fixed effects regression (year and division). Standard errors in brackets under the coefficients,
where (*), (**) and (***) correspond to significantly different from zero coefficients at 10%,
5% and 1% confidence level. Source: own calculations from US Census data.
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Table 15: IV regression results with HO and MP
Variable Primary Secondary Tertiary Personal KIBS
Land 4.670*** -0.040 -0.748*** 1.138*** 0.320
(1.724) (0.295) (0.202) (0.174) (0.263)
Agrarian -2.813*** 0.837*** 0.419*** 0.178** -0.146
(0.848) (0.141) (0.103) (0.082) (0.133)
Artisans 28.526** -1.002 2.328* -1.544 -5.860***
(11.224) (1.928) (1.200) (1.046) (1.770)
Clerical -1.350 -0.980 -1.967*** 1.313*** 4.055***
(3.792) (0.753) (0.474) (0.406) (0.781)
Professionals 9.487 -7.286*** -4.652*** 5.821*** 4.739***
(9.598) (1.492) (1.073) (0.866) (1.144)
Unskilled -61.855*** 15.030*** 7.101*** -3.066*** -6.148***
(9.032) (1.760) (1.165) (0.973) (1.449)
Capital Stock 28.826*** -7.156*** -2.625*** -3.794*** 2.152***
(5.800) (0.873) (0.557) (0.521) (0.811)
Log TMP -0.958*** 0.079*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.067***
(0.028) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Constant 26.591*** -0.653*** -0.294*** -0.419*** -1.002***
(0.688) (0.136) (0.082) (0.074) (0.106)
r-squared 0.30 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.04
N 8832 8838 8843 8835 8779
Dependent variable: Hoover’s index of localization by county. Independent variables: Logarithm
of Market Potential by county, Shares of HO factors of production. Instruments: Logarithm of
Foreign Market Potential and lagged Shares of HO mobile factors of production. Coefficients
from IV regression with year and region fixed effects, where (*), (**) and (***) correspond
to significantly different from zero coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level. Standard
errors clustered by region reported under the coefficients. Source: own calculations from US
Census data.
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